Event Notification Report for March 24, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/23/1999 - 03/24/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3550335504355053550635507
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35503
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: GREGORY SCOTT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: GREGORY SCOTT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/24/1999
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/1999
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
Discovery of false information provided by a contract employee granted access to the site.
Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Call HOO for more information.
Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Call HOO for more information.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35504
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: THERESA MELTER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: THERESA MELTER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/24/1999
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/1999
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT SECURITY REPORT -
PLANT SECURITY COMPUTER SYSTEM DEGRADATION. COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
PLANT SECURITY COMPUTER SYSTEM DEGRADATION. COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35505
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/24/1999
Notification Time: 22:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 13:26 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/1999
Notification Time: 22:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 13:26 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
- Power to C-746-Q Building Criticality Accident Alarm System lost when a bird contacted an overhead electrical line -
At 1326 CST on 03/24/99, air circuit breaker #23B5B tripped due to a bird contacting an energized portion of the overhead electrical line. As a result of this breaker tripping, power was lost to the C-746-Q Building Criticality Accident Alarm (CAA) System beacons. CAA System audibility for the C-746-Q Building was lost,. However, the breaker tripping did not affect the detectability of the CAA System. Power to the C-746-Q Building was restored and the CAA System was declared operable at 1337 CST.
The inaudibility of the CAA Systems is reportable as a 24-hour event report per 10CFR76.120(c)(2). (Paducah Problem Report No ATR-99-1691; Paducah Event Report No PAD-1999-022).
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
At 1326 CST on 03/24/99, air circuit breaker #23B5B tripped due to a bird contacting an energized portion of the overhead electrical line. As a result of this breaker tripping, power was lost to the C-746-Q Building Criticality Accident Alarm (CAA) System beacons. CAA System audibility for the C-746-Q Building was lost,. However, the breaker tripping did not affect the detectability of the CAA System. Power to the C-746-Q Building was restored and the CAA System was declared operable at 1337 CST.
The inaudibility of the CAA Systems is reportable as a 24-hour event report per 10CFR76.120(c)(2). (Paducah Problem Report No ATR-99-1691; Paducah Event Report No PAD-1999-022).
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35506
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID H. HANKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID H. HANKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/25/1999
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 21:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/26/1999
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 21:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Division 3 Diesel Generator declared inoperable.
HPCS (Division 3) EDG oil level was discovered to be out of specification low during normal rounds. The Division 3 EDG was conservatively declared inoperable until further evaluations can be performed to determine final disposition of oil leakage from its inspection cover. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.8.1 (72 hour limiting conditioning of operation). All Emergency Core Cooling systems including HPCS are fully operable. Earlier in the day an undervoltage spike on the electrical grid caused the Division 3 EDG to start. The diesel was properly secured.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED ON 3/26/99 AT 1215 EST BY JAMES OWENS TO FANGIE JONES * * *
After further evaluation, the licensee determined that the oil leak was minor and there was no need to declare the HPCS EDG inoperable. The low oil level was discovered on routine operator rounds at the lower end of its allowed band. If there was any increase in leakage, it would have been noted on the operator rounds and further action could have been taken. Therefore, the conservative measure of declaring the HPCS EDG inoperable was not necessary and the event notification is retracted.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R4DO (Charles Cain).
HPCS (Division 3) EDG oil level was discovered to be out of specification low during normal rounds. The Division 3 EDG was conservatively declared inoperable until further evaluations can be performed to determine final disposition of oil leakage from its inspection cover. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.8.1 (72 hour limiting conditioning of operation). All Emergency Core Cooling systems including HPCS are fully operable. Earlier in the day an undervoltage spike on the electrical grid caused the Division 3 EDG to start. The diesel was properly secured.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED ON 3/26/99 AT 1215 EST BY JAMES OWENS TO FANGIE JONES * * *
After further evaluation, the licensee determined that the oil leak was minor and there was no need to declare the HPCS EDG inoperable. The low oil level was discovered on routine operator rounds at the lower end of its allowed band. If there was any increase in leakage, it would have been noted on the operator rounds and further action could have been taken. Therefore, the conservative measure of declaring the HPCS EDG inoperable was not necessary and the event notification is retracted.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R4DO (Charles Cain).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35507
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/25/1999
Notification Time: 01:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 19:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Notification Time: 01:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/1999
Event Time: 19:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS 76.120(c)(2)(iii) - REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS 76.120(c)(2)(iii) - REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
TSR allowed one of two smoke detectors to be inoperable during withdrawal operations when both smoke detectors have to be operable during withdrawal operations.
On March 10, 1999, Operations personnel identified a deficiency in a TSR requirement for the Pigtail line Isolation System at ERP (extended range product), LAW (low assay withdrawal), and TAILS, (TSR 2.5.3.4). The TSR required action allowed continued withdrawal operations if one (1) smoke detector was inoperable. The Pigtail Line Isolation System requires two (2) Pyrotronics Smoke Detectors to actuate for the isolation valve to close. Operation personnel initiated a Compensatory Action (CA-99-009) for this anomaly to isolate the withdrawal cylinder and manifold per TSR 2.5.3.4b if one smoke detector is declared inoperable.
Initially there was no evidence that the Pigtail Line Isolation System had been allowed to operate any applicable mode (modes II or III) with one or more inoperable smoke head. As a follow up investigation to this deficiency, a search of the BPS system (problem report database) was conducted. This search identified that on July 8, 1998, a Pyrotronic smoke head at the Law IA withdrawal position had been declared inoperable and cylinder filling operations had been allowed to continue.
This event is reportable due to a Safety System required by the TSR not being available or operable and no redundant equipment was available to perform the required safety function.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
* * * UPDATE at 1645EDT on 4/6/99 from Keith Williamson to S.Sandin * * *
"On April 6, 1999 at 0850, the Plant Shift Superintendent retracted the above event. Based on completion of Engineering Evaluation EVAL-OS-1999_0202 Rev. 0, the plant has determined that the system would have performed its designed safety function in this particular instance."
The certificatee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative. Notified R3DO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Camper).
On March 10, 1999, Operations personnel identified a deficiency in a TSR requirement for the Pigtail line Isolation System at ERP (extended range product), LAW (low assay withdrawal), and TAILS, (TSR 2.5.3.4). The TSR required action allowed continued withdrawal operations if one (1) smoke detector was inoperable. The Pigtail Line Isolation System requires two (2) Pyrotronics Smoke Detectors to actuate for the isolation valve to close. Operation personnel initiated a Compensatory Action (CA-99-009) for this anomaly to isolate the withdrawal cylinder and manifold per TSR 2.5.3.4b if one smoke detector is declared inoperable.
Initially there was no evidence that the Pigtail Line Isolation System had been allowed to operate any applicable mode (modes II or III) with one or more inoperable smoke head. As a follow up investigation to this deficiency, a search of the BPS system (problem report database) was conducted. This search identified that on July 8, 1998, a Pyrotronic smoke head at the Law IA withdrawal position had been declared inoperable and cylinder filling operations had been allowed to continue.
This event is reportable due to a Safety System required by the TSR not being available or operable and no redundant equipment was available to perform the required safety function.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
* * * UPDATE at 1645EDT on 4/6/99 from Keith Williamson to S.Sandin * * *
"On April 6, 1999 at 0850, the Plant Shift Superintendent retracted the above event. Based on completion of Engineering Evaluation EVAL-OS-1999_0202 Rev. 0, the plant has determined that the system would have performed its designed safety function in this particular instance."
The certificatee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative. Notified R3DO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Camper).