Event Notification Report for March 08, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/07/1999 - 03/08/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
35447354483544935450
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35447
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GEORGE TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GEORGE TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/08/1999
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/1999
Event Time: 11:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/1999
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/1999
Event Time: 11:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 82 | Power Operation | 82 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF SINGLE OFFSITE SIREN DURING TESTING OF ACTUATION SYSTEM
During Y2K testing of the offsite siren actuation system, a single siren actuated for about 5 seconds. The test was terminated and the system returned to pretest conditions. The licensee notified the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and informed them of the actuation. The LOEP decided not to make a public announcement on the emergency alert system as the siren was only actuated for a short period of time.
The licensee notified the local parishes and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1753 EST ON 3/25/99 BY GARY HOUSTON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The testing was not Y2K testing, but testing of a Y2K compliant software upgrade. The Y2K testing was previously completed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO (Charles Cain).
During Y2K testing of the offsite siren actuation system, a single siren actuated for about 5 seconds. The test was terminated and the system returned to pretest conditions. The licensee notified the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and informed them of the actuation. The LOEP decided not to make a public announcement on the emergency alert system as the siren was only actuated for a short period of time.
The licensee notified the local parishes and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1753 EST ON 3/25/99 BY GARY HOUSTON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The testing was not Y2K testing, but testing of a Y2K compliant software upgrade. The Y2K testing was previously completed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO (Charles Cain).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35448
Rep Org: FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE DIVISION
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE DIVISION
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GOLDING
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE DIVISION
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GOLDING
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/08/1999
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/1999
Event Time: 14:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/1999
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/1999
Event Time: 14:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT REGARDING IMPROPER HEAT TREATMENT TO CAM ROLLERS
On February 9, 1999, Coltec Industries, Fairbanks Morse Engine Division (FMED), became aware of a
potential safety hazard associated with the air and exhaust valve cam rollers for FM-ALCO 251 engines. Final analysis was completed on March 8, 1999 by Engineering and Quality Assurance. They determined the cause to be improper heat treatment of the cam rollers, which results in premature wear of the roller and possible damage to the camshaft lobe, roller pin, and push rod. The suspect rollers were induction hardened, which resulted in inadequate case depth hardness and surface hardness.
FMED had supplied the suspect rollers to Consolidated Edison Indian Point 2 nuclear power station on November 14, 1997. Based on a review of FMED records, Consolidated Edison is the only nuclear utility that is impacted.
FMED has taken corrective action to prevent reoccurrence. In addition, the tolerance used during the dedication process for the cam rollers has been changed. Other tolerances will be reviewed as parts are dedicated.
It should be noted that FMED has not been notified, nor is it aware of any air and exhaust valve cam roller failures that have occurred at any nuclear facilities. The failures that have occurred have been in commercial applications after approximately 200 hours of operation.
On February 9, 1999, Coltec Industries, Fairbanks Morse Engine Division (FMED), became aware of a
potential safety hazard associated with the air and exhaust valve cam rollers for FM-ALCO 251 engines. Final analysis was completed on March 8, 1999 by Engineering and Quality Assurance. They determined the cause to be improper heat treatment of the cam rollers, which results in premature wear of the roller and possible damage to the camshaft lobe, roller pin, and push rod. The suspect rollers were induction hardened, which resulted in inadequate case depth hardness and surface hardness.
FMED had supplied the suspect rollers to Consolidated Edison Indian Point 2 nuclear power station on November 14, 1997. Based on a review of FMED records, Consolidated Edison is the only nuclear utility that is impacted.
FMED has taken corrective action to prevent reoccurrence. In addition, the tolerance used during the dedication process for the cam rollers has been changed. Other tolerances will be reviewed as parts are dedicated.
It should be noted that FMED has not been notified, nor is it aware of any air and exhaust valve cam roller failures that have occurred at any nuclear facilities. The failures that have occurred have been in commercial applications after approximately 200 hours of operation.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35449
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARY BETH GREENDONNER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARY BETH GREENDONNER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/08/1999
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/1999
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
PLANT SECURITY REPORT
Safeguards system degradation related to potential unauthorized entry into a vital area. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
* * * UPDATE AT 1838 EST ON 3/8/99 BY MARY BETH GREENDONNER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
Additional safeguards system degradation found during additional inspection after initial report. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (R. Gardner) and R3 IAT (James Creed).
* * * UPDATE AT 1139 EST ON 3/9/99 BY MARY BETH GREENDONNER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
Additional safeguards system degradation found during additional inspection after follow-up report. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and R3 IAT (James Creed).
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (R. Gardner).
Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
Safeguards system degradation related to potential unauthorized entry into a vital area. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
* * * UPDATE AT 1838 EST ON 3/8/99 BY MARY BETH GREENDONNER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
Additional safeguards system degradation found during additional inspection after initial report. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (R. Gardner) and R3 IAT (James Creed).
* * * UPDATE AT 1139 EST ON 3/9/99 BY MARY BETH GREENDONNER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
Additional safeguards system degradation found during additional inspection after follow-up report. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and R3 IAT (James Creed).
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (R. Gardner).
Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35450
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAYMOND SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAYMOND SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/08/1999
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/1999
Event Time: 21:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/1999
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/1999
Event Time: 21:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
Two Trains of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Inoperable - Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications
"At 2042, with both U2 & U3 in Mode 1, U2 coasting down at 3145 MWth, U3 100% 3458 MWth, U2 and U3 received alarms 'SBGT C RH [Relative Humidity] TEMP HIGH' and 'SBGT C FLT [Filter] BANK HTR ELEM POWER LOST.' The system engineer reported the supply breaker for C train SBGT tripped. C SBGT was declared inoperable. B SBGT was already INOP due to scheduled maintenance. With two trains of SBGT INOP, this resulted in entering TS LCO 3.0.3 on both units immediately. At 2141, shutdown was initiated on both U2 and U3. This is reportable as a 1 hour report to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A), as 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specification.'
"Upon investigation by Engineering and Maintenance it was determined there was a problem with SBGT switch. Tech Spec Requirement 3.3.A.1 allows tripping of the logic of the inoperable flow switch and starting the affected SBGT C. This action was completed and C SBGT was declared OPERABLE and TS LCO 3.0.3 exited at 2237."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"At 2042, with both U2 & U3 in Mode 1, U2 coasting down at 3145 MWth, U3 100% 3458 MWth, U2 and U3 received alarms 'SBGT C RH [Relative Humidity] TEMP HIGH' and 'SBGT C FLT [Filter] BANK HTR ELEM POWER LOST.' The system engineer reported the supply breaker for C train SBGT tripped. C SBGT was declared inoperable. B SBGT was already INOP due to scheduled maintenance. With two trains of SBGT INOP, this resulted in entering TS LCO 3.0.3 on both units immediately. At 2141, shutdown was initiated on both U2 and U3. This is reportable as a 1 hour report to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A), as 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specification.'
"Upon investigation by Engineering and Maintenance it was determined there was a problem with SBGT switch. Tech Spec Requirement 3.3.A.1 allows tripping of the logic of the inoperable flow switch and starting the affected SBGT C. This action was completed and C SBGT was declared OPERABLE and TS LCO 3.0.3 exited at 2237."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.