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Event Notification Report for April 17, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/16/1999 - 04/17/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3560035601

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35600
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVE SLAGER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/17/1999
Notification Time: 11:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/1999
Event Time: 09:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
Event Text
FAILURE OF A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE RETURN ISOLATION VALVE TO MEET MAXIMUM INSERVICE TEST STROKE-TIME REQUIREMENTS

While performing quarterly valve stroke-time testing on Unit 3, a primary containment air sample return isolation valve exceeded its specified maximum stroke-time limit. The sample return line was isolated in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.D for primary containment isolation valves, and this action satisfied the 4-hour limiting condition for operation action statement requirements. The second in-line primary containment isolation system valve remains operable.

The licensee stated that no other valves failed to meet the maximum stroke-time limits. The licensee also stated that, during a test that was performed last month, the valve in question was identified as being in the 'Alert' time range for inservice test timing requirements and that it was being tested per the required increased testing frequency. Corrective actions are being initiated, and troubleshooting activities are in progress.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

*** UPDATE ON 04/23/99 AT 0443 FROM GADBOIS TO GOULD *** RETRACTION

UPON FURTHER REVIEW, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS EVENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A REPORTABLE CONDITION SINCE THE PENETRATION HAD AN OPERABLE REDUNDANT VALVE WHICH COULD HAVE ISOLATED THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION. THEREFORE, THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION.

THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE R3DO (LEACH) WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35601
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON ROLAND
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 04/18/1999
Notification Time: 01:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/1999
Event Time: 22:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAN HOLODY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
UNIT 1 HAD LESS THAN THREE OPERABLE DIESEL GENERATORS FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

During restoration from loss of coolant accident/loss of offsite power (LOCA/LOOP) Division II testing on Unit 2, which is shutdown, operators inadvertently placed the 'D' Diesel Generator Synchronization Auto Control Select Switch to Bypass with the 'B' Diesel Generator already in Bypass per plant procedures. This action requires the diesel be declared inoperable. The action was immediately identified, and the switch on the 'D' Diesel was returned to Normal. The total time that two diesel generators were inoperable was less than 1 minute. This left Unit 1 with only the 'A' and 'C' Diesel Generators operable.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

******************** UPDATE AT 1720 ON 04/26/99 FROM JEFF HELSEL TO TROCINE ********************

The licensee is retracting this event notification.

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"Diesel Generator 'D' remained operable and fully capable of performing its intended safety functions on 04/17/99 at approximately 2214 when the 43SYN switch was placed in bypass. This occurred during the performance of Unit 2 Division II LOCA/LOOP testing. At the time of this condition, the diesel was running in the emergency (isochronous) mode of operation supplying the 2D [emergency safeguards system (ESS)] bus. Placing the Synchronization Auto Control Select Switch (43SYN) to bypass enables manual control of both the speed and voltage setpoints to enable paralleling back to offsite power. It does not place the diesel in the droop mode. With the 43SYN in normal, a fixed resistance for frequency and a fixed motor-operated potentiometer resistance for voltage is input into the circuitry. Placing the switch in bypass maintains these same resistance values and enables circuits for manually adjusting frequency and voltage. As long as manipulation of the controlling switches does not occur, the values remain at their initial setting. Post-event interviews with the [plant control operator] in control revealed [that] no adjustments were made. That is to say that frequency will remain at 60 Hz and will return to 60 Hz following picking up or shedding of loads. The same is true of voltage. Initial voltage was 4,250 when the switch was in normal and remained at 4,250 following placing in bypass. Voltage will return to the initial value following load pickup or shedding. The transient recovery time for both frequency and voltage is expected to be identical for both bypass and normal positions under these specific conditions. This conclusion of operability is based on a detailed review of system circuitry, system design features and a review of 2D ESS bus voltage data at the time of the occurrence."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Anderson).