Event Notification Report for February 19, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/18/1999 - 02/19/1999
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35389
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 02/20/1999
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/1999
Event Time: 23:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/1999
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/1999
Event Time: 23:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (CAAS) "SLAVE" SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE.
AT 2300 ON 2/19/99, AN INSTRUMENT MAINTENANCE WORK CREW DISCOVERED THE NITROGEN BOTTLE VALVED OFF WHILE RESPONDING TO A TROUBLESHOOT AND REPAIR WORK PACKAGE FOR THE X-700 CAAS "SLAVE" SYSTEM. THE REQUIRED ACTIONS FOR THIS LCO WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED UNTIL THE CAAS "SLAVE" SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 2234
THIS DISCOVERY RESULTED IN A NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENT (TSR) 2.8.3.1b LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION (LCO), WHICH STATES THE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SHALL BE OPERABLE (AUDIBLE).
THE X-700 BUILDING IS PROVIDED WITH BOTH A CAAS CLUSTER WITH ITS ASSOCIATED NITROGEN BOTTLE AND A "SLAVE" NITROGEN-DRIVEN HORN SYSTEM (INCLUDES 3 HORNS) TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE AUDIBILITY WITHIN THE BUILDING IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY.
THE CAAS CLUSTER AND ITS ASSOCIATED NITROGEN HORN REMAINED OPERABLE THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT, THEREFORE, TSR COMPLIANCE WITH THE LCO. CRITICALITY ACCIDENT DETECTION WAS MAINTAINED.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED AND THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE NOTIFIED
AT 2300 ON 2/19/99, AN INSTRUMENT MAINTENANCE WORK CREW DISCOVERED THE NITROGEN BOTTLE VALVED OFF WHILE RESPONDING TO A TROUBLESHOOT AND REPAIR WORK PACKAGE FOR THE X-700 CAAS "SLAVE" SYSTEM. THE REQUIRED ACTIONS FOR THIS LCO WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED UNTIL THE CAAS "SLAVE" SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 2234
THIS DISCOVERY RESULTED IN A NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENT (TSR) 2.8.3.1b LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION (LCO), WHICH STATES THE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SHALL BE OPERABLE (AUDIBLE).
THE X-700 BUILDING IS PROVIDED WITH BOTH A CAAS CLUSTER WITH ITS ASSOCIATED NITROGEN BOTTLE AND A "SLAVE" NITROGEN-DRIVEN HORN SYSTEM (INCLUDES 3 HORNS) TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE AUDIBILITY WITHIN THE BUILDING IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY.
THE CAAS CLUSTER AND ITS ASSOCIATED NITROGEN HORN REMAINED OPERABLE THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT, THEREFORE, TSR COMPLIANCE WITH THE LCO. CRITICALITY ACCIDENT DETECTION WAS MAINTAINED.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED AND THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE NOTIFIED
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35387
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: K. A. BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: K. A. BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 02/20/1999
Notification Time: 08:44 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/1999
Event Time: 10:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/1999
Notification Time: 08:44 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/1999
Event Time: 10:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
WATER INVENTORY CONTROL SYSTEM ACTIVATION
A water inventory control system (WICS) activation occurred on C-360 position 4 autoclave on February 19, 1999, at 1005 CST. A high level drain primary alarm was received during a cylinder sampling heat cycle. The safety system did operate as required (shuts off steam to the autoclave which reduces the amount of condensation in the autoclave). The purpose of the WICS is to limit the amount of condensate in the autoclave. The cause of this actuation is being investigated. The certificate holder thinks that this event might have been caused by an invalid signal, and if it is determined that this event was caused by an invalid signal, this event notification will be retracted at a later time.
The safety system actuation is reportable per Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.9, Table 1, Criteria J.2, Safety System Actuation due to a Valid Signal, as a 24-hour event notification.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event.
***RETRACTION on 03/12/99 at 1324 EST from W. F. Cage taken by MacKinnon****
Subsequent investigation and troubleshooting of the autoclave systems has concluded that the WICS actuated due to an invalid signal. This condition is supported by the following:
1. The actuation occurred at a point in the heating cycle after the maximum steam demand and resulting highest condensate load has passed. Past history has shown that valid actuations occur during maximum steam and condensate load, not afterward at lower loads.
2. The actuation was initiated by the primary condensate probe only. The secondary condensate probe did not alarm until after the steam supply had been isolated by the WICS actuation, which caused a drop in autoclave pressure supplying the motive force, driving the condensate out into the drain. This, and testing subsequent to the event, proved that both probes were operable and would have alarmed had water in the drain actually risen to the probe level.
3. The drain line was inspected, and no obstruction was noted that could have caused a blockage or disruption of condensate flow.
4. Inspection of the autoclave electrical systems indicated that some of the condensate probe wires were not properly, or firmly, grounded. These loose connections are considered to be the most likely cause of the WICS actuation. This would be an actuation from an invalid signal, i.e., not what the safety system is designed to protect against.
The NRC resident inspector was not notified of this event by the certificate holder. The NRC Region 3 (Ron Gardner) and NMSS EO (Fred Combs) were notified by the NRC operations officer.
A water inventory control system (WICS) activation occurred on C-360 position 4 autoclave on February 19, 1999, at 1005 CST. A high level drain primary alarm was received during a cylinder sampling heat cycle. The safety system did operate as required (shuts off steam to the autoclave which reduces the amount of condensation in the autoclave). The purpose of the WICS is to limit the amount of condensate in the autoclave. The cause of this actuation is being investigated. The certificate holder thinks that this event might have been caused by an invalid signal, and if it is determined that this event was caused by an invalid signal, this event notification will be retracted at a later time.
The safety system actuation is reportable per Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.9, Table 1, Criteria J.2, Safety System Actuation due to a Valid Signal, as a 24-hour event notification.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event.
***RETRACTION on 03/12/99 at 1324 EST from W. F. Cage taken by MacKinnon****
Subsequent investigation and troubleshooting of the autoclave systems has concluded that the WICS actuated due to an invalid signal. This condition is supported by the following:
1. The actuation occurred at a point in the heating cycle after the maximum steam demand and resulting highest condensate load has passed. Past history has shown that valid actuations occur during maximum steam and condensate load, not afterward at lower loads.
2. The actuation was initiated by the primary condensate probe only. The secondary condensate probe did not alarm until after the steam supply had been isolated by the WICS actuation, which caused a drop in autoclave pressure supplying the motive force, driving the condensate out into the drain. This, and testing subsequent to the event, proved that both probes were operable and would have alarmed had water in the drain actually risen to the probe level.
3. The drain line was inspected, and no obstruction was noted that could have caused a blockage or disruption of condensate flow.
4. Inspection of the autoclave electrical systems indicated that some of the condensate probe wires were not properly, or firmly, grounded. These loose connections are considered to be the most likely cause of the WICS actuation. This would be an actuation from an invalid signal, i.e., not what the safety system is designed to protect against.
The NRC resident inspector was not notified of this event by the certificate holder. The NRC Region 3 (Ron Gardner) and NMSS EO (Fred Combs) were notified by the NRC operations officer.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35384
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 02/19/1999
Notification Time: 13:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/1999
Event Time: 09:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/1999
Notification Time: 13:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/1999
Event Time: 09:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JIM TRAPP (R1)
JIM TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SEVERAL ESF ACTUATIONS OCCURRED DUE TO THE UNEXPECTED DE-ENERGIZATION OF THE "D" 4.16KV VITAL BUS.
DURING THE CONDUCT OF AN 18 MONTH DEGRADED VOLTAGE TEST OF THE "D" 4.16KV VITAL BUS INFEED BREAKER, THE BUS WAS INADVERTENTLY DE-ENERGIZED RESULTING IN A BUS UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION. THE RELAY TECHNICIAN CONDUCTING THE TEST STATED THAT THE NORMAL INFEED BREAKER TRIPPED OPEN AS HE WITHDREW HIS VOLTMETER LEADS UPON COMPLETING THE DEGRADED VOLTAGE RELAY STATUS CHECK. THE CAUSE OF THIS BREAKER TRIP IS UNKNOWN AND BEING INVESTIGATED. THE ALTERNATE FEED BREAKER DID NOT CLOSE WHEN THE NORMAL INFEED TRIPPED, AND THE "D" VITAL BUS WAS DE-ENERGIZED AS A RESULT. AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, THE PLANT WAS IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 WITH CORE OFF LOAD IN PROGRESS. "A" AND "C" CHANNELS OF ELECTRICAL POWER AND SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT WERE PROTECTED AND AVAILABLE. THE "D" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR HAD BEEN CLEARED AND TAGGED FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE, AND THE "DD447" 125 VDC BATTERY WAS ALSO CLEARED AND TAGGED FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE. THE LOSS OF THE 4.16 KV BUS DE-ENERGIZED THE ASSOCIATED "D" CHANNEL 480 VAC UNIT SUBSTATION, MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS, AND UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES. THE LOSS OF THIS ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT CAUSED A LOSS OF THE CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION, REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION, AND REACTOR WATER CLEANUP PUMPS. THE "A" RHR PUMP REMAINED IN SHUTDOWN COOLING AND WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE LOSS OF THE "D" BUS. THE FRVS SYSTEM WAS PLACED IN SERVICE TO RESTORE THE REACTOR BUILDING TO A NEGATIVE PRESSURE. ONE OF TWO COMMON SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES WAS DE-ENERGIZED IN THE OPEN POSITION, AS WELL AS THE "A" SHUTDOWN COOLING RETURN TO THE REACTOR VESSEL. CORE ALTERATIONS WERE TERMINATED AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, AND THERE WAS NO IMPACT TO PLANT SAFETY. BUS RESTORATION AND ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION IS IN PROGRESS.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/2/99 @ 2215 BY CONICELLA TO GOULD * * * EVENT RETRACTION
THE LICENSEE HAS REVIEWED THIS EVENT AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE SELF INDUCED UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION ON THE BUS DID NOT ACTUATE THE ESF EQUIPMENT (DIESEL GENERATOR) SINCE IT WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE, THIS EVENT WAS NOT REPORTABLE AND IS BEING RETRACTED.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.
THE REG 1 RDO (MODES) WAS NOTIFIED.
DURING THE CONDUCT OF AN 18 MONTH DEGRADED VOLTAGE TEST OF THE "D" 4.16KV VITAL BUS INFEED BREAKER, THE BUS WAS INADVERTENTLY DE-ENERGIZED RESULTING IN A BUS UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION. THE RELAY TECHNICIAN CONDUCTING THE TEST STATED THAT THE NORMAL INFEED BREAKER TRIPPED OPEN AS HE WITHDREW HIS VOLTMETER LEADS UPON COMPLETING THE DEGRADED VOLTAGE RELAY STATUS CHECK. THE CAUSE OF THIS BREAKER TRIP IS UNKNOWN AND BEING INVESTIGATED. THE ALTERNATE FEED BREAKER DID NOT CLOSE WHEN THE NORMAL INFEED TRIPPED, AND THE "D" VITAL BUS WAS DE-ENERGIZED AS A RESULT. AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, THE PLANT WAS IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 WITH CORE OFF LOAD IN PROGRESS. "A" AND "C" CHANNELS OF ELECTRICAL POWER AND SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT WERE PROTECTED AND AVAILABLE. THE "D" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR HAD BEEN CLEARED AND TAGGED FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE, AND THE "DD447" 125 VDC BATTERY WAS ALSO CLEARED AND TAGGED FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE. THE LOSS OF THE 4.16 KV BUS DE-ENERGIZED THE ASSOCIATED "D" CHANNEL 480 VAC UNIT SUBSTATION, MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS, AND UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES. THE LOSS OF THIS ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT CAUSED A LOSS OF THE CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION, REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION, AND REACTOR WATER CLEANUP PUMPS. THE "A" RHR PUMP REMAINED IN SHUTDOWN COOLING AND WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE LOSS OF THE "D" BUS. THE FRVS SYSTEM WAS PLACED IN SERVICE TO RESTORE THE REACTOR BUILDING TO A NEGATIVE PRESSURE. ONE OF TWO COMMON SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES WAS DE-ENERGIZED IN THE OPEN POSITION, AS WELL AS THE "A" SHUTDOWN COOLING RETURN TO THE REACTOR VESSEL. CORE ALTERATIONS WERE TERMINATED AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, AND THERE WAS NO IMPACT TO PLANT SAFETY. BUS RESTORATION AND ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION IS IN PROGRESS.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/2/99 @ 2215 BY CONICELLA TO GOULD * * * EVENT RETRACTION
THE LICENSEE HAS REVIEWED THIS EVENT AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE SELF INDUCED UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION ON THE BUS DID NOT ACTUATE THE ESF EQUIPMENT (DIESEL GENERATOR) SINCE IT WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE, THIS EVENT WAS NOT REPORTABLE AND IS BEING RETRACTED.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.
THE REG 1 RDO (MODES) WAS NOTIFIED.