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Event Notification Report for February 10, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/09/1999 - 02/10/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
35366353613536235363

Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35366
Rep Org: U. S. ARMY (ACALA)
Licensee: U. S. ARMY (ACALA)
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND   State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM MOHS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 02/12/1999
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
Event Text
LOST MUZZLE REFERENCE SENSOR

A unit stationed in Kuwait removed a foggy muzzle reference sensor (MRS) containing 10 curies of tritium. The MRS was triple bagged and transported to headquarters for maintenance in a truck, which was used for transporting garbage to the dump before its removal at headquarters. The MRS was apparently dumped with the garbage in a Kuwait dump. A safety investigation is underway. Their reference number is 99-11. The device is not considered a hazard to personnel.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35361
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 02/10/1999
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/1999
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
BOB PIERSON (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4-HOUR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING INCORRECT RAFFINATE MASS AND CONCENTRATION CALCULATION

On 02/10/99, X-705 building personnel discovered that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement had not been maintained in the X-705 Decontamination Facility. Uranium recovery waste stream solutions are sampled to determine the U-235 concentration, mass, and enrichment as spelled out in NCSA-0705_027, Heavy Metals Precipitation. These sample results are used to calculate U-235 concentration and U-235 mass prior to transferring and processing the waste solutions as identified in the administrative requirements of the NCSA.

Sample results for raffinate solutions (recovery waste streams) were recorded incorrectly on the raffinate transfer sheet and the heavy metals batch sheets. The double contingency principle was violated as result of: 1) failure of the operator to correctly determine the U-235 concentration prior to transfer (control "A") and 2) failure of supervision to find the error while verifying the data and calculations (control "B"). This error resulted in solution being transferred and processed to a geometrically unfavorable sludge collection tub without the correct U-235 concentration and U-235 mass being recorded.

There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is low. This is because when this material was sampled for enrichment, the enrichment was found to be 3.95% U-235. Also, due to the reduction of HEU material on site, material now being processed through the heavy metals systems routinely has an enrichment less than 10% U-235.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): For a criticality to occur, both calculations of how much material is in the system must be wrong and the total mass of material must exceed 760 grams U-235. The minimum critical mass for 100% enriched material is approximately 760 grams U-235. Even if the enrichment had been 100%, the total mass in the system as a result of this event would have been 245 grams.

Also, a second path would be the processing material and collecting material with greater than the minimum critical mass in the heavy metals collection drums.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC.): The controlled parameter in this case was mass. (Both of the mass controls were lost because the calculations were in error.)

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The total amount of material in the system was 245 grams U-235 assuming an enrichment of 100%. The enrichment was measured after the event and found to be 3.95% U-235. The material was uranium solution. The minimum critical mass at 100% enrichment is approximately 760 grams U-235, and using the 100% enriched values, the percent worst case critical mass is 32.2%.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: NCSA-0705_027 requires that material to be processed through the heavy metals recovery system is sampled and the total amount of uranium in the material calculated and recorded by an operator on a transfer sheet and verified by another operator or supervisor on the same sheet. If the enrichment of the sample is not known, an enrichment of 100% is assumed for the calculation. The total amount of U-235 allowed to be processed at any time is limited to 200 grams. The calculations done by both the operator and the verifier used a concentration value ten times less than the actual enrichment, which was only 3.95%.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: The heavy metals precipitation was shutdown and isolated. Similar operations (microfiltration filter press and oil and grease removal unit ) were also shut down and isolated. An investigation has been initiated to determine if similar anomalous conditions exists in those operations.

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the Portsmouth personnel.

*************** UPDATE AT 1825 ON 02/17/99 FROM JOE HALCOMB RECEIVED BY TROCINE ***************

On 02/10/99, the error in the mass values for the sludge collection drum was corrected. This changed the total U-235 mass in the drum from 43.02 grams to 139.78 grams. This value is below the NCSA limit of 200 grams.

Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan), NMSS EO (Haughney), and IRO (Hogan).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35362
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2     State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: W. R. DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/10/1999
Notification Time: 21:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/1999
Event Time: 20:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
- FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT -

A LICENSED OPERATOR WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL DURING A RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST. THE EMPLOYEE'S ACCESS AUTHORIZATION TO THE PLANT HAS BEEN DEACTIVATED. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

***UPDATE ON 02/11/99 AT 0925ET FROM C. MEYER TAKEN BY MACKINNON****

A URINE SAMPLE WAS TAKEN ON 02/10/99 AT 2000 HOURS, BUT THE SAMPLE HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED. THE LICENSED OPERATOR FAILED A BREATHALYZER TEST (TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL). THE INDIVIDUAL FAILED A SECOND BREATHALYZER TEST FOR ALCOHOL FROM A DIFFERENT BREATHALYZER MACHINE.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER NOTIFIED THE R2DO (TOM DECKER).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35363
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 02/11/1999
Notification Time: 04:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/1999
Event Time: 11:37 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
During a postulated seismic event, Component Cooling Water (CCW) isolation valves which separate the CCW critical loops from the non-critical loop may not operate.

"At 1137 PST on February 10, 1999, with Unit 2 in a refueling outage and Unit 3 at about 100 percent power, SCE concluded that isolation valves which separate CCW critical loops [loops to safety-related equipment] from the non-Critical Loop (NCL) may not have operated during a postulated seismic event.

"The CCW system is required to perform its intended safety function during a seismic event concurrent with a Loss of Coolant Accident. These valves (28-inch Fisher Type-9241 air/nitrogen-operated butterfly valves) close on a CCW surge tank low-low level alarm or when a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) is received. These isolation valves are normally actuated with non-seismically qualified instrument air and normal nitrogen. During a postulated seismic event, the air and nitrogen systems are assumed to fail. A seismically qualified accumulator tank provides the motive force to close the isolation valves during such events. This actuation occurs through the pressurization and venting of pneumatic tubing.

"During outage testing [first time the test has been performed this way] of the Train A CCW isolation valves, the valves would not stroke closed within the required time when actuated by the accumulators only. SCE's Air-Operated Valve diagnostic testing determined the pneumatic tube sizing provided insufficient venting to properly actuate the valves, which cause the isolation valves to stroke slower than desired. When the isolation valves between one CCW critical loop and the non-critical loop are opened, SCE now considers that CCW critical loop to be inoperable.

"During past plant operation, it is possible that one CCW critical loop was out of service while the remaining critical loop was not isolated from the non-critical loop. If a seismic event were to have occurred in this configuration, it is possible the plant would not have had an operable train of CCW. Consequently, SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).

"Currently, Unit 2 is in Mode 6 in a refueling outage; there is no safety function requiring the valves to close in this mode. At Unit 3, both CCW trains are functional with the isolation valves for one train closed. In this configuration, Unit 3 is in a 72-hour action statement. SCE plans to modify the valve actuator design within 72 hours to correct this condition."

The licensee said that the isolation valves mentioned above should normally close within 10 to 15 seconds. During testing of the valve, the licensee believed that it took approximately 47 seconds for the valves to close.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE AT 2002 EST ON 02/11/99 BY CLAY WILLIAMS TO FANGIE JONES * * *

The licensee noted a typographical error in the original report as reported. The time reported in the first quoted paragraph should be 1137 PM or 2337 PST.

The R4DO (John Pellet) was notified by the NRC Operations Officer.