Skip to main content

Event Notification Report for February 26, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/25/1999 - 02/26/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3540935410354113541535416

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35409
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1     State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE MORRISSEY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/26/1999
Notification Time: 09:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/1999
Event Time: 01:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
DISCOVERY OF A DEAD SEAL IN THE CIRCULATING WATER FOREBAY

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"A dead seal was observed in the Seabrook Station's CW (circulating) water forebay on February 26, 1999, at about 0122. It is not known whether the seal was alive or dead upon entering the offshore intake structure. This 24-hour notification is [being] made in accordance with Section 4.1 of the Environmental Protection Plan, Appendix 'B' of the Operating License."

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35410
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: M. UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 02/26/1999
Notification Time: 14:09 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/1999
Event Time: 08:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE (24-HOUR REPORT)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:

"On 02/26/99 at 0845 [CST], while performing TSR surveillances on C-333 unit 4 cell 10 Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD), it was discovered that the detector heads would not test fire. In the process of evaluating and troubleshooting, the PGLD system was placed in a condition (override mode) which would have detected a release, but was then placed back in a condition (normal mode) in which the PGLD system was inoperable. After approximately 90 minutes, the system was returned to an operable condition (override mode). The PGLD system is required to be operable when operating above atmospheric pressure. C-333 unit 4 cell 10 was operating above atmospheric pressure at the time of the failure."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification by Paducah personnel.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35411
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY NICHOLSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 02/26/1999
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
EFW SYSTEM DECLARED OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS

"On February 8, 1999, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) met with the NRC staff at NRC Headquarters to discuss a concern involving the differences in the Oconee Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system design and post-TMI licensing basis associated with the mitigation of certain Main Feedwater break scenarios. The plant design utilizes the availability of EFW from any unit should the affected unit's EFW system be lost during a Main Feedwater line break. In response, an NRC letter, dated February 24, 1999, agreed that the issue did not constitute a significant safety concern and provided an NRC interpretation that the reliance of alternate EFW sources, except for certain approved exceptions, was not consistent with the current licensing basis.

"The specific concern involves the failure to close of the upper surge tank to hotwell makeup valve (C-187) following a main feedwater line rupture, resulting in the depletion of the upper surge tank and subsequent loss of EFW on the affected unit. Should this occur, operators would restore feedwater by either cross-connecting EFW to one of the other units or starting the Standby Shutdown Facility Auxiliary Service Water pump. These alternate sources are designed and capable of supplying feedwater to the affected unit. Operators are trained and procedures are established to accomplish these tasks.

"On February 26, 1999, following review of the NRC letter, it was determined that the differences in the Oconee Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system design and post-TMI licensing basis regarding mitigation of certain Main Feedwater break scenarios, concurrent with a single active failure, constituted a condition outside the licensing basis of the plant. This condition does not constitute a safety concern due to the availability of multiple, diverse sources of feedwater. The EFW system is considered operable but in non-conformance with the licensing basis as stated in the UFSAR. Duke is evaluating options to resolve the subject UFSAR discrepancy."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.


Hospital
Event Number: 35415
Rep Org: SAN DIEGO MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: VA MEDICAL SYSTEM
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO   State: CA
County:
License #: 04-15030-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE ZORN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 02/26/1999
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/1999
Event Time: 08:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
PACKAGE RECEIVED WITH SURFACE CONTAMINATION ABOVE LIMITS

At 0810 PST, a courier delivered a shipment of radiopharmaceuticals from the SYNCOR pharmacy in San Diego, CA. Upon receipt, the licensee performed a routine wipe sample of the external surfaces of the outer container (ammo box), and discovered contamination in excess of the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.1906. Initial wipes indicated up to 30,000 CPM of gross activity for a swab that had been run over all surfaces of the container. The package contained two vials of radiopharmaceuticals; 10 mCi of Tc-99m META solution, and 10 mCi of Ga-67 (not NRC regulated). The licensee did not report any damage to the vials, and they were administered to patients. No contamination occurred at the medical center as a result of this shipment.

A more detailed survey of the container revealed up to 50,000 cpm/300cm2. The licensee did not determine the isotope of the contaminant. A representative of SYNCOR visited the medical center, and took several wipe samples for isotopic identification. The licensee plans to investigate this event with SYNCOR.


*** UPDATE ON 3/1/99 @ 1322 BY ZORN(FAX) TO GOULD ***

BASED ON WIPE SURVEYS, THREE SEPARATE LOCATIONS ON THE EXTERIOR SURFACE OF THE SYNCOR PACKAGE BORE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IN EXCESS OF THE 22 DPM/SQ CM 49 CFR 173.443 LIMIT. THE THREE AREAS MEASURED AS FOLLOWS:

PACKAGE WIPE LOCATION CALCULATED DPM/SQ CM

BOTTOM THIRD OF FRONT SIDE 89.7
MIDDLE THIRD OF FRONT SIDE 74.8
MOST OF RIGHT SIDE 206.3
(THESE VALUES WERE OBTAINED BY USING A COUNTING EFFICIENCY OF ~89% FOR Tc-99m AND Ga-67)

FOR EACH OF THESE THREE AREAS LISTED ABOVE, AN AREA OF 300 SQ CM WAS WIPED WITH AN ALCOHOL SWAB AND ANALYZED IN A SEARLE 1195 GAMMA COUNTER.

THE SUMMARY OF THE DETAILS IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. AT 0810, A SYNCOR COURIER PLACED A RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGE ON COUNTER IN ROOM 4059. THE PACKAGE CONTAINED ONE UNIT DOSE OF TECHNETIUM-99m AND ONE UNIT DOSE OF GALLIUM-67 (EACH UNIT DOSE HAD AN ACTIVITY OF 10 MILLICURIES).

2. ON RECEIPT OF THE PACKAGE ITS EXTERIOR WAS SWIPED AND PLACED INTO A GAMMA COUNTER.

3. AFTER RECORDING EXPOSURE RATES FROM THE PACKAGE SURFACE AND AT 1 METER, THE WIPE SAMPLE WAS CHECKED AT ~30000 CPM.

4. TWO SUCCESSIVE REWIPES OF THE PACKAGE EXTERIOR YIELDED ~25000 AND ~11000 CPM, RESPECTIVELY.

5. SYNCOR WAS THAN CONTACTED TO INFORM THEM THAT THE PACKAGE WAS CONTAMINATED AND THAT THEY SHOULD CHECK THE DELIVERY DRIVER AND TRUCK FOR CONTAMINATION.

6. THE VASDHS RAD SAFETY OFFICER WAS NOTIFIED.

7. THE ASSISTANT RAD SAFETY OFFICER WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A THROUGH EVALUATION OF THE PACKAGE.

8. THE PACKAGE WAS THEN MOVED FROM ROOM 4509 TO ROOM 6056.

9. FOURTEEN MORE WIPES OF FOURTEEN AREAS OF THE ENTIRE PACKAGE EXTERIOR SURFACE WERE MADE. THE AREA RANGED FROM 75 SQ CM TO 300 SQ CM.

10. THE 14 WIPES WERE ANALYZED IN A GAMMA COUNTER AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THREE AREAS BORE CONTAMINATION IN EXCESS OF THE LIMITS.

11. SYNCORE WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE PACKAGE THEY HAD DELIVERED TO VASDHS HAD EXTERIOR CONTAMINATION IN EXCESS OF THE 10 CFR 70.87(i) LIMITS.

12. THE RADIONUCLIDE WAS IDENTIFIED AS Tc-99m.

REG 4 RDO(JONES) WAS NOTIFIED.

NMSS EO(BRIAN SMITH) WAS NOTIFIED.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35416
Facility: COOK
Region: 3     State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MUTZ
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/27/1999
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/1999
Event Time: 21:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
- Potentially excessive thermal stress on two containment penetrations due to blocked cooling flow -

At 2130 on 02/26/99, with Unit 2 in cold shutdown mode in a refueling outage, the Licensee determined that on 08/02/96, with Unit 2 at 100% power, a temporary plant modification was implemented on Unit 2 which allowed for continued power operation with component cooling water (CCW) to containment penetrations #CPN-3 and #CPN-4 isolated. These penetrations contain the steam generator #2 and #3 main steam headers. This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as an event found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being in a seriously degraded condition that significantly compromised plant safety. The component cooling water return header upstream of the containment isolation valve, #2-CCR-441, (containment penetrations #CPN-3 and #CPN-4 inner cooling coils CCW outlet containment isolation valve) was discovered to contain blockage during a post maintenance activity associated with the repair of valve #2-CCR-441. The blocked line eliminated cooling flow to the penetration inner coolers, which is designed to assure integrity of the penetration sleeve. The result of operating with the CCW isolated to penetrations #CPN-3 and #CPN-4 was the creation of potentially excessive thermal stress on the penetration sleeves. Design basis information indicates that the penetration sleeve may be exposed to temperatures of as high as 150°F without experiencing degradation. It is estimated that the penetration sleeves on penetrations #CPN-3 and #CPN-4 were operated at a temperature approximating main steam temperature of approximately 600°F.

This condition was identified during an expanded system readiness review. No immediate corrective action is planned since the main steam system is currently out of service and containment integrity is not required in the current operational mode. Further analysis and corrective action will be considered during ongoing investigation under the corrective action program.

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.