Event Notification Report for March 18, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/17/1999 - 03/18/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3548935484354853548635498
Hospital
Event Number: 35489
Rep Org: FLOWER HOSPITAL
Licensee: FLOWER HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: SYLVANIA State: OH
County:
License #: 34-15184-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DR. JUSTICE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Licensee: FLOWER HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: SYLVANIA State: OH
County:
License #: 34-15184-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DR. JUSTICE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 16:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 16:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
DR. COOL (NMSS)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
DR. COOL (NMSS)
MISADMINISTRATION
A Cs-137 BRACHYTHERAPY source was found in a patient's stool during a routine survey. The survey was conducted prior to removal of the material from the patient's room. The source was one of two being used to provide an intended dose to the patient of 65 Gray. Each source had an activity of 11 mg Radium equivalent. The other source remained in place during the treatment period. The licensee is conducting an investigation to determine how and when the source became dislodged.
A Cs-137 BRACHYTHERAPY source was found in a patient's stool during a routine survey. The survey was conducted prior to removal of the material from the patient's room. The source was one of two being used to provide an intended dose to the patient of 65 Gray. Each source had an activity of 11 mg Radium equivalent. The other source remained in place during the treatment period. The licensee is conducting an investigation to determine how and when the source became dislodged.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35484
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/18/1999
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 16:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 16:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
"As part of the corrective actions for LER 99-01, Niagara Mohawk Engineering is performing a review of control circuits associated with the fire protection program needed during the control room fire scenario. During this review engineering identified that the control circuits for the service water intake bar rack heaters are not capable of isolation from the control room. If a control room fire were to occur, these control circuits and associated heaters may not function. The bar rack heaters are required to operate on each service water intake structure to prevent the formation of anchor ice which would cause a loss of service water flow required to support safe shutdown, when lake temperature is less than 39 degrees F.
"As compensatory action for this deficiency, a roving fire patrol is being established once per 24 hours in the control room, relay room, and adjacent cable raceway areas. Fire detection and suppression automatic systems are currently in service."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"As part of the corrective actions for LER 99-01, Niagara Mohawk Engineering is performing a review of control circuits associated with the fire protection program needed during the control room fire scenario. During this review engineering identified that the control circuits for the service water intake bar rack heaters are not capable of isolation from the control room. If a control room fire were to occur, these control circuits and associated heaters may not function. The bar rack heaters are required to operate on each service water intake structure to prevent the formation of anchor ice which would cause a loss of service water flow required to support safe shutdown, when lake temperature is less than 39 degrees F.
"As compensatory action for this deficiency, a roving fire patrol is being established once per 24 hours in the control room, relay room, and adjacent cable raceway areas. Fire detection and suppression automatic systems are currently in service."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35485
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAT NAVIN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAT NAVIN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/18/1999
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL FOR FIRE INDUCED FLOODING
During a review of the Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) methodology, it was determined that potential damage from a postulated fire in Fire Areas 6N (Unit 2), 6S (Unit 2), 13N (Unit 3) and 13S (Unit 3) could result in spurious operation of high/low pressure interface MOVs and air operated valves in the RHR or Core Spray systems. The sustained opening of these valves could result in pressure relief valve discharge and resultant unacceptable flooding of a sump pump room in the Unit 2 or Unit 3 Reactor Building. These sump pump rooms contain instruments associated with the HPCI and RCIC systems. Water damage to these instruments may result in loss of these systems which are required for FSSD in the identified fire areas. RHR and Core Spray piping integrity would be maintained during the postulated event.
Previous analysis did not adequately consider potential effects of the flooding on other systems. Hourly roving fire watch patrol inspections have been established for the identified fire areas. A temporary plant alteration is being pursued to remove power from one of the valves in the impacted high/low pressure interfaces which will be adequate to isolate the water flow paths.
This condition represents a failure to maintain the provisions of the Fire Protection Program (Appendix R to 10 CFR 50).
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
During a review of the Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) methodology, it was determined that potential damage from a postulated fire in Fire Areas 6N (Unit 2), 6S (Unit 2), 13N (Unit 3) and 13S (Unit 3) could result in spurious operation of high/low pressure interface MOVs and air operated valves in the RHR or Core Spray systems. The sustained opening of these valves could result in pressure relief valve discharge and resultant unacceptable flooding of a sump pump room in the Unit 2 or Unit 3 Reactor Building. These sump pump rooms contain instruments associated with the HPCI and RCIC systems. Water damage to these instruments may result in loss of these systems which are required for FSSD in the identified fire areas. RHR and Core Spray piping integrity would be maintained during the postulated event.
Previous analysis did not adequately consider potential effects of the flooding on other systems. Hourly roving fire watch patrol inspections have been established for the identified fire areas. A temporary plant alteration is being pursued to remove power from one of the valves in the impacted high/low pressure interfaces which will be adequate to isolate the water flow paths.
This condition represents a failure to maintain the provisions of the Fire Protection Program (Appendix R to 10 CFR 50).
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35486
Rep Org: U.S. STEEL
Licensee: U.S. STEEL
Region: 3
City: GARY State: IN
County:
License #: 13-07964-07
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEAN LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Licensee: U.S. STEEL
Region: 3
City: GARY State: IN
County:
License #: 13-07964-07
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEAN LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/18/1999
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED DURING MAINTENANCE
The licensee reported that a Texas Nuclear moisture density gauge, model number 5010A, serial number B153, was damaged by a cutting torch during maintenance activities. The gauge contains a 1 Ci Am-241 source. The torch cut a small hole in the outer case of the gauge. The gauge was surveyed for both loose contamination and higher than normal radiation levels. Both surveys indicated that the source had not been damaged and was stowed in its shielded position.
The gauge has been removed from service pending a review by the device manufacturer. There were no personnel over exposures as a result of this event.
The licensee reported that a Texas Nuclear moisture density gauge, model number 5010A, serial number B153, was damaged by a cutting torch during maintenance activities. The gauge contains a 1 Ci Am-241 source. The torch cut a small hole in the outer case of the gauge. The gauge was surveyed for both loose contamination and higher than normal radiation levels. Both surveys indicated that the source had not been damaged and was stowed in its shielded position.
The gauge has been removed from service pending a review by the device manufacturer. There were no personnel over exposures as a result of this event.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35498
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UNIVERSITY of AL at BIRMINGHAM
Region: 2
City: BIRMINGHAM State: AL
County:
License #: 266
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. McNees/D. Turberville
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: UNIVERSITY of AL at BIRMINGHAM
Region: 2
City: BIRMINGHAM State: AL
County:
License #: 266
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. McNees/D. Turberville
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/22/1999
Notification Time: 18:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/1999
Notification Time: 18:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
JOSIE PICCONE, EO (NMSS)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
JOSIE PICCONE, EO (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT (ALABAMA INCIDENT #99-6) - LOST I-125 MEDICAL THERAPY SEEDS
In the late afternoon of March 19, 1999, the State of Alabama was contacted by the University of Alabama at Birmingham (Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 266) concerning an incident involving lost or stolen Iodine-125 medical therapy seeds. The seeds, used for the treatment of prostate cancer, were delivered to the licensee's permittee (the medical user) by an employee of the licensee's Hazardous Material Facility on the afternoon of March 18, 1999. Upon delivery, the individual placed the package on the top of a trash can and then went to check on a patient. Upon his return, the package was missing. The package contained 107 seeds of I-125 with a total activity of 37.5 millicuries in a lead pig. The licensee continues the process of interviewing housekeeping personnel and surveying trash dumpsters to locate the package. As of the close of business on March 22, 1999, the radioactive seeds had not been located despite extensive efforts by the licensee.
In the late afternoon of March 19, 1999, the State of Alabama was contacted by the University of Alabama at Birmingham (Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 266) concerning an incident involving lost or stolen Iodine-125 medical therapy seeds. The seeds, used for the treatment of prostate cancer, were delivered to the licensee's permittee (the medical user) by an employee of the licensee's Hazardous Material Facility on the afternoon of March 18, 1999. Upon delivery, the individual placed the package on the top of a trash can and then went to check on a patient. Upon his return, the package was missing. The package contained 107 seeds of I-125 with a total activity of 37.5 millicuries in a lead pig. The licensee continues the process of interviewing housekeeping personnel and surveying trash dumpsters to locate the package. As of the close of business on March 22, 1999, the radioactive seeds had not been located despite extensive efforts by the licensee.