Event Notification Report for February 01, 1999

UNIT 2 DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WERE PREPARING TO RACK OUT ELECTRICAL BREAKER "2A04-18", WHEN THE BREAKER UNEXPECTEDLY CLOSED. THIS BREAKER, WHICH WAS OUT-OF-SERVICE AT THE TIME, SUPPLIES POWER TO THE 4160 VAC CLASS 1-E BUS "2A04" FROM THE RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER. AS A RESULT, AT 1009 PST THE "2A04" BUS DEENERGIZED CAUSING A LOSS OF BOTH THE OPERATING TRAIN "A" SHUTDOWN COOLING PUMP AND THE CROSS-TIED CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP "A" WHICH WAS SUPPLYING SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING. THE STANDBY EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTOSTARTED BUT DID NOT CLOSE ONTO THE BUS DUE TO A PROTECTIVE RELAY LOCKOUT. CORE ALTERATIONS WERE SUSPENDED. AT 1014 PST, THE "2A04" BUS WAS REENERGIZED AND AT 1025 PST SHUTDOWN COOLING FLOW WAS RESTORED. DURING THE 16 MINUTES THAT SHUTDOWN COOLING WAS LOST, INDICATED TEMPERATURE AS MEASURED BY TWO (2) SENSORS IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS INCREASED FROM 72°F TO 74°F AND 77°F TO 80°F, RESPECTIVELY.

UNIT 3 WAS IN THE PROCESS OF VERIFYING OFFSITE POWER SUPPLIES AS REQUIRED BY SURVEILLANCE SINCE THE "2A04" BUS CAN BE CROSS-TIED TO UNIT 3.

THE LICENSEE IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE ROOT CAUSE. UNIT 2 EXITED THE UNUSUAL EVENT AT 1040 PST. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE STATE AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A SPURIOUS ESF ACTUATION OF TWO DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES DURING BULB REPLACEMENT ON THE DRYWELL WIDE RANGE RADIATION MONITOR.

"I&C PERSONNEL WERE REPLACING THE GREEN NORMAL/RESET PUSHBUTTON LIGHT BULB FOR DRYWELL WIDE RANGE RADIATION MONITOR '2D11-K621B' WHEN THE AMBER HIGH LIGHT LIT UP ON THE MONITOR RESULTING IN TWO 18 INCH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PURGE AND VENT VALVES, '2T48-F320' AND '2T48-F308', GOING CLOSED. THE NORMAL/RESET PUSHBUTTON WAS BEING DEPRESSED IN THE LIGHT HOLDER WHEN THE AMBER HIGH LIGHT CAME ON AND IMMEDIATELY RESET. THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY A SPURIOUS SIGNAL. [THERE WAS NO ACTUAL] HIGH RADIATION CONDITION IN THE DRYWELL. A DEFICIENCY IS BEING INITIATED [AS PART OF THE INVESTIGATION]. "

BOTH VALVES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY REOPENED AND THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

OFFSITE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FROM THE BLAIR VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT DUE TO A REPORT OF SMOKE IN THE TRAINING FACILITY.

WHILE CLEANING THE NORTHEAST END OF TRAINING FACILITY, WHICH IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA, SMOKE AND A BURNING SMELL WERE NOTED BY A MEMBER OF THE JANITORIAL STAFF. THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AND DISPATCHED AN OPERATOR WITH A SECURITY GUARD TO INVESTIGATE. ASSISTANCE WAS REQUESTED FROM THE BLAIR VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT (VFD) WHO RESPONDED TO THE SCENE. THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE WAS A FAILED RESISTIVE HEATING ELEMENT IN THE VENTILATION DUCTING. POWER WAS REMOVED FROM THE HEATER AT 2115 CDT AND THE BLAIR VFD WAS RELEASED.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

LICENSEE REPORTED A LOST AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE DURING SHIPMENT.

"THE SOURCE MATERIAL LOST IN SHIPMENT IS AN AMERICIUM-241 80mCi SEALED SOURCE CERAMIC ENCAPSULATED BY WELDED STAINLESS STEEL. THE SOURCE SERIAL NUMBER IS 8462LX MOUNTED IN DEVICE NUMBER 2992 MANUFACTURED BY NDC SYSTEMS, 5314 NORTH IRWINDALE AVE., IRWINDALE, CALIFORNIA 91706. THE SOURCE IS AN INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF AN NDC MODEL 104F PAPER MACHINE FOURDRINIER MASS MEASUREMENT GAUGE.

"THE MATERIAL WAS PICKED UP AT OUR FRANKLIN, VIRGINIA, TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT LOCATION BY UPS COURIER MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1999 FOR OVERNIGHT SHIPMENT TO NDC IN IRWINDALE. THE UPS TRACKING NUMBER ASSIGNED WAS 1Z2923930143701285. NDC SYSTEMS WAS CONTACTED ON 1/18/99 AND ADVISED TO EXPECT THE PACKAGE ON 1/19/99. NDC PERSONNEL WERE REQUESTED TO ADVISE US UPON RECEIPT. NDC PERSONNEL WERE CONTACTED 1/19/99 TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PACKAGE WAS, IN FACT, RECEIVED. IT WAS NOT. NDC WAS CONTACTED ON 1/20/99 TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PACKAGE WAS RECEIVED. IT WAS NOT. SUBSEQUENTLY, ON 1/20/99, UPS WAS CONTACTED TO REQUEST THAT THE PACKAGE BE TRACED. UPS ASSIGNED TRACING NUMBER 020A0110 TO THE SHIPMENT. THE PACKAGE WAS SCANNED UPON ARRIVAL IN THE UPS SYSTEM IN LOUISVILLE INTERNATIONAL IN LOUISVILLE, KY. AT 1152 P.M. ON 1/18/99. THE MATERIAL SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME MISSING IN THE UPS SHIPPING SYSTEM.

"ANY EXPOSURE TO INDIVIDUALS IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. THE MATERIAL WAS PACKAGED IN COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH DOT REGULATIONS FOR AN EXCEPTED PACKAGE LIMITED QUANTITY MATERIAL AND NDC RECOMMENDED PACKAGING GUIDELINES WITH THE SOURCE SHUTTER SECURELY CLOSED. THERE IS LESS THAN 0.1mR/HR EXPOSURE RATE 50 MILLIMETERS FROM THE FACE OF THE SHUTTERED SENSOR. A SURVEY WAS PERFORMED USING A TN TECHNOLOGIES MODEL 200X RADIATION SURVEY METER SERIAL NUMBER B587W LAST CALIBRATED 10/19/98 TO CONFIRM EXPOSURE RATE.

"REPRESENTATIVES OF UNION CAMP HAVE BEEN IN DAILY CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF NDC AND UPS IN ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE THE UNIT. INGLEHART & ASSOCIATES WAS CONSULTED FOR ADDITIONAL IDEAS IN LOCATING THE DEVICE. TO DATE, THE DEVICE HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED.

"FROM A UNION CAMP PROCEDURES STANDPOINT, THERE IS NO KNOWN METHOD OR MEASURE THAT CAN BE ADOPTED TO ENSURE AGAINST A RECURRENCE OF A LOSS SUCH AS THIS. "

***UPDATE ON 02/03/99 AT 1001 ET BY RAULSTON TAKEN BY MACKINNON***


THE SOURCE HAS BEEN FOUND INTACT AND IT IS NOW AT RAULSTON'S OFFICE IN FRANKLIN, VA.. THE PACKAGE CONTAINING THE SOURCE HAD NOT BEEN OPENED. RAULSTON NOTIFIED NRC REGION 2 (WADE LOO) AND INFORMED HIM THAT THE MISSING SHIPMENT HAD BEEN FOUND. MR. RAULSTON SAID THAT HE WILL CHECK THE SOURCE OUT BEFORE SHIPPING IT OUT AGAIN TO NDC IN IRWINDALE, CA. R2DO (FREDRICKSON) & NMSS EO (COMBS) NOTIFIED.

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING TWICE DURING PAST REFUELING OUTAGE

On February 1, and February 2, 1999, the Unit 3 shutdown cooling isolation valves isolated due to an invalid 350 degree F recirculation loop temperature input signal. The actual reactor water temperature was less than 212 degrees F.

This event was determined not to be reportable in accordance with the site reportability manual. Upon further review of deficiency documents, it was determined this event should have been reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).

The shutdown cooling isolation valves are part of the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) which is an Engineered Safeguard Feature (ESF). The 350 degree F trip signal is electrically part of the PCIS trip logic circuitry. This signal will cause an isolation actuation, which is processed through the PCIS ESF logic, resulting in closure of the shutdown cooling isolation valves. Even though the signal was invalid, the system was not an excepted system and these valves were actuated unnecessarily and therefore this event is being reported as an invalid ESF actuation.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.