Skip to main content

Event Notification Report for February 22, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/21/1999 - 02/22/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
353923539335394

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35392
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ROY GILLOW
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 02/22/1999
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/1999
Event Time: 15:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 75 Power Operation 75 Power Operation
Event Text
DISCOVERY OF MODELING ERRORS IN THE MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK ANALYSIS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"Ginna Station was notified by its NSSS vendor, Westinghouse Electric Company, of two modeling errors in the analysis for a main steam line break (MSLB) with an assumed single failure of a feedwater control valve. The first error was not taking into account the full amount of energy released to containment by the flashing of high temperature feedwater downstream of the motor-operated isolation valves after feedwater flow is isolated. The second error was a mistake in the assumed time of feedwater isolation. Isolation should have occurred at 85 seconds but incorrectly occurred at 15 seconds.

"Preliminary analyses show that in the past, under the postulated conditions of a MSLB coincident with a feedwater regulating valve failure, the containment pressure design limit may have been exceeded and that Ginna Station may have been in a condition outside the design basis of the plant. This condition is also being evaluated for the criteria of 10 CFR [Part] 21. However, a recently performed analysis for the current operating cycle using more realistic modeling assumptions, accounting for cycle specific shutdown margin values and crediting current heat sink temperatures, showed that acceptable results (less than 60 psig) were obtained. Thus, there is no concern for continued plant operation through the end of the current cycle (March 1, 1999) based on these results."

Further analyses will be performed prior to the plant restarting after the next refueling outage.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35393
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3     State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN STEIMER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 02/22/1999
Notification Time: 22:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/1999
Event Time: 20:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
BOTH STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEMS MOMENTARILY INOPERABLE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"The 'B' Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) subsystem was undergoing its 10-hour monthly surveillance testing when it was discovered that the flow indicating controller for the 'A' train was not properly displaying flow. The 'A' SBGT subsystem was declared inoperable at 1113 on 02/22/99 while monthly surveillance testing continued on the 'B' SBGT subsystem. Repairs were completed on the 'A' flow indicating controller coincident with the ongoing surveillance test on the 'B' SBGT subsystem.

"In accordance with the monthly surveillance for shutting down a 'B' SBGT subsystem, its mode selector switch was momentarily placed in the 'manual' position at 2045 hours for approximately 15 seconds, which in effect disabled 'B' SBGT from automatically starting, and it was therefore declared inoperable. For those 15 seconds, both SBGT subsystems were considered inoperable which is a condition that could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of SBGT system to control the release of radioactive material. This is considered a 4-hour reportable event per 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C).

"The 'B' SBGT subsystem was restored to operable status once the mode selector switch was returned to the 'auto' position. Surveillance testing is currently in progress on the 'A' SBGT subsystem to demonstrate operability for the repairs made to its flow indicating controller."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35394
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: R. LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 02/23/1999
Notification Time: 08:24 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/1999
Event Time: 10:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
FRED COMBS, EO (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR NOTIFICATION)

Two condensers were found with their drain valves closed. This is loss of moderation control and a violation of the NCSA requirements.

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:

"On 02/22/99 at 1015 hours, X-333 operations personnel discovered that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being maintained on off-stream cell 33-5-7. NCSA-0333_015.A03 requirement #10 states in part, 'The condenser shall remain drained and vented to atmosphere until after the R-114 is restored to the coolant system.' On cell 33-5-7, the condenser drain valve was discovered closed; therefore, the condenser was not vented. When the drain valve was opened, there was a small amount of water removed from the condenser. Due to the above condition, the plant shift superintendent (PSS) directed the X-326, X-330, and the X-333 operations personnel [to] conduct a walkdown of all off-stream cells to verify NCSA compliance. As a result of this walkdown, off-stream cell 33-8-9 was discovered with the condenser drain valve closed thus violating the same NCSA requirement. Requirement #10 was established immediately when the drain valve was opened. There was no water present on 33-8-9 when the drain valve was opened. Both of these incidents violated requirement #10 of the specified NCSA thus constituting a loss of control 'A' (moderation) in the double contingency matrix for contingency event A/B.6.b.3. Control 'B' (mass) was maintained throughout this event. A walkdown of all off-stream cells in all process buildings [was conducted and completed at 0600 EST on 02/23/99 without finding any drain valves closed]."

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Control 'A' (moderation) was lost when the condenser drain valve was found closed, and in one case, water [was] present. For criticality to occur, a leak would have to develop and have greater than safe mass present and moderated."

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAY(S) INVOLVED ... : If a deposit in the cell was greater than safe mass with optimum conditions, a criticality could occur if moderated."

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS ... : Control 'A' (moderation) was lost. Control 'B' (mass) was maintained throughout this event."

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL ... : Less than 3% enrichment
U-235. Less than safe mass at optimum conditions."

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Control 'A' (moderation) was lost when the condenser drain valve was found closed, and in one case, water [was] present. Control 'B' (mass) was maintained throughout this event."

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: 33-5-7 condenser drain valve opened and [a] small amount of water [was] removed upon discovery. 33-8-9 condenser drain valve opened with no water present upon discovery. [The] PSS directed operations personnel to walkdown all off-stream cells to verify NCSA compliance."

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.