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Event Notification Report for March 30, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/29/1999 - 03/30/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
355263552735531355323553335534

General Information or Other
Event Number: 35526
Rep Org: US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Licensee: IDAHO NATL ENGINEERING LAB
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS   State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB TUNE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/30/1999
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/1999
Event Time: 08:24 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
Event Text
SECURITY EVENT INVOLVING THREE MILE ISLAND SHIPMENT

A Lockheed-Martin employee left INTEC (Idaho Nuclear Technology Environmental Complex ) building 1774 to retrieve a tool. The individual did not notify security personnel before reentering the area, as required by procedure. The individual was detained and interviewed by security personnel before being released to return to work. The caller stated that this event was reportable because a shipment of TMI material was underway from TAN (Test Area North) to the INTEC.


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35527
Rep Org: ALT & WITZIG ENGR. INC.
Licensee: ALT & WITZIG ENGR. INC.
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS   State: IN
County:
License #: 13-18685-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHIL DILK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/30/1999
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/1999
Event Time: 06:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
Event Text
CPN GAUGE STOLEN FROM THE BACK OF A COMPANY PICKUP TRUCK IN FRONT OF A EMPLOYEE'S RESIDENCE.

Alt & Witzig Engineering Incorporated located in Indianapolis, Indiana, reported that one of their CPN gauges was reported to them from one of their employees as having been stolen from the back of a company pickup truck. The serial number of the CPN gauge is MD40401995, and the model number of the gauge is MC1. The gauge contained 10 mCi of Cesium-137 and 50 mCi of Americium-241/Beryllium. At approximately 1300 hours on 03/29/99, a company employee arrived at his residence in South Bend in a company owned pickup truck with a CPN gauge triple locked down in the open bed of the pickup truck. This morning around 0630 hours, the person discovered that the CPN gauge was missing from the back of the pickup truck, but the gauge case was still in the back of the truck. The licensee notified the local police, local radio stations, and local television stations that a CPN gauge had been stolen from the back of one of their company pickup trucks. The licensee has already posted fliers with a picture of the stolen CPN gauge. The licensee has also offered a reward for the return of the gauge.

The CPN gauge was in a triple lock position with the case being secured to the bed of the truck with a padlock, and a lock was placed on the other half of the case. In addition, the handle was in its locked position.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35531
Facility: WASHINGTON NUCLEAR
Region: 4     State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MIKE KELLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/30/1999
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/1999
Event Time: 11:42 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
A licensee employee was confirmed positive during a Fitness-For-Duty test. The individual's unescorted access was terminated. (Contact the NRC operations officer for details.)

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35532
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1     State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: D PITRUSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/30/1999
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/1999
Event Time: 09:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
FIRE PROTECTION VALVE FOUND CLOSED

At 0910 hours on 03/30/99, Fire Protection Valve, V-9-151 (Supply Valve for Deluge System 4A - Lower Cable Spreading Room) was found closed. This valve being in the closed position was determined to be reportable (24 hour) as a violation of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of the Facility Operating License.

This valve being closed would render 1/2 of the cable spreading rooms without fire protection. The licensee thinks that valve V-9-151 was not reopened after the performance of a surveillance test of the Fire Protection system. At the present time, the licensee is looking for the last surveillance test performed on the Fire Protection system which manipulated valve V-9-151 to see if the procedure closed and then reopened the valve.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35533
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: ED BURCHFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/30/1999
Notification Time: 20:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/1999
Event Time: 20:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/15/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (EOPs) AND ABNORMAL PROCEDURES (AP) DO NOT PROVIDE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE REGARDING NECESSARY OPERATOR ACTIONS SHOULD LOW PRESSURE INJECTION (LPI) HEADER FLOW INDICATION BE LOST. INTERIM GUIDANCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO ON-SHIFT OPERATORS TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM.

During table top review and validation of EOPs, it was discovered that plant procedures did not provide that necessary guidance to ensure adequate operator action will occur during a certain scenario. A review of the EOPs has identified a scenario that is not adequately addressed in the procedure and therefore could place the Oconee Units outside their design basis. Specifically, the EOP requires throttling LPI header flow during a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) to protect against potential pump runout. If flow cannot be maintained, the EOP directs the operator to Abnormal Procedures (AP) AP/1/A/1700/007, "Loss of LPI System." The EOP (EOP Section 505) and AP do not provide specific guidance regarding the necessary operator actions should LPI header flow indication be lost. This could occur on a subsequent loss of a specific power supply. Failure to take appropriate actions during a LOCA with this specific single failure could result in operators opening the LPI pump header cross connect valves (LP-9 and LP-10) per existing procedures, resulting in the potential loss of both LPI pumps due to runout. Interim guidance to close the valve of the affected Train (Train "A" is LP-17 and Train "B" is LP-18) so runout will not occur has been provided to the operators to address this potential deficiency, and the EOP is currently being revised.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE at 1120 on 04/15/99 from Reene Gambrell to Jolliffe * * *

After further investigation of this event, Duke Power Company has determined that there is no credible single failure that would result in the loss of the safety and non-safety flow instrumentation on an LPI header. Therefore, adequate instrumentation was available for the operators to successfully mitigate a Core Flood Line Break accident, and this event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72. Thus, the licensee desires to retract this event.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Operations Officer notified the R2DO Pierce Skinner.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35534
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/31/1999
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
DON COOL, EO (NMSS)
Event Text
- NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -

Four drums containing seal parts in the C-746-Q1 building were discovered to have been improperly characterized and labeled/treated as NCS Spacing Exempt in violation of NCSA WM-O. The drum weights were discovered to be outside the valid calibration range of the instrument, resulting in an invalid mass measurement for characterization. The purpose of using a valid calibration range is to ensure that fissile waste will not be improperly classified as NCS Spacing Exempt.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Double contingency was not maintained because the drums were not properly characterized. The control relied upon for verification of U-235 mass was violated. However, previous NDA measurements of the drums, performed as a single unit, demonstrated an always safe single unit mass. Although the safety significance is low, a control for double contingency was lost.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two controls on mass. The first leg of double contingency is based on limiting the mass of uranium that is accumulated. NCSA KY/S-253 states that it is unlikely that heterogeneous waste will contain greater than 120 grams U-235 per drum. The drums involved contain seal parts and would be considered heterogeneous waste; therefore this control was maintained.

The second leg of double contingency relies upon maintaining mass in NCS spacing exempt drums to less than 120 grams of U-235. WM-01 controls mass by requiring a drum monitor analysis to verify that each drum has less than 120 grams of U-235 prior to handling as NCS spacing exempt. This control was violated because the drums were not characterized properly. Therefore, it cannot be shown that the 120 gram limit was maintained. Since one of the two controls on the mass process condition was violated, double contingency was not maintained.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Controlled parameter is the establishment of two controls on mass.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
The amount has been conservatively measured as less than 200 pounds of U-235, which is significantly less than 600 pounds of U-235 at 2.0 wt %.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
Loss of mass control. The process relies on two controls on mass to assure double contingency. Inadequate drum monitor analysis resulted in the loss of one of the controls.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The drums were moved to a secure area with proper spacing. Additional corrective actions will be provided via remediation guide NCS-RG-99-008.

This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a and NRC Bulletin 91-01, Supplement 1 Report.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-1832; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-1999-023.