Event Notification Report for April 06, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/05/1999 - 04/06/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3554735548355493555035551
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35547
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RUSS GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RUSS GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 06:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 01:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 06:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 01:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
TOM STETKA (R4)
TOM STETKA (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INADVERTENT INITIATION OF DIVISION 1 STANDBY SERVICE WATER DURING PERFORMANCE OF COLD SHUTDOWN VALVE STROKE TESTING
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 0150 [CDT], on April 6, 1999, with the plant in Mode 5 (Refueling), Division One Standby Service Water initiated due to Reactor Component Cooling Water low pressure."
"The low-pressure condition was inadvertently created during the performance of cold shutdown valve stroke testing."
"The Division One Standby Service Water System is not required to be OPERABLE in the current plant MODE; however, the system was in standby and responded as expected. Operators returned the system to a standby line up."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 0150 [CDT], on April 6, 1999, with the plant in Mode 5 (Refueling), Division One Standby Service Water initiated due to Reactor Component Cooling Water low pressure."
"The low-pressure condition was inadvertently created during the performance of cold shutdown valve stroke testing."
"The Division One Standby Service Water System is not required to be OPERABLE in the current plant MODE; however, the system was in standby and responded as expected. Operators returned the system to a standby line up."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35548
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DON KOSLOFF
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DON KOSLOFF
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/1999
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
DISCOVERY OF THE POTENTIAL COMPROMISE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.
At 0700 EDT on 04/06/99, a potential compromise of safeguards information was discovered. Immediate compensatory actions were taken upon discovery. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details and for licensee contact information.)
This issue was reported as a 1-hour event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1), Appendix G.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION 1552 EDT 4/8/1999 FROM DON KOSLOFF TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
The licensee has retracted this notification. Contact HOO for additional details. Notified R3DO (Burgess).
At 0700 EDT on 04/06/99, a potential compromise of safeguards information was discovered. Immediate compensatory actions were taken upon discovery. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details and for licensee contact information.)
This issue was reported as a 1-hour event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1), Appendix G.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION 1552 EDT 4/8/1999 FROM DON KOSLOFF TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
The licensee has retracted this notification. Contact HOO for additional details. Notified R3DO (Burgess).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35549
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM KOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM KOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 10:27 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 09:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 10:27 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 09:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF A VULNERABILITY THAT COULD HAVE ALLOWED UNDETECTED ACCESS TO A VITAL AREA
The licensee discovered a safeguards system degradation related to a vital area door. Compensatory actions were taken upon discovery. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
This issue was reported as a 1-hour report event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1).
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
The licensee discovered a safeguards system degradation related to a vital area door. Compensatory actions were taken upon discovery. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
This issue was reported as a 1-hour report event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1).
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35550
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALAN HALL
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALAN HALL
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 11:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 11:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
VERY SMALL THROUGH WALL LEAKS ON ECCS SUCTION LINES REQUIRE PLANT SHUTDOWN
While the mechanical people were making a normal plant walkdown, they discovered very small through wall leaks on both emergency core cooling system (ECCS) suction lines. The leaks are downstream of the motor operated isolation valves just after the splitter for the connection to the refueling water tank. Both leaks were discovered due to boric acid buildup on the '2A' and '2B' ECCS suction lines. The plant has entered Technical Specifications 3.5.2, 3.5.3, and 3.0.3 which requires plant shutdown to cold shutdown. The plant is in the process of shutting down and expects to be shutdown until the problems are corrected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE at 1729EDT on 4/6/99 from Alan Hall to S. Sandin * * *
"Following discussion with NRR and Region II if the as-found condition of the low pressure piping, FPL has performed an OPERABILITY evaluation of the flawed piping in accordance with Generic Letters 91-18 and 90-05 and concluded that the ECCS piping is OPERABLE. FPL exited the LCOs and secured the downpower of unit 2 as of 1640 on 4/6/99 following Facility Review Group and management review of the OPERABILITY evaluation. As discussed with the NRC, FPL will submit a relief request in a timely manner."
Unit 2 is currently at 28% power. The licensee intends to increase and hold power at 50% for grid stabilization. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Rodgers).
While the mechanical people were making a normal plant walkdown, they discovered very small through wall leaks on both emergency core cooling system (ECCS) suction lines. The leaks are downstream of the motor operated isolation valves just after the splitter for the connection to the refueling water tank. Both leaks were discovered due to boric acid buildup on the '2A' and '2B' ECCS suction lines. The plant has entered Technical Specifications 3.5.2, 3.5.3, and 3.0.3 which requires plant shutdown to cold shutdown. The plant is in the process of shutting down and expects to be shutdown until the problems are corrected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE at 1729EDT on 4/6/99 from Alan Hall to S. Sandin * * *
"Following discussion with NRR and Region II if the as-found condition of the low pressure piping, FPL has performed an OPERABILITY evaluation of the flawed piping in accordance with Generic Letters 91-18 and 90-05 and concluded that the ECCS piping is OPERABLE. FPL exited the LCOs and secured the downpower of unit 2 as of 1640 on 4/6/99 following Facility Review Group and management review of the OPERABILITY evaluation. As discussed with the NRC, FPL will submit a relief request in a timely manner."
Unit 2 is currently at 28% power. The licensee intends to increase and hold power at 50% for grid stabilization. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Rodgers).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35551
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB PELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB PELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES
DAVID GRAVES
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK DETERMINED INOPERABLE DURING LAST REFUELING OUTAGE
"On 10/7/98 during the 2RE06 Refueling outage in Unit 2, The Temporary Modification used to return power to the Reactor Containment Building (RCB) personnel airlock did not adequately cover all components necessary to enable the Instrument Air (IA) Supply Solenoids to be OPENED (IA is a required support system used to pressurize the airlock door seals). Therefore, instrument air could not be supplied to the airlock seals within 30 minutes as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4.b. TS 3.9.4 required one airlock door capable of being closed within 30 minutes. During this time period, when the airlock door was inoperable core alterations were performed. This ACTION was in violation of TS 3.9.4.b.
"This condition is being reported under Section 2G of the Operating License (NPF-80)."
This condition was discovered while implementing the same Temporary Modification on Unit 1. The licensee is conducting a root cause investigation following which appropriate corrective actions will be identified.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 10/7/98 during the 2RE06 Refueling outage in Unit 2, The Temporary Modification used to return power to the Reactor Containment Building (RCB) personnel airlock did not adequately cover all components necessary to enable the Instrument Air (IA) Supply Solenoids to be OPENED (IA is a required support system used to pressurize the airlock door seals). Therefore, instrument air could not be supplied to the airlock seals within 30 minutes as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4.b. TS 3.9.4 required one airlock door capable of being closed within 30 minutes. During this time period, when the airlock door was inoperable core alterations were performed. This ACTION was in violation of TS 3.9.4.b.
"This condition is being reported under Section 2G of the Operating License (NPF-80)."
This condition was discovered while implementing the same Temporary Modification on Unit 1. The licensee is conducting a root cause investigation following which appropriate corrective actions will be identified.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.