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Event Notification Report for March 09, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/08/1999 - 03/09/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
35552354543545135452

Hospital
Event Number: 35552
Rep Org: BARNES-JUDISH HOSPITAL
Licensee: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, MO
Region: 3
City: St. Louis   State: MO
County:
License #: 24-00167-11
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN EICHLING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/07/1999
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
Event Text
Description of the material

On March 9, 1999, during preparation of preloaded needles for a permanent interstitial prostate implant, a single I-125 radioactive seed was lost. The seed was model 6711 manufactured by Medi-Physics, Inc., Amersham Healthcare, Arlington Heights, IL 60005. The seed originated from either lot number E3254 or E3256. The seed is 4.5 mm in length and 0.8 mm in diameter. Radioactive material is absorbed on a silver core and encapsulated in a titanium shell. The apparent activity of the seed on March 9, 1999 was 0.37 mCi. As of today the apparent activity is 0.26 mCi.

Description of the event

As stated above, the source was lost on March 9, 1999, at approximately 3 p.m., during preparation of needles for a permanent prostate implant. The needle preparation procedure involves placement of seeds and spacers into needles under sterile conditions. At the time of the event, needle preparation was performed in a large operating room, which was also used to store surgical equipment. Needle tips are plugged with wax. During the course of the procedure there was a need to reload one of the needles. After extracting seeds from the needle, two of the seeds were stuck in wax. The technologist attempted to separate the two seeds using tweezers. One of the seeds slipped from the tweezers and was ejected somewhere into the operating room.

Actions taken to recover material

Immediately, the technologist attempted to locate the lost seed using a Geiger detector. She and another technologist spent 45 minutes looking for the seed. After an unsuccessful search, they contacted a physicist. The physicist performed a careful search also using a Geiger detector, which included a survey of the entire operating room and hallway, and the technologist's shoes, clothing, and hair. At this time, it was decided to lock the room and return in the morning. The following day, two physicists attempted to locate the lost seed using a NI and Geiger detectors. This search also proved unsuccessful. The following two days, members of the radiation safety team performed two additional searches, which were also unsuccessful.


Probable disposition of the material

Approximately in the center of the operating room (6 feet away from the area where the radioactive seeds were located) is a large drain. It is possible that the seed reached the drain and that it was lost in the drain.

Possible exposure to individuals in unrestricted areas

The specific operating room is being used only for storage and it is estimated that no individual spends more than 0.5 hours/week in that room. The radiation levels in the room are at the background level. If the seed was lost in the drain, there would be no exposure to any member of the public due to the extremely low average energy of the source (28 kEv). The risk to individuals is further reduced due to relatively short half-life of I-125 (59.6 days).

Procedures or actions to prevent a recurrence

The licensee relocated the needle preparation procedure and equipment to a much smaller room (approximately 4x8 square feet). Should a seed be lost again it will be much easier to locate it in a small area.

Other pertinent information

The licensee has performed over 120 prostate implants that involved approximately 14,000 seeds. During this time, the licensee has lost only this one seed. This indicates that the system is well organized and that proper precautions are in place. However, to further improve the process we will prepare needles in the small room.


Hospital
Event Number: 35454
Rep Org: ST. JOHNS MERCY MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: ST. JOHNS MERCY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: ST. LOUIS   State: MO
County:
License #: 24-00794-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TURCO
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/10/1999
Notification Time: 10:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
Event Text
MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION

DURING A REVIEW OF ST. JOHNS MERCY MEDICAL CENTER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS A WRITTEN DIRECTIVE FOR SODIUM IODIDE-131 WHERE THE PRESCRIPTION WAS FOR A 4 MILLICURIE DOSE FOR WHOLE BODY IMAGING. THE PATIENT, HOWEVER, WAS GIVEN 5 MILLICURIES INSTEAD. THIS EVENT OCCURRED ON 02/99 AND THE PATIENT'S PHYSICIAN WILL BE NOTIFIED BY THE MEDICAL CENTER.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35451
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/09/1999
Notification Time: 05:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/1999
Event Time: 02:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/08/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
COMMON FAILURE EFFECTING BOTH TRAINS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING

"On 3/9/99, at 0221 it was discovered that the Unit 1 shutdown cooling valves HV-51-1F015A, HV-51-1F015B, and HV-51-1F08 could not be opened, if plant conditions required, due to a failure in the isolation logic circuit connectors.

"This failure affected both shutdown cooling return valves and a common suction valve which results in one failure effecting both trains of shutdown cooling. The identified deficiency is being planned for repairs. This condition, of a single failure disabling multiple trains of a system, is being reported pursuant to 50.72(b)(2)(iii)."

This deficiency was discovered during routine maintenance. These valves could be opened manually using existing plant procedures if it were necessary to initiate shutdown cooling.

The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTION 1421 4/8/1999 FROM McCABE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"This is a retraction of Event # 35451: Common Failure Effecting Both Trains of Shutdown Cooling

"During normal operator rounds in the Auxiliary Equipment room, an operator noticed an extinguished NSSSS indicator light. An attempt to reset that portion of the logic circuitry failed. Troubleshooting revealed that there was an open connection across a Grayboot electrical connector. The connector was replaced and the system was returned to normal. The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Shutdown Cooling Mode (SCM) was not in demand at any time during the incident. Had the failure existed during a loss of coolant event, high drywell pressure would have prevented the common suction valve for both loops of RHR-SCM from initially being used.

"A lab analysis of the failed electrical Grayboot connector revealed an over-crimping of the connector during initial installation. The failure was attributable to improperly setting the crimping tool from its initial calibration setting prior to performing the final crimp. Six other Grayboot connectors from various other Limerick Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems were removed and analyzed in the lab. No similar incidences of over-crimping were found, therefore the identified condition is considered not to be a generic concern.

"A licensing basis review for shutdown cooling was performed. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) section 7.4.1.3.1.1 states that '...The system can use a preferred method to accomplish its design objectives by directly extracting reactor vessel water from the reactor vessel via the recirculation loop and routing it to a heat exchanger and back to the vessel. An alternate method is to indirectly extract the water via relief valve discharge lines to the suppression pool and route the suppression pool water to the heat exchanger and back to the vessel. The redundancy and diversity of RHR-SCM is also discussed in UFSAR Section 7.4.1.3.3.5. Failure of RHR - SCM is analyzed in UFSAR Section 15.2.9. Also, UFSAR Section 15.9.2.4 discusses alternate path availability to accomplish the shutdown cooling function.

"In addition, plant procedures exist to respond to a Loss of Shutdown Cooling. The Shutdown Cooling system is initiated by Off-Normal procedure ON-I 21, loss of Shutdown Cooling. Also, the other mechanism for SCM was available and is also procedurally governed by S41 .7.B Use of SRV's and Suppression Pool Cooling as an Alternate Shutdown Cooling Method.

"Based on our review of the licensing basis for shutdown cooling, we determined that the Shutdown Cooling System was not rendered incapable of performing its design safety function."

The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector of this retraction. Notified R1DO (Costello).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35452
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS LONG
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/09/1999
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/1999
Event Time: 14:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
REACTOR TRIP DURING MAINTENANCE ON REACTOR COOLANT FLOW TRANSMITTER

"On March 9, 1999, at approximately 1421 hours, the Instrument and Control department finished installing a temporary modification on loop 3 'C' channel RCS flow transmitter (FT-436) low pressure side drain line. This temporary modification consisted of cutting and capping the low side drain line because the drain line isolation valve was known to be leaking by. While unisolating the low pressure side of the transmitter, a spike occurred on the other two transmitters in loop 3. The 'B' transmitter (FT-435) spiked low enough to trip its associated bistable. This resulted in two channels tripped in one RCS loop. The 'C' channel (FT-436) had been previously been tripped as required by Technical Specifications. This resulted in a reactor trip. All equipment responded as expected. The plant is stable in the hot shutdown condition."

Heat removal is by auxiliary feedwater and steam dumps to the main condenser. No atmospheric reliefs or safeties lifted during the transient and all rods fully inserted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.