Event Notification Report for April 07, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/06/1999 - 04/07/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
35559355533555435555
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35559
Rep Org: ILLINOIS DEPT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY
Licensee: MEDI-PHYSICS
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01052-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SANZA (EMAIL)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: MEDI-PHYSICS
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01052-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SANZA (EMAIL)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 04/08/1999
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/1999
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
CONTAMINATED PACKAGE RECEIVED BY PHARMACY
The following information was received via email from the State of Illinois:
"On April 7, 1999, Medi-Physics Pharmacy (IL-01052-01) in Chicago reported that they received a package with removable contamination of 265,000 cpm. The package was picked up and transported by the pharmacy's driver from West Suburban Hospital in Oak Park, IL (IL-01520-01). The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety is conducting an investigation at the shipper's facility in Oak Park into the cause of the event. The Illinois equivalent to 20.1906(d) is 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.960(d). The contaminant was Tc-99m."
The following information was received via email from the State of Illinois:
"On April 7, 1999, Medi-Physics Pharmacy (IL-01052-01) in Chicago reported that they received a package with removable contamination of 265,000 cpm. The package was picked up and transported by the pharmacy's driver from West Suburban Hospital in Oak Park, IL (IL-01520-01). The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety is conducting an investigation at the shipper's facility in Oak Park into the cause of the event. The Illinois equivalent to 20.1906(d) is 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.960(d). The contaminant was Tc-99m."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35553
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TODD GRANLUND
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TODD GRANLUND
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/07/1999
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/1999
Event Time: 12:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/1999
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/1999
Event Time: 12:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
- A single failure could cause both trains of the switchgear heat removal system to be inoperable -
A new potential single failure scenario has been identified on the switchgear heat removal system, System VX. Damper #1(2)VX22Y is the System VX exhaust air shaft isolation damper. This damper is a normally open, fail open damper. This damper is closed if the System VX heat recovery fans are running. If a single active failure were to occur, a short in the motor would drive the damper closed. It is possible that the Division 2 and RPS MG set rooms could pressurize. These rooms are adjacent to the control room envelope. If these rooms pressurize, it is possible that the 1/8 inch minimum positive differential pressure required between the VC/VE room and the adjacent VX rooms may not be maintained. This would result in both VC/VE room switchgear heat removal system trains being inoperable.
Long term corrective actions are being determined.
Damper #1(2)VX22Y is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Unit 2 is currently in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) in a Refueling Outage.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
A new potential single failure scenario has been identified on the switchgear heat removal system, System VX. Damper #1(2)VX22Y is the System VX exhaust air shaft isolation damper. This damper is a normally open, fail open damper. This damper is closed if the System VX heat recovery fans are running. If a single active failure were to occur, a short in the motor would drive the damper closed. It is possible that the Division 2 and RPS MG set rooms could pressurize. These rooms are adjacent to the control room envelope. If these rooms pressurize, it is possible that the 1/8 inch minimum positive differential pressure required between the VC/VE room and the adjacent VX rooms may not be maintained. This would result in both VC/VE room switchgear heat removal system trains being inoperable.
Long term corrective actions are being determined.
Damper #1(2)VX22Y is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Unit 2 is currently in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) in a Refueling Outage.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35554
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARY BETH DePUYDT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARY BETH DePUYDT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/07/1999
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/1999
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/1999
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/1999
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
- Unit 1 and 2 EDG starting air system air compressors not safety related seismic category 1 -
This report is a four-hour notification in accordance 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), of a condition which was found while both reactors were shutdown, which, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, could have resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition.
The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) system at Cook is comprised of four EDGs, two per unit. The EDGs are designed to start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection signal and/or a loss of offsite power signal and be ready to accept loads within 10 seconds of receiving the start signal. The starting air system supplies compressed air for starting the EDGs, and each EDG has its own system consisting of two redundant starting air trains. Each train has one receiver of sufficient volume for at least two EDG start attempts when pressurized to 220 psig. The starting air system also provides compressed air for the starting air supply valve actuators, the diesel engine control system and the aftercooler cooling water regulating valves. While the starting air receivers and piping are safety related seismic category 1, the compressors are not safety related nor are they seismically mounted.
A potential deficiency in the design of the EDG starting air system has been identified. If the starting air compressors were lost during a seismic event, the ability of the starting air system could be impaired to the point that the control air pressure necessary for the engine control system could not be maintained. It is postulated that leakage from the system would result in a loss of air receiver pressure of approximately 25 psi in a 12 hour period. Based on preoperational test data, with a starting air receiver pressure of 132 to 188 psig, the control air pressure could drop below the critical value of 65 psig in less than two days. Therefore, it is possible that the EDG would not be able to sustain long term operability without the starting air compressors.
Evaluation of this potential design deficiency is ongoing, as well as research into the licensing/design basis of the starting air system. Both units are in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) with all four EDGs declared inoperable, but functional. The EDGs were already inoperable due to HFA relay concerns, and will remain inoperable until this problem is resolved. With all four EDGs inoperable, the plant has additional offsite power lines to back up normal offsite power sources. This condition was discovered during an extended plant system readiness review and has existed since initial plant criticality. The Licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
This report is a four-hour notification in accordance 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), of a condition which was found while both reactors were shutdown, which, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, could have resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition.
The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) system at Cook is comprised of four EDGs, two per unit. The EDGs are designed to start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection signal and/or a loss of offsite power signal and be ready to accept loads within 10 seconds of receiving the start signal. The starting air system supplies compressed air for starting the EDGs, and each EDG has its own system consisting of two redundant starting air trains. Each train has one receiver of sufficient volume for at least two EDG start attempts when pressurized to 220 psig. The starting air system also provides compressed air for the starting air supply valve actuators, the diesel engine control system and the aftercooler cooling water regulating valves. While the starting air receivers and piping are safety related seismic category 1, the compressors are not safety related nor are they seismically mounted.
A potential deficiency in the design of the EDG starting air system has been identified. If the starting air compressors were lost during a seismic event, the ability of the starting air system could be impaired to the point that the control air pressure necessary for the engine control system could not be maintained. It is postulated that leakage from the system would result in a loss of air receiver pressure of approximately 25 psi in a 12 hour period. Based on preoperational test data, with a starting air receiver pressure of 132 to 188 psig, the control air pressure could drop below the critical value of 65 psig in less than two days. Therefore, it is possible that the EDG would not be able to sustain long term operability without the starting air compressors.
Evaluation of this potential design deficiency is ongoing, as well as research into the licensing/design basis of the starting air system. Both units are in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) with all four EDGs declared inoperable, but functional. The EDGs were already inoperable due to HFA relay concerns, and will remain inoperable until this problem is resolved. With all four EDGs inoperable, the plant has additional offsite power lines to back up normal offsite power sources. This condition was discovered during an extended plant system readiness review and has existed since initial plant criticality. The Licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35555
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY KILBY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY KILBY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/07/1999
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/1999
Event Time: 14:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/1999
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/1999
Event Time: 14:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
The licensee notified the National Marine Fisheries and the NRC Resident Inspector that while cleaning the plant service water forebay, they discovered a dead seal.