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Event Notification Report for February 09, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/08/1999 - 02/09/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
35358353593536035399

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35358
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3     State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DICK FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/09/1999
Notification Time: 17:52 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
JOSE CALVO, EO (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM

WITH THE TRAIN 'A' CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION (CBV) SYSTEM STANDBY FILTER UNIT (SFU) INOPERABLE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE PHOTOCELL FOR THE 'B' TRAIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH (DPS) (#7304B) WAS NOT ILLUMINATED. THIS CONDITION PREVENTS THE DPS FROM PERFORMING ITS FUNCTION TO CONTROL THE TRAIN 'B' SFU HEATERS, RENDERING THE TRAIN 'B' CBV SYSTEM SFU INOPERABLE.

WITH BOTH TRAINS OF THE CBV SYSTEM SFUs INOPERABLE, THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECH SPEC LCO A/S 3.0.3 WHICH REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO BEGIN SHUTTING THE PLANT DOWN WITHIN ONE HOUR AND TO PLACE THE PLANT IN AT LEAST CONDITION 2 (STARTUP) WITHIN NINE HOURS.

THE LICENSEE PLANS TO REPLACE THE FAILED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH WITHIN EIGHT HOURS.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35359
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF SHIPE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/09/1999
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/1999
Event Time: 18:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS 21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
LAURIE PELUSO (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation
Event Text
- Non-conservative dose calculation methodology is a condition outside the design basis of Unit 1 -

As a result of LER 2-97-008 corrective actions, non-conservative inputs have been identified that is associated with the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) methodology in calculating radiation doses for accidents which must analyze for a concurrent iodine spike as part of their radiological analyses. The identified non-conservative factors during past operation, could have resulted in the calculated control room personnel dose values exceeding 10CFR50 Appendix A, Criterion 19 thyroid limits. Since BVPS no longer has reasonable assurance that acceptance criteria for control room personnel dose limits per Criterion 19 would have been met during past operation, the identified non-conservative dose calculation methodology was a condition which was outside the design basis of the plant per 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii). This condition is also being evaluated for the criteria in 10CFR Part 21.

For BVPS, the only Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) which involve a concurrent iodine spike analysis are Main Steam Line Break, Small Line Breaks (e.g., letdown line break outside containment), and Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The most significant of the non-conservative issues is purification (i.e., letdown) flow, which was given as 60 gpm. This is the lower limit of the plant design flow rate range of 60-120 gpm. Analysis using 60 gpm results in a significant underestimation of the concurrent iodine spike source term as compared to operation at the upper design limit of 120 gpm. Of lesser importance were underestimated demineralizer decontamination factor, overestimated reactor coolant system (RCS) mass and inadequate use of RCS leakage as an iodine removal mechanism. It has been determined that correcting the above identified non-conservative factor would raise calculated control room personnel dose values of those events analyzed for concurrent iodine spikes by at least 40% and potentially as high as 140%.

Until the BVPS dose calculations can be formally revised to address the identified non-conservative factors, the station has placed administrative controls on the extent of steady state letdown flow to ensure that plant operation remains within past analyzed limits. The influence of the other identified non-conservative factors have also been reviewed and determined not to be an operability concern at this time.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1110 ON 02/19/99 FROM JIM DAUGHERTY TO JOLLIFFE * * *

The licensee is evaluating the above described issue and at 1600 on 02/18/99, they determined that it also meets the reportability criteria pursuant to l0CFR Part 21 specifically for Beaver Valley Unit 1. The generic issue (Westinghouse issue) is applicable to both Beaver Valley Units I and 2. A written report will be supplied pursuant to 10CFR Part 21 and I0CFR50.73 in a supplement to LER 2-97-008.

Until the Beaver Valley dose calculations can be formally revised to address the identified non-conservative factors, BVPS has implemented administrative controls to ensure that plant operation remains within past analyzed limits.

The licensee is continuing to evaluate this issue.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Jim Trapp and NRR Vern Hodge.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35360
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDRE DALL'AU
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/09/1999
Notification Time: 21:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/1999
Event Time: 21:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
- BOTH UNIT ERDS LOST DUE TO ERDADS COMPUTER FAILURE -

AT 2100 ON 02/09/99, THE COMMON EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA ACQUISITION AND DISPLAY SYSTEM (ERDADS) COMPUTER FAILED CAUSING A LOSS OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) FOR BOTH UNITS. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE LOSS. AT 2110, THE LICENSEE RESTORED THE UNIT 3 ERDS TO OPERABLE STATUS AND IS RESTORING THE UNIT 4 ERDS.

THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35399
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4     State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 02/24/1999
Notification Time: 19:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/1999
Event Time: 10:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
DISCOVERY OF MISPOSITIONED OUTLET VALVES ON THE UNIT 1 ESSENTIAL CHILLERS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On February 9, 1999, at 0510 MST, Unit 1 essential chillers 1MECAE01 and 1MECBE01 were started in support of maintenance work in-progress on other equipment. At approximately 1045 [MST], the temperatures of the essential chiller oil reservoirs were found to be reading 193°F/190°F, respectively. Within the next 15 minutes, the temperatures increased to 200°F/195°F, respectively. Inspections revealed that oil cooler outlet valves ECAV321 and ECAV421 were required to be adjusted to bring the oil cooler temperatures within the normal band of 140 - 150°F. Preliminary evaluations indicate that craft personnel may have mispositioned the valves during the recent installation of insulation on adjacent chiller lines. At approximately 1045 MST on February 9, 1999, the valves were adjusted, and the oil temperatures were returned within acceptable limits. Reasonable operator actions corrected the temperature problem; however, an apparent human error (valve mispositioning) did occur that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function were it not corrected. The Unit 2 and Unit 3 lube oil cooler outlet valves were inspected and found to be in the correct position.

"Engineering personnel have since evaluated the impact of the mispositioned outlet valves on the essential chiller and determined that the mispositioned valves could have caused the chillers to trip in approximately 6-1/2 hours. Therefore, in the event of a loss of coolant accident concurrent with a loss of power, the essential chillers could not have performed their intended design basis function, and this event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii). Reportability was determined at approximately 1445 MST on February 24, 1999."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTED ON 3/26/99 AT 1820 EST BY DAN MARKS TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"On February 9, 1999 the Unit 1 Essential Chillers 1MECAE01 and 1MECRE01 were running when the temperatures of the oil reservoirs were found to be elevated above the normal band. It was initially thought that the chillers would have tripped, within 6.5 hours from the start of the chillers at 0510 MST, on high compressor bearing oil temperature.

"Investigation of the event following the ENS notification has concluded that both chillers would have continued to operate and would not have tripped. The chillers' oil temperatures had stabilized at elevated temperatures with enough margin from the trip setpoint to ensure their continued operation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R4DO (Charles Cain).