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Event Notification Report for March 12, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/11/1999 - 03/12/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
35462354643546535466354673546835469354903551035511

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35462
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH HOLBROOK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/12/1999
Notification Time: 09:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 06:39 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP AND MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION CAUSED BY HIGH STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL.

This is a report of the following actuations: ESF-P-14, Turbine Trip and Main Feedwater Isolation; auxiliary feedwater actuation; and a reactor trip.

A loss of control of the "C" feed regulating valve caused steam generator water level to increase. Operators attempted to take manual control but had very little control from the main control room. The steam generator water level exceeded the 82.4% high steam generator water level trip setpoint causing a P-14 (steam generator high level override) actuation. This actuation resulted in a turbine trip/reactor trip and a loss of both running main feedwater pumps. It also caused all main feedwater isolation valves to close. All control rods fully inserted. No primary/secondary plant code safety valves or power-operated relief valves opened. Both motor-driven and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started on low steam generator water level following the reactor trip. The steam dump bypass control system is operating properly and is maintaining a T(ave) of 557°F. At the present time, steam generator water levels are being maintained by one operating motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Troubleshooting is in progress to determine the failure of "C" feedwater regulating valve (air-operated valve).

The offsite electrical grid is stable, and all emergency core cooling systems and the emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35464
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3     State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL SHORT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/12/1999
Notification Time: 15:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 13:14 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 73 Power Operation 73 Power Operation
Event Text
- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR BOTH UNITS INOPERABLE FOR 4 MINUTES -

UNIT 1 IS OPERATING AT 100% POWER, AND UNIT 2 IS OPERATING AT 73% POWER.

ON 03/12/99, DURING AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION, LICENSEE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL DETERMINED THAT THE UNIT 2 TURBINE-DRIVEN (TD) AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW)
PUMP FLOW RATE HAD BEEN SET INCORRECTLY DURING A PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED TEST. LICENSEE PERSONNEL DETERMINED THAT THIS CONDITION AFFECTED THE ENTIRE AFW SYSTEM. (PORTIONS OF THE AFW SYSTEM ARE SHARED BY BOTH UNITS.)

AT 1314 CST ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE ADMINISTRATIVELY DECLARED THE UNIT 1 TD AFW PUMP, THE UNIT 2 TD AFW PUMP, AND THE TWO SHARED MOTOR-DRIVEN (MD) AFW PUMPS INOPERABLE (AND THUS, THE ENTIRE AFW SYSTEM) AND ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION STATEMENT 15.3.0.B (a.k.a. 3.0.3). ALL FOUR AFW PUMPS REMAINED FUNCTIONAL. THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED TO BE OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASES OF THE PLANT.

AT 1318 CST ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE TRIPPED THE UNIT 2 TD AFW PUMP AND DECLARED IT INOPERABLE, ENTERED TECH SPEC LCO A/S 15.3.4.C.1 (72 HOUR SHUTDOWN LCO), DECLARED THE OTHER THREE AFW PUMPS OPERABLE, AND EXITED TECH SPEC LCO A/S 15.3.0.B. THUS, ONLY THE UNIT 2 PORTION OF THE AFW SYSTEM IS INOPERABLE.

THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


***RETRACTION ON 03/24/99 AT 1128ET BY RANDY HASTINGS TAKEN BY MACKINNON***

An engineering evaluation has subsequently been completed to assess whether the error in adjustment of the 2P-29 discharge throttle valves, which could have accelerated the drain down of supply water to the AFW pumps in the event of an external event induced break in the AFW suction line from the condensate storage tanks, could have resulted in the AFW pumps being inoperable once the pumps were switched to the alternate source of water (service water). This evaluation concludes that the postulated air entrainment mechanism does not result in operation of the AFW pumps outside their design basis before, during or after the pump's suctions are switched to service water. Accordingly, it was not necessary to declare the AFW system out of service and this condition was not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. R3DO (Pat Hiland) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35465
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PHIL BREIDENBAUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/12/1999
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 12:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
- RCIC SYSTEM VALVES CLOSED TO ISOLATE CONTAINMENT DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES -

AT 1234 ON 03/12/99, WITH UNIT 3 AT 100% POWER, A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION OCCURRED FOR THE REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM DURING RESTORATION FROM MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. THE ISOLATION OCCURRED WHEN THE OUTBOARD STEAM ISOLATION VALVE WAS JOGGED OPEN TO REPRESSURIZE THE STEAM LINE TO THE RCIC TURBINE. WHEN THE VALVE WAS JOGGED OPEN, A MOMENTARY HIGH STEAM FLOW SIGNAL OCCURRED AND BOTH INBOARD AND OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED TO THEIR ISOLATION POSITION.

AT 1620 ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE RESET ALL SYSTEMS TO NORMAL.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 35466
Rep Org: COOPER ENERGY SERVICES
Licensee: COOPER ENERGY SERVICES
Region: 1
City: GROVE CITY   State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN M. HORNE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/12/1999
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(c)(3)(i) - DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
Event Text
- Amendment to 10 CFR Part 21 - Cooper-Bessemer KSV Emergency Diesel Generator Power Piston Failure -
(Refer to event #32416 for additional information.)

Following the failure of a KSV power piston due to a hydraulic lock at Commonwealth Edison Zion Station in January, 1997, Cooper Cameron Corporation issued a Part 21 notification letter dated May 29, 1997, reference QCG-10389. The piston which failed had a minimum crown thickness of 0.040 inches, but had operated successfully for several years, and failed only because of the unusual hydraulic lock event. That letter recommended that KSV pistons be inspected for crown thickness by ultrasonic or other methods when the pistons were exposed in the course of normal maintenance activities. A conservative minimum thickness limit of 0.100 inches was established.

In the 2 years since the Zion failure, a total of 198 or more pistons have been measured at seven different sites. Of these, one was found initially in our plant with a thickness of 0.070 inches and was destroyed. All other pistons checked have been above the 0.100-inch limit, and the actual measured thickness was recorded for 157 of these. All but seven of those documented have had a minimum thickness of 0.150 inch or greater. The distribution of minimum thickness for the pistons has been documented to be from 0.100 to >0.400 inches. These results, in combination with the successful operating history of the KSV engine, provide reasonable assurance that all potentially defective pistons have been removed from service.

Based on this information, Cooper-Bessemer believes it is not necessary to continue to measure the thickness of piston crowns during other maintenance activities.

This 10 CFR Part 21 Amendment applies to the following plants:
Region 1 - Nine Mile Point and Susquehanna
Region 3 - Byron and Zion
Region 4 - Cooper, Palo Verde, Waterford, South Texas and Grand Gulf.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number.)


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35467
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ART WELLS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/12/1999
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
- PLANT SECURITY REPORT -

A SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO PERIMETER MONITORING OCCURRED. COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMMEDIATELY WERE TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35468
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1     State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE RUTTAR
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/12/1999
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 17:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
-Control room personnel access door latch mechanism may not withstand HELB pressure in the turbine building-

A licensee preliminary review of an error in an analysis assumption for the pressure applied to a control room personnel access door (#C-49-1) due to a high energy line break (HELB) in the turbine building indicates that the door latch mechanism might not withstand the applied pressure.

The control room door has been latched with an alternative latching mechanism and will remain closed against this pressure so there are no current operability concerns.

This situation results in a historical condition where Unit 3 may have operated outside its design basis. Engineering evaluation is continuing. A conservative decision has been made to report this condition as a condition outside the design basis of Unit 3 pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) pending the results of this evaluation.

The Licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE at 1237 on 03/24/99 by DALE BRODSKY to JOLLIFFE * * *

A mockup test of the door latch and hinges was conducted on 03/19/99 at the door manufacturer's facility. This test determined that the door hinges and latch will withstand a total pressure in excess of that resulting from a HELB in the turbine building. Additionally, the pressure on this door will actually be less than the pressure in the turbine building due to its remote location and tortuous path.

Therefore, this condition is not reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition outside the design basis of Unit 3 and thus, the Licensee desires to retract this event.

The Licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Jack McFadden.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35469
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4     State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM FRAWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/12/1999
Notification Time: 19:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 14:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
WILLIAM BECKNER, EO (NRR)
ROSEMARY HOGAN (IRO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
- PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DUE TO A FAULT IN A SWITCHYARD CIRCUIT BREAKER -

AT 1412 CST ON 03/12/99, DURING PLANT SWITCHYARD ACTIVITIES, UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF POWER TO THE #2 STANDBY TRANSFORMER DUE TO A FAULT IN A SWITCHYARD CIRCUIT BREAKER. THIS CONDITION CAUSED TRAIN 'B' AND TRAIN 'C' 4160-VOLT ESF BUSES TO ACTUATE ON A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. THE FOLLOWING ESF SYSTEMS ACTUATED: TRAIN 'B' AND TRAIN 'C' ESF EDGs, ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM, ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM, CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM, AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (ON RECIRC MODE).

DURING THIS EVENT, THE SPENT FUEL POOL TEMPERATURE INCREASED APPROXIMATELY 1.5°F, AND THE TRAIN 'B' ESF EDG (#22) OUTPUT BREAKER FAILED TO CLOSE AUTOMATICALLY. THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE TRAIN 'B' ESF EDG (#22) INOPERABLE, EVEN THOUGH IT IS FUNCTIONAL (72-HOUR LCO).

THERE WAS NO FIRE, AND NO PERSONNEL WERE INJURED. THE LICENSEE RESTORED ALL SYSTEMS TO NORMAL. UNIT 2 IS STABLE AND OPERATING AT 100% POWER.

THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE FAULT IN THE SWITCHYARD CIRCUIT BREAKER AND THE TRAIN 'B' ESF EDG (#22) OUTPUT BREAKER FAILING TO CLOSE AUTOMATICALLY.

THE LICENSEE PLANS TO SUBMIT A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ON THIS EVENT TO THE NRC.

THIS EVENT HAD NO IMPACT ON UNIT 1.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS ON SITE DURING THIS EVENT AND REPORTED IT TO REGION 4.
REGION 4 PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF THIS EVENT PRIOR TO THE LICENSEE REPORTING IT TO THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.


* * * UPDATE AT 1207 ON 03/13/99 FROM TIM FRAWLEY TO JOLLIFFE * * *

AT 1412 CST ON 03/12/99, DURING THE LOSS OF POWER TO #2 STANDBY TRANSFORMER, THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECH SPEC 3.0.3 FOR UNIT 2 DUE TO THE LOSS OF POWER TO TWO 13.8-KV STANDBY BUSES AND THE INOPERABLE CONDITION OF THE TRAIN 'B' ESF EDG (#22); THIS CONDITION IS NOT COVERED UNDER THE ACTIONS OF TECH SPEC 3.8.1.1 (AC ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCES).

AT 1530 CST ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE RESTORED POWER TO THE TWO 13.8-KV STANDBY BUSES.

AT 1553 CST ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE EXITED TECH SPEC 3.0.3 FOLLOWING SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.8.1.1.1.a. THIS CONDITION IS REPORTABLE TO THE NRC UNDER SECTION 2.G OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-80.

UNIT 2 IS STABLE AND OPERATING AT 100% POWER.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R4DO (GARY SANBORN), NRR EO (BILL BECKNER), AND IRO MGR (ROSEMARY HOGAN).

* * * UPDATE 1916 3/16/99 FROM MERTINK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"ON 3/12/99 STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR 22 AUTO STARTED IN RESPONSE TO A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TO THE 4.15 kV ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUS (ESF) E2B. THE DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER FAILED TO AUTOMATICALLY CLOSE. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANUALLY CLOSED THE OUTPUT BREAKER USING THE REMOTE HANDSWITCH IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND ENERGIZED THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUS. DURING THE TROUBLESHOOTING OF THIS EVENT IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CELL SWITCH IN E2B 480 VOLT LOAD CENTER CUBICLE 3F FOR ESSENTIAL CHILLER 216 WAS FOUND TO BE IN DEGRADED CONDITION. THIS FUNCTION OF THIS CELL SWITCH IS TO ALLOW THE SEQUENCER TO RECOGNIZE THE BREAKER AS OPEN AND PERFORM THE REQUIRED SEQUENCING OF ESF LOADS, STARTING WITH THE CLOSING OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER. THIS BREAKER HAD BEEN RACKED OUT SINCE 2/28/99 FOR MAINTENANCE ON THE CHILLER.

"SINCE THE PERFORMANCE OF RACKING OUT THIS BREAKER DID NOT VERIFY CELL SWITCH OPERATION AS DIRECTED BY OPERATING PROCEDURES, DIESEL GENERATOR 22 WAS INOPERABLE SINCE THE RACKING OUT OF THE CHILLER BREAKER ON 2/28/99. WITH THIS DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE PERFORMANCE OF CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES FOR VERIFICATION OF OPERABILITY OF AC OFFSITE SOURCES. SINCE THIS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENT WAS NOT SATISFIED, THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE AS A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND NOTIFICATION IS MADE PER NPF-80, SECTION 2G."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee. Notified R4DO (Harrell).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35490
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE STOTLOLIS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 04:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT HATCH NOT PROPERLY SECURED

"On March 12, 1999, it was identified that air was being drawn into the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 containment through the closed equipment hatch while the reactor was being de-fueled. Fuel movement was halted until the equipment hatch bolts were re-tightened and the inleakage was terminated. The inleakage was caused by a pressure differential across the equipment hatch set up by the containment ventilation. The design basis fuel handling accident for BVPS Unit No. 2 assumes that there is no pressure differential across the containment equipment hatch since the containment ventilation would be automatically secured upon a high radiation signal. It was originally believed that the door would have been able to contain any air transfer without the pressure differential across the door since it was closed with ten bolts in place versus the four required by Technical Specification 19.4 during fuel movement.

"Information was obtained on March 19, 1999 that 1) the containment equipment hatch may have become ajar due to inadequate support during an equipment hatch chain hoist preventative maintenance and 2) there was a sufficient separation between the containment wall and the equipment hatch door to allow some light to be seen on the inside of containment coming from the outside. Given this information, it could not be concluded that the containment capability of the equipment hatch would have been sufficient to have performed its safety function during a fuel handling accident if it were postulated to occur. Since the BVPS Unit No. 2 design basis fuel handling accident inside containment concludes that environmental release is precluded, this condition violated the UFSAR safety analysis. Therefore this indication of an air gap through the closed containment equipment hatch is being reported as a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C)."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 35510
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: H & G INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON   State: TX
County:
License #: 2181
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By:
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/25/1999
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas Department of Health:

"10 CFR Part 20.2202(b)(1) - Exposure (real or threatened) greater than or equal to TEDE of 5 rem, eye/lens 15 rem, skin/extremities 50 rads.

"Incident report 7428: A Texas licensee - H & G Inspection had a radiographer receive an annual 1998 whole body exposure of 5.4 R. The Texas Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control received the notification letter on 3/17/99 and is investigating."

There was no additional information available on the facsimile.

See event number 35511.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number and address.)


General Information or Other
Event Number: 35511
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: H & G INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON   State: TX
County:
License #: 2181
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By:
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/25/1999
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas Department of Health:

"10 CFR Part 20.2202(b)(1) - Exposure (real or threatened) greater than or equal to TEDE of 5 rem, eye/lens 15 rem, skin/extremities 50 rads.

"Incident report 7429: A Texas licensee - H & G Inspection had a radiographer receive an annual 1998 whole body exposure of 5.14 R. The radiographer did not work together with the one in incident report 7428. The Texas Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control received the notification letter on 3/17/99 and is investigating."

There was no additional information available on the facsimile.

See event number 35510.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number and address.)