Event Notification Report for February 05, 1999

- STYRENE RESIN SPILLED FROM RUPTURED LINE IN ALLIED TECHNOLOGY GROUP Q-CEP BUILDING -

AT 0430 ON 02/05/99, A STAINLESS STEEL ELBOW ON THE DE-INVENTORY LINE FROM THE DYNAMIC AIR SYSTEM TO THE TOP OF THE 10-FOOT DIAMETER STORAGE TANK (#T106A) IN THE RESIN PREPARATION AREA OF THE ALLIED TECHNOLOGY GROUP/MMT QUANTUM CATALYTIC EXTRACTION PROCESS (Q-CEP) BUILDING RUPTURED AND CONTAMINATED THE Q-CEP BUILDING. THE CONTAMINATION RESULTED IN A ONE-INCH LAYER OF SOLID STYRENE RESINS IN PARTS OF THE Q-CEP BUILDING WITH CONTAMINATION LEVELS BETWEEN 400,000 AND 600,000 dpm. THE ISOTOPES ARE MIXED FISSION PRODUCTS INCLUDING Co-60, Cs-134, AND Cs-137. THE EXACT ACTIVITY IS UNKNOWN, BUT IT EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF THE "TN STATE REGULATIONS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION" [#1200-2-5-141(2)(c)1(ii)]. THE TN INCIDENT FILE NUMBER IS #TN-99-017.

THIS FACILITY PROCESSES SPENT RESIN FROM COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

CURRENT PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE DATA INDICATES THAT NO PERSONNEL RECEIVED AN INHALATION EXPOSURE, THAT NO PERSONNEL WERE OVEREXPOSED, AND THAT THIS EVENT DOES NOT POSE AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for contact telephone numbers.)

- Damaged package containing two vials of Xe-133 (20 millicuries each) at FEDEX facility in Memphis, TN -

At 1530 on 02/05/99, DuPont Pharmaceuticals, Inc., notified the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program that two vials containing 20 millicuries each of Xe-133 had been lost in transit from their Billerica, Massachusetts, facility to a licensee in Wichita, Kansas. The damaged package was discovered at the Federal Express hub facility in Memphis, Tennessee. At this time, the FEDEX health physicist and safety officer are conducting a search at the hub facility. DuPont Pharmaceuticals expects to submit a written report to the Radiation Control Program early next week.

The licensee reports the dose rate from an unshielded vial to be approximately 250 millirem per hour per millicurie.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number.)

- IN-SITU LEACH MINE MONITOR WELL PLACED IN EXCURSION STATUS -

THE 'B' MONITOR WELL #M-64 AT THE IN-SITU LEACH MINE OPERATIONS AT THE HIGHLAND URANIUM PROJECT, GLENROCK, WY, WAS PLACED IN EXCURSION STATUS BECAUSE TWO OF THREE MONITORED PARAMETERS WERE ABOVE THEIR SPECIFIED LIMITS: CHLORIDES - 9 MILLIGRAMS PER LITER (LIMIT IS 11); BICARBONATES - 413 MILLIGRAMS PER LITER (LIMIT IS 281); CONDUCTIVITY - 749 MICROMHOS PER CENTIMETER (LIMIT IS 735). THE LICENSEE FEELS THAT THIS IS A FALSE EXCURSION THAT IS NOT A RESULT OF THE LEACH MINE OPERATION BUT IS DUE TO AN OLD ABANDONED UNDERGROUND MINE LOCATED NEARBY. THIS SITUATION HAS OCCURRED IN THE PAST.

THE RESULTING RISK IS NIL, AND THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON LOCAL PEOPLE, LIVESTOCK, WILDLIFE, OR THE ENVIRONMENT AND NO THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO COLLECT ADDITIONAL SAMPLES, NOTIFY STATE AUTHORITIES, AND SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC WITHIN 60 DAYS.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number.)

- 12.3% UNDER-DOSE DURING A CANCEROUS BRAIN TUMOR TREATMENT USING A GAMMA KNIFE -

AT 0830 CST ON 02/06/99, WHILE REVIEWING A PATIENT'S MEDICAL CHART, A HOSPITAL SURGEON DETERMINED THAT DURING A CANCER TREATMENT FOR A BRAIN TUMOR USING A GAMMA KNIFE (201 Co-60 SOURCES) ON 01/06/99, THE PATIENT WAS ADMINISTERED AN UNDER-DOSE BY 12.3%. THERE WERE NO APPARENT ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE PATIENT. HOSPITAL PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THE PATIENT AND HIS PHYSICIAN.

HOSPITAL PERSONNEL ARE PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE ANY ADDITIONAL TREATMENTS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. HOSPITAL PERSONNEL PLAN TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO NRC REGION 3 WITHIN 15 DAYS.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number.)

- RHR & CS SYSTEMS FLOW INSTRUMENT POWER SUPPLY LINES ROUTED IN SAME CABLE TRAY -

AT 1725 ON 02/05/99, DURING A REVIEW FOR A DESIGN CHANGE, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE 120-VAC POWER FEED TO POWER SUPPLY #PS10-100B IS ROUTED IN THE SAME DIVISION II CABLE TRAY AS POWER SUPPLY #PS10-100A. THESE TWO POWER SUPPLIES ARE INTENDED TO BE REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER AND SUPPLY POWER TO REDUNDANT TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM AND CORE SPRAY (CS) SYSTEM FLOW INSTRUMENTATION. A LICENSEE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION CONCLUDED THAT THE FLOW INSTRUMENTATION IS OPERABLE, AND THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON PRESENT PLANT OPERATIONS. THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

***RETRACTION ON 03/05/99 AT 1532ET BY ANDREW WISNIEWSKI TAKEN BY MACKINNON***

EVENT IS BEING RETRACTED AFTER FURTHER EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE ABOVE MENTIONED FLOW INSTRUMENTATION IS STILL CLASSIFIED UNDER THE ORIGINAL SER (REG. GUIDE 1.97 SUBMITTAL) AS TYPE "D", CATEGORY 2 AND 3, WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE REDUNDANCY. IN ADDITION A REVIEW HAS CONFIRMED THAT THIS IS NOT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED INSTRUMENTATION. R1DO(MICHAEL MODES ) NOTIFIED.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS RETRACTION BY THE LICENSEE.