Event Notification Report for March 11, 1999

- Discrepancies between Plant Fire Protection Program and 10CFR50, Appendix R, Safety Evaluation Report -

A self initiated technical audit of the McGuire Fire Protection Program identified apparent deviations from the approved Fire Protection Program. A potential discrepancy exists between the McGuire Fire Protection Program and the NRC description provided in Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Supplement 6, regarding Appendix R, Section III.G.3. Additional deviations from certain licensee commitments regarding testing were also identified in the audit.

The licensee's engineering staff has evaluated deviations identified by the audit team and has determined that the fire protection related systems are fully operable. In addition, these deviations have no impact on achieving and maintaining safe shutdown following a design bases fire event.

McGuire Facility Operating License (FOL) NPF-9 (Unit 1) and NPF-17 (Unit 2) require 24-hour notification to the NRC for deviations from the approved Fire Protection Program. The above deviations are being reported under that license condition criterion. A follow-up report describing the cause of the deviations and corrective actions will be submitted to the NRC within 14 days.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector

- NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT -

THE FOLLOWING IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE FROM PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT:

ON MARCH 11,1999 AT l030 HOURS, THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY (NCS) STAFF DETERMINED THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL (NCSA) FOR X-705, THAT DEALT WITH DISASSEMBLY OF EQUIPMENT, WAS DEFICIENT. NCSA-0705_038 WAS DEFICIENT IN THAT IT FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE CONTROLS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE DISASSEMBLY OF EQUIPMENT, PREVIOUSLY CLASSIFIED "UH (UNCOMPLICATED HANDLING) BASED ON GEOMETRY", DID NOT LEAD TO AN UNSAFE CONFIGURATION FOR NCS. BUILDING AND NCS PERSONNEL HAVE ASSESSED THE AREA AND NO UNSAFE CONDITIONS OR DISASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES WERE FOUND.

THE NCSA DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF DISASSEMBLY ON EQUIPMENT CLASSIFIED AS "UH BASED ON GEOMETRY" THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UNSAFE CONFIGURATION.

X-705 BUILDING MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL HAVE DISCONTINUED DISASSEMBLY OPERATIONS OF EQUIPMENT INVOLVING COMPONENTS PREVIOUSLY CLASSIFIED AS "UH BASED ON GEOMETRY". APPLICABLE NCSAs WILL BE CORRECTED AND IMPLEMENTED.

THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

- TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM A LOCKED COMPANY PICKUP TRUCK -

AT 0710 ON 03/11/99, CHUCK FORD, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, GAI CONSULTANTS, INC, MONROEVILLE, PA, (LICENSE #37-09180-01) WAS NOTIFIED THAT A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE HAD BEEN STOLEN FROM THE BACK OF A COMPANY PICKUP TRUCK WITH A LOCKED CAMPER TOP. THE TRUCK WAS PARKED IN THE PARKING LOT OF THE COMFORT INN IN MARTINSBURG, WV. THE CAMPER TOP LOCK WAS DAMAGED AND THE GAUGE HAD BEEN STOLEN BETWEEN 1900 ON 03/10/99 TO 0630 ON 03/11/99. THE UNDAMAGED LOCKED GAUGE (MODEL #3440, SERIAL #29575) CONTAINED SEALED 8 MILLICURIES OF Cs-137 AND 40 MILLICURIES OF Am-241-Be SOURCES.

MR. FORD REPORTED THE THEFT TO THE WV STATE POLICE AND NRC REGION 1 (JUDY JOUSTRA) AND PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC WITHIN 30 DAYS. THE WV STATE POLICE ISSUED A PRESS RELEASE REGARDING THIS THEFT.

- LICENSEE NOTIFIED EPA & NH OF SANITARY WASTE WATER DISCHARGE INTO ATLANTIC OCEAN -

AT 1430 ON 03/11/99, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES THAT APPROXIMATELY 60 GALLONS OF SANITARY WASTE WATER HAD INADVERTENTLY BEEN DISCHARGED INTO A PLANT STORM DRAIN WHICH DISCHARGES INTO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN IN VIOLATION OF THEIR NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

THE PLANT DOES NOT MEET THE DESIGN BASIS REQUIREMENT FOR RHR HEAT EXCHANGER CONTROL VALVES TO BE SECURED IN A SAFE POSITION.

DURING A REVIEW OF THE OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) HEAT EXCHANGER SYSTEM, NO STEPS OR LINEUPS WERE FOUND TO IMPLEMENT THE DESIGN BASIS REQUIREMENT FOR THE RHR HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW AND BYPASS CONTROL VALVES TO BE SECURED IN THEIR SAFE POSITION.

THE RHR HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW AND BYPASS CONTROL VALVES WERE FOUND TO BE CONFIGURED WITH THE SOLENOID VENT VALVES IN AN ENERGIZED CONDITION, THEREFORE, POTENTIALLY ALLOWING THE NON-SAFETY-RELATED POSITIONER TO CONTROL THE VALVE.
FAILURE OF ONE OF THE NON-SAFETY POSITIONERS (DUE TO ADVERSE CONDITIONS) COULD HAVE DRIVEN THE VALVES TO THEIR NON-SAFETY POSITION AT THE ONSET OF A POSTULATED ACCIDENT, THEREBY PREVENTING THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF THE LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW.

THIS CONDITION WAS RESOLVED AS SOON AS IT WAS IDENTIFIED BY DE-ENERGIZING AND REMOVING THE FUSES FOR THE VALVES.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.