Event Notification Report for March 17, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/16/1999 - 03/17/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
354993547635477354783547935480354813548235483
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35499
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BHATE ENGINEERING CORP
Region: 2
City: BIRMINGHAM State: AL
County:
License #: 655
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. McNees/D. Turberville
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: BHATE ENGINEERING CORP
Region: 2
City: BIRMINGHAM State: AL
County:
License #: 655
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. McNees/D. Turberville
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/22/1999
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/1999
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
JOSIE PICCONE, EO (NMSS)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
JOSIE PICCONE, EO (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE EVENT (ALABAMA INCIDENT #99-5) - Damaged Troxler Moisture Density Gauge
In the morning of March 18, 1999, the State of Alabama was contacted by William B. Bass, a radiological consultant on behalf of Bhate Engineering Corporation of Birmingham (Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 655) concerning an incident involving a damaged Troxler Moisture Density Gauge. Mr. Bass reported that at approximately 1500 CST on March 17, 1999, the radioactive device was accidentally driven over by a John Deere 770B-H Motor Grader. The Troxler gauge was in the closed shielded position when the accident occurred. The impact bent the source rod and "crushed" the shield around the source. Mr. Bass reported that he checked for contamination and finding none, secured the rod with duct tape to prevent any movement and placed the damaged device in the case and secured it in place with duct tape. The area was surveyed and determined to be contamination free and a wipe test made along the seams of the damaged device. Radiation exposure levels adjacent to the device were 2.5 mR/hr at six inches from the surface which is typical for an undamaged Troxler device. The licensee intends to ship the damaged device to the manufacturer.
In the morning of March 18, 1999, the State of Alabama was contacted by William B. Bass, a radiological consultant on behalf of Bhate Engineering Corporation of Birmingham (Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 655) concerning an incident involving a damaged Troxler Moisture Density Gauge. Mr. Bass reported that at approximately 1500 CST on March 17, 1999, the radioactive device was accidentally driven over by a John Deere 770B-H Motor Grader. The Troxler gauge was in the closed shielded position when the accident occurred. The impact bent the source rod and "crushed" the shield around the source. Mr. Bass reported that he checked for contamination and finding none, secured the rod with duct tape to prevent any movement and placed the damaged device in the case and secured it in place with duct tape. The area was surveyed and determined to be contamination free and a wipe test made along the seams of the damaged device. Radiation exposure levels adjacent to the device were 2.5 mR/hr at six inches from the surface which is typical for an undamaged Troxler device. The licensee intends to ship the damaged device to the manufacturer.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35476
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 07:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 03:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 07:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 03:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A VALVE PACKING LEAK
"On March 17, 1999 at 03:36, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was declared inoperable due to being isolated because of a large steam leak from the packing on the steam line outboard isolation valve. This valve was being tested in accordance with a quarterly periodic test to verify valve operability. The steam leak has been secured by isolation of the inboard isolation valve.
"The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is a single-train system used to prevent overheating of the reactor fuel in the event of a reactor isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater. The High Pressure Coolant Injection System (approximately ten times the flow rate as the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System) remains operable. Plant technical specification 3.5.3 allow continued operation for 14 days with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System inoperable. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is not considered an engineered safety feature at the Brunswick Plant. It is, however, included in plant technical specifications.
"Engineering and maintenance personnel are working to determine the corrective action plan at this time."
The system is expected to be restored within 14 days.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 17, 1999 at 03:36, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was declared inoperable due to being isolated because of a large steam leak from the packing on the steam line outboard isolation valve. This valve was being tested in accordance with a quarterly periodic test to verify valve operability. The steam leak has been secured by isolation of the inboard isolation valve.
"The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is a single-train system used to prevent overheating of the reactor fuel in the event of a reactor isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater. The High Pressure Coolant Injection System (approximately ten times the flow rate as the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System) remains operable. Plant technical specification 3.5.3 allow continued operation for 14 days with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System inoperable. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is not considered an engineered safety feature at the Brunswick Plant. It is, however, included in plant technical specifications.
"Engineering and maintenance personnel are working to determine the corrective action plan at this time."
The system is expected to be restored within 14 days.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35477
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: NDT & INSPECTIONS
Region: 2
City: PEMBROKE PINES State: FL
County: BROWARD
License #: 2941-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EAKINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: NDT & INSPECTIONS
Region: 2
City: PEMBROKE PINES State: FL
County: BROWARD
License #: 2941-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EAKINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 07:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 05:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/1999
Notification Time: 07:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 05:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
DON COOL EO (NMSS)
ROSEMARY HOGAN (IRO)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
DON COOL EO (NMSS)
ROSEMARY HOGAN (IRO)
THE FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL REPORTED A STOLEN RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA.
THE CAMERA (AEA TECHNOLOGY MODEL 66B) IS THE PROPERTY OF NDT & INSPECTIONS OF PEMBROKE PINES, FL. IT CONTAINS 88.3 CURIES OF IRIDIUM-192. IT WAS STOLEN FROM A TRAILER AT THE RADIOGRAPHER'S HOUSE IN PEMBROKE PINES, FL BETWEEN 0400 AND 0440 ON 03/17/99. THE SOURCE SERIAL NUMBER IS C9062. THE INDIVIDUALS THAT STOLE THE DEVICE ALSO HAVE THE KEYS FOR THE CAMERA. THERE WILL BE A PRESS RELEASE BY BROWARD COUNTY.
THE FLORIDA REPORT NUMBER IS FL99-039.
CONTACT THE HOO FOR STATE TELEPHONE NUMBER.
* * * UPDATE AT 1230 ON 03/17/99 BY STRANSKY * * *
THE NRC ENTERED THE MONITORING PHASE OF NORMAL RESPONSE MODE AT 1230 ON 03/17/99 AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED IRO (CONGEL), CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE (WEBER), EDO (TSCHILTZ), OPA (LANDAU), AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES (VIA FAX AND PHONE).
* * * UPDATE AT 1205 ON 03/22/99 BY JOLLIFFE * * *
AT 1205 ON 03/22/99, THE NRC SECURED FROM THE MONITORING PHASE OF NORMAL RESPONSE MODE. THE CAMERA HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE FOLLOWING: CHAIRMAN (MIKE WEBER), EDO (GLEN TRACY), NMSS EO (DON COOL), R2DO (KERRY LANDIS), IRO (CHARLIE MILLER/ROSEMARY HOGAN), OPA (VIC DRICKS), FBI (JIM KUNKEL), EPA (NRC) (MATT ROBERTSON), DOE (MIKE WYATT), USDA (LORI THOMAS), HHS (MARK KEIM), AND FEMA (PAUL WRIGHT).
THE CAMERA (AEA TECHNOLOGY MODEL 66B) IS THE PROPERTY OF NDT & INSPECTIONS OF PEMBROKE PINES, FL. IT CONTAINS 88.3 CURIES OF IRIDIUM-192. IT WAS STOLEN FROM A TRAILER AT THE RADIOGRAPHER'S HOUSE IN PEMBROKE PINES, FL BETWEEN 0400 AND 0440 ON 03/17/99. THE SOURCE SERIAL NUMBER IS C9062. THE INDIVIDUALS THAT STOLE THE DEVICE ALSO HAVE THE KEYS FOR THE CAMERA. THERE WILL BE A PRESS RELEASE BY BROWARD COUNTY.
THE FLORIDA REPORT NUMBER IS FL99-039.
CONTACT THE HOO FOR STATE TELEPHONE NUMBER.
* * * UPDATE AT 1230 ON 03/17/99 BY STRANSKY * * *
THE NRC ENTERED THE MONITORING PHASE OF NORMAL RESPONSE MODE AT 1230 ON 03/17/99 AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED IRO (CONGEL), CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE (WEBER), EDO (TSCHILTZ), OPA (LANDAU), AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES (VIA FAX AND PHONE).
* * * UPDATE AT 1205 ON 03/22/99 BY JOLLIFFE * * *
AT 1205 ON 03/22/99, THE NRC SECURED FROM THE MONITORING PHASE OF NORMAL RESPONSE MODE. THE CAMERA HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE FOLLOWING: CHAIRMAN (MIKE WEBER), EDO (GLEN TRACY), NMSS EO (DON COOL), R2DO (KERRY LANDIS), IRO (CHARLIE MILLER/ROSEMARY HOGAN), OPA (VIC DRICKS), FBI (JIM KUNKEL), EPA (NRC) (MATT ROBERTSON), DOE (MIKE WYATT), USDA (LORI THOMAS), HHS (MARK KEIM), AND FEMA (PAUL WRIGHT).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35478
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK RARY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK RARY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 10:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 10:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
A contract employee access to the plant was terminated when the final background check revealed falsified information had been submitted on the individual's background information.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Refer to the HOO log for additional information.
A contract employee access to the plant was terminated when the final background check revealed falsified information had been submitted on the individual's background information.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Refer to the HOO log for additional information.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35479
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 13:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 11:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 13:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 11:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
PORTION OF WELD CHANNEL VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The licensee discovered that two valves (EW-1 and EW-2) associated with the post accident containment ventilation system were closed. This condition resulted in the partial inoperability of zone 4 of the weld channel ventilation system. The licensee entered 7-day Technical Specification LCO Action Statement 3.3.D.1.a as a result of this condition. The valves were reopened at 1235, restoring the system to service. The licensee is investigating the cause of this event. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
The licensee discovered that two valves (EW-1 and EW-2) associated with the post accident containment ventilation system were closed. This condition resulted in the partial inoperability of zone 4 of the weld channel ventilation system. The licensee entered 7-day Technical Specification LCO Action Statement 3.3.D.1.a as a result of this condition. The valves were reopened at 1235, restoring the system to service. The licensee is investigating the cause of this event. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35480
Rep Org: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANT
Licensee: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: 37-18456-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MCFEEDERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: 37-18456-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MCFEEDERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
Person (Organization):
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
POSSIBLE PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE
Dosimetry results from the period of 1/25/99 to 2/24/99 indicate that a technician received a deep dose of 6615 mrem (66.15 mSv), as recorded by his film badge. The licensee reported that this individual normally operates a Troxler moisture/density gauge, but did not use the gauge during the period. The licensee plans to interview the technician to determine whether he was working near any sources that could have accounted for this dose reading. The licensee has already contacted NRC Region 1 regarding this event.
Dosimetry results from the period of 1/25/99 to 2/24/99 indicate that a technician received a deep dose of 6615 mrem (66.15 mSv), as recorded by his film badge. The licensee reported that this individual normally operates a Troxler moisture/density gauge, but did not use the gauge during the period. The licensee plans to interview the technician to determine whether he was working near any sources that could have accounted for this dose reading. The licensee has already contacted NRC Region 1 regarding this event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35481
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: C. HINES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: C. HINES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 14:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 14:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(C) - COND OUTSIDE EOPS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(C) - COND OUTSIDE EOPS
Person (Organization):
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL TO DAMAGE HHSI PUMPS DURING A FIRE DUE TO HYDROGEN INTRUSION
"On 3/5/99, at approximately 2002 hours a four-hour non-emergency Unit 2 event notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2) was made to identify potential loss of High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)/Charging Water pump capability due to hydrogen intrusion into the pump's suction piping resulting from inadequate Pre-Fire Plan procedures to isolate the Unit Volume Control Tank (VCT) outlet valves. Following this notification, an extent of condition review of this concern has been in progress on Unit 1.
"This Unit 1 review has determined that the Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan operating procedures for actions to respond to a postulated fire in Control Building fire areas CR-1, CR-4, and CS-1 and Primary Access Building fire area PA-1G do not adequately ensure isolation of the VCT outlet valves MOV-CH-115C or E. Operating Manual 10M-56C.4.C directs opening Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) outlet valves MOV-CH-115B or D using the benchboard controls. However, this action may not be successful because the valve's control circuits may be affected due to the postulated fire. 10M-56C.4.E directs the Operator to deenergize and manually open MOV-CH-115B or D, but does not direct closing MOV-CH-115C or E. The postulated fire may result in the loss of Reactor Coolant System letdown makeup flow to the VCT. Consequently, when MOV-CH-115B or D are opened to align the RWST to the HHSI/Charging pumps, intrusion of hydrogen from the VCT into the pump's suction piping may occur, if the VCT outlet has not been isolated. This may result in damage to and unavailability of the HHSI/Charging pumps. 10M-56.B.4.2 directs the Operator to align the RWST to the HHSI/Charging water suction header through the Low Head Safety Injections. 10M-56B.4.2.B-4 directs the Operator to locally open MOV-CH-115B or D and close MOV-CH-115C or E if the fire does not prevent entry into the boron blender cubicle area. This action is inadequate because it does not address the loss of MOV-CH-115C and E due to fire. If these valves remain open due to fire damage of the valves or associated electrical cables and the Operator is unable to gain access to this area because of the fire, hydrogen from the VCT could be introduced into the HHSI/Charging pumps suction and damage to the operating pump could occur.
"Preliminary calculation by the engineering department shows that limiting VCT tank pressure to a maximum of 36 psi will prevent hydrogen intrusion from the VCT as described in the events above.
"Operations will institute compensatory actions to limit VCT pressure. In addition, a continuous fire watch is being implemented for the Primary Auxiliary Building 722-foot elevation. In addition, Operations will restrict hot work permits in this area. These interim compensatory actions will remain in place until long-term compensatory actions have been completed."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
[HOO note: See related Event #35446, #35537 AND #35538].
"On 3/5/99, at approximately 2002 hours a four-hour non-emergency Unit 2 event notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2) was made to identify potential loss of High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)/Charging Water pump capability due to hydrogen intrusion into the pump's suction piping resulting from inadequate Pre-Fire Plan procedures to isolate the Unit Volume Control Tank (VCT) outlet valves. Following this notification, an extent of condition review of this concern has been in progress on Unit 1.
"This Unit 1 review has determined that the Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan operating procedures for actions to respond to a postulated fire in Control Building fire areas CR-1, CR-4, and CS-1 and Primary Access Building fire area PA-1G do not adequately ensure isolation of the VCT outlet valves MOV-CH-115C or E. Operating Manual 10M-56C.4.C directs opening Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) outlet valves MOV-CH-115B or D using the benchboard controls. However, this action may not be successful because the valve's control circuits may be affected due to the postulated fire. 10M-56C.4.E directs the Operator to deenergize and manually open MOV-CH-115B or D, but does not direct closing MOV-CH-115C or E. The postulated fire may result in the loss of Reactor Coolant System letdown makeup flow to the VCT. Consequently, when MOV-CH-115B or D are opened to align the RWST to the HHSI/Charging pumps, intrusion of hydrogen from the VCT into the pump's suction piping may occur, if the VCT outlet has not been isolated. This may result in damage to and unavailability of the HHSI/Charging pumps. 10M-56.B.4.2 directs the Operator to align the RWST to the HHSI/Charging water suction header through the Low Head Safety Injections. 10M-56B.4.2.B-4 directs the Operator to locally open MOV-CH-115B or D and close MOV-CH-115C or E if the fire does not prevent entry into the boron blender cubicle area. This action is inadequate because it does not address the loss of MOV-CH-115C and E due to fire. If these valves remain open due to fire damage of the valves or associated electrical cables and the Operator is unable to gain access to this area because of the fire, hydrogen from the VCT could be introduced into the HHSI/Charging pumps suction and damage to the operating pump could occur.
"Preliminary calculation by the engineering department shows that limiting VCT tank pressure to a maximum of 36 psi will prevent hydrogen intrusion from the VCT as described in the events above.
"Operations will institute compensatory actions to limit VCT pressure. In addition, a continuous fire watch is being implemented for the Primary Auxiliary Building 722-foot elevation. In addition, Operations will restrict hot work permits in this area. These interim compensatory actions will remain in place until long-term compensatory actions have been completed."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
[HOO note: See related Event #35446, #35537 AND #35538].
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35482
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BRIAN STETSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BRIAN STETSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 18:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 18:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Notification Time: 18:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 18:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 91 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation |
STRUCTURES COULD BE DAMAGED DUE TO TORNADO LOADING
"The Perry design for tornado depressurization effects has been reviewed in response to OER PS 33978/Z05106. This review has confirmed that safety related structures are designed against failure using conservative assumptions that they are not vented, thus allowing full tornado depressurization across the building walls and slabs.
"Exterior doors to the plant are not designed to resist tornado depressurization loads, and thus are expected to fail in the event of the design basis tornado. This will expose building internals to some degree of depressurization. In most cases, safety related building interior walls are constructed from reinforced concrete and are inherently strong. Architectural walls have been used in the Central Complex and they have not been designed to consider these potential tornado depressurization loads."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
"The Perry design for tornado depressurization effects has been reviewed in response to OER PS 33978/Z05106. This review has confirmed that safety related structures are designed against failure using conservative assumptions that they are not vented, thus allowing full tornado depressurization across the building walls and slabs.
"Exterior doors to the plant are not designed to resist tornado depressurization loads, and thus are expected to fail in the event of the design basis tornado. This will expose building internals to some degree of depressurization. In most cases, safety related building interior walls are constructed from reinforced concrete and are inherently strong. Architectural walls have been used in the Central Complex and they have not been designed to consider these potential tornado depressurization loads."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35483
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: W.G. HALICKS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: W.G. HALICKS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/18/1999
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 19:51 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/1999
Event Time: 19:51 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
"On 3/17/99, at 1951 CST, the C-315 Normetex pump UF6 release detection system failed. 120 Volt AC circuit breaker No. 5 in C-315 power panel CPD-1 tripped which removed power from both channels of the Normetex UF6 release detection system. The breaker trip was determined to be the result of a failure of the "A" power supply which, along with the (parallel) "B" power supply, supplies 200 Volt DC power to the Normetex pump UF6 release detection heads. The breaker trip removed power from both the "A" and "B" power supplies, thus disabling the UF6 release detection system. No other safety systems in the C-315 were affected by this loss of power. The Normetex pump UF6 release detection system was declared inoperable and a continuous smoke watch was initiated in the affected area as required by TSR 2.3.4.3. Repairs were immediately initiated and the system was declared operable at 0138 on 3/18/99, and returned to service.
"This event report is submitted in accordance with Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria J.1. And 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as a safety equipment failure. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On 3/17/99, at 1951 CST, the C-315 Normetex pump UF6 release detection system failed. 120 Volt AC circuit breaker No. 5 in C-315 power panel CPD-1 tripped which removed power from both channels of the Normetex UF6 release detection system. The breaker trip was determined to be the result of a failure of the "A" power supply which, along with the (parallel) "B" power supply, supplies 200 Volt DC power to the Normetex pump UF6 release detection heads. The breaker trip removed power from both the "A" and "B" power supplies, thus disabling the UF6 release detection system. No other safety systems in the C-315 were affected by this loss of power. The Normetex pump UF6 release detection system was declared inoperable and a continuous smoke watch was initiated in the affected area as required by TSR 2.3.4.3. Repairs were immediately initiated and the system was declared operable at 0138 on 3/18/99, and returned to service.
"This event report is submitted in accordance with Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria J.1. And 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as a safety equipment failure. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."