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Event Notification Report for February 18, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/17/1999 - 02/18/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
353823538335412

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35382
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4     State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 02/18/1999
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE YANDELL (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
Improper sequencing could have allowed a control room fire to create a hot short across any of several main control board hand switches.

During corrective actions associated with LER 98-004-00 (submitted to NRC by letter dated November 6, 1998), Wolf Creek Generating Station personnel determined that off-normal procedure OFN RP-017 sequence of actions historically allowed control power to be removed from the "B" train ESF bus before rotating the Normal / Isolate switch to the "Isolate" position. This improper sequencing could have allowed a control room fire to create a hot short across any of several main control board hand switches (i.e., ESW "B", CCW "B", Charging "B", Load Centers on "B" train, Pressurizer Backup Heaters, and Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "B"); the most significant of which is the EDG "B." This hot short could potentially result in a loss of availability of any or all of the previously listed components. Because a loss of offsite power and the loss of EDG "A" are assumed coincident with a control room fire, the loss of EDG "B" could result in a station blackout. The resultant scenario is inconsistent with Wolf Creek fire safe shutdown commitments associated with Appendix R of 10CFR50, which are contained in Letter #SLNRC 84-109.

As noted above, this is a historical occurrence. Revision 12 of the controlling procedure (OFN RP-017) corrected the improper sequencing.

In accordance with NUREG-1022, this event is reportable as a condition outside the design basis of the plant.
This issue also constituted a loss of safe shutdown capability and a violation of License Condition 2.C (5), which indicates that Wolf Creek may not make changes to the approved fire protection program which significantly decreases the level of fire protection to the plant without prior NRC approval. Section 2.F of the Operating License requires Wolf Creek to report any violations of Section 2.C of the Operating License to the NRC within 24 hours,

The root cause and associated corrective actions will be reported to the NRC in a supplement to LER 98-004 and will include systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of the event on the plant, actions taken or planned, etc.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35383
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BRIAN STETSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 02/18/1999
Notification Time: 21:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/1999
Event Time: 20:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 97 Power Operation 97 Power Operation
Event Text
LEAKAGE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT EXCEEDED ITS 60 GPH LIMIT.

AT 2040 ON 02/18/99, RELIEF VALVE #1E12-F0036 ON THE LINE FROM THE RHR HEAT EXCHANGERS TO THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS DETERMINED TO BE LEAKING AT 75 GPH INTO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP. THE RCIC SYSTEM IS ALIGNED TO THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK, NOT TO THE SUPPRESSION POOL. IN THE EVENT THAT THE RCIC SYSTEM IS NEEDED IN AN ACCIDENT, IT COULD ALIGN TO THE SUPPRESSION POOL, RESULTING IN SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEAKING OUT OF CONTAINMENT. THE PLANT IS NOT IN ANY LCO ACTION STATEMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT WHEN REPAIRS TO THE VALVE COMMENCES, THE RCIC SYSTEM WILL BE DECLARED INOPERABLE AND THE LICENSEE WILL ENTER A 14 DAY LCO. THE HPCS SYSTEM HAS BEEN VERIFIED TO BE OPERABLE.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.

* * * RETRACTED AT 0806 EST ON 3/18/99 BY BRIAN STETSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *

Upon further engineering review, the doses calculated with a leakage of 135 gph were determined to be less that allowed by both 10CFR50 Appendix A and 10CFR100. Since no regulatory limits would have been exceeded during an accident, a condition that was outside of the design basis did not exist. Therefore, the licensee has retracted this event notification.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of this retraction. The Headquarters Operations Officer informed the R3DO (Geoffrey Wright).


Hospital
Event Number: 35412
Rep Org: MAYO CLINIC
Licensee: MAYO FOUNDATION
Region: 3
City: ROCHESTER   State: MN
County:
License #: 22-00519-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD VETTER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 02/26/1999
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION 21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
KEVIN RAMSEY (fax) (NMSS)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
Event Text
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - TREATMENT SOFTWARE ERROR CAUSED MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION

The licensee reported that a medical misadministration occurred on 2/18/1999 due to a problem with treatment planning software (TCP Version 1.20 upgrade) provided by Nucletron of Columbia, Maryland. The misadministration was identified on 2/25/1999 and verified on 2/26/1999. Specifically, a patient was prescribed a dose of 4500 rads by external beam; however, due to a problem with the treatment software, the patient was also given a dose of 200 rads to the area from a high dose rate brachytherapy unit. The patient and the referring physician have both been informed of the misadministration.

The licensee submitted the following information in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21:

"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component:
High dose rate afterloader treatment (Ir-192 microselectron HDR V2)
Device software (TCS Version 1.20 upgrade)

"Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which failed to comply:
Nucletron, Columbia, MD

"Nature of the failure and safety hazard that could be created:
The software allows more than one active cell on a treatment planning sheet.

"This allows parameters within another cell to be modified while not working in that cell. In this case, dwell time and step size were simultaneously active. While purposely intending to change dwell time, step size can change without alerting the user. This could result in a possible therapy misadministration under 10CFR35.

"Date on which information of defect was obtained:
February 25, 1999

"Number and location of all such components:
Mayo Foundation has only one such device. It is located in the Charlton Building, Room CHS-209. Nucletron can supply information regarding other facilities using the device.

"Corrective action:
Mayo Foundation modified its procedures to require a pretreatment check that includes step size; this action has been completed. All individuals who manually enter treatment data will be made aware of the defect and told to visually confirm their entries prior to printing the pretreatment report; this action will be completed by Tuesday, March 2, 1999.

"On Friday, February 26, Mayo Foundation notified Nucletron of the anomaly suggesting they correct their computer software."