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Event Notification Report for January 25, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/24/1999 - 01/25/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
35313353143531535316

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35313
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1     State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK SOENS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/25/1999
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT

A LICENSED EMPLOYEE WHO WAS NOT PERFORMING LICENSED ACTIVITIES AT THE TIME WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL DURING A "FOR-CAUSE" TEST. THE EMPLOYEE'S ACCESS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED. CONTACT THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR DETAILS.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 35314
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: H&G INSPECTION COMPANY
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON   State: TX
County: HARRIS
License #: 2181
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HELEN WATKINS (FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/25/1999
Notification Time: 17:28 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
MIKE BELL (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE

THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH - BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL (TDH-BRC) REPORTED THAT THE H&G INSPECTION COMPANY, LOCATED IN HOUSTON, TX, NOTIFIED THEM OF A 5.4-REM EXPOSURE TO A RADIOGRAPHER. THE WHOLE BODY EXPOSURE WAS ANNUAL JANUARY THROUGH NOVEMBER 1998; THE DECEMBER 1998 BADGE IS BEING EVALUATED BY THE PROCESSOR. THE NOVEMBER 1998 EXPOSURE EXCEEDING THE REGULATORY LIMIT WAS RECEIVED BY THE LICENSEE IN 1999. TDH-BRC IS INVESTIGATING AND HAS IDENTIFIED THIS REPORT AS INCIDENT #7412.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35315
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JOHN JORDAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/25/1999
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/1999
Event Time: 08:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TONY VEGEL (R3)
MIKE BELL (NMSS)
Event Text
24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN NOTIFICATION INVOLVING STORED MATERIAL NOT MEETING THE FOUR (4) FEET SPACING REQUIREMENT PER THE NCSA

THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH:

"ON MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1999, AT 0830 HOURS, A FRONT LINE MANAGER (FLM) DISCOVERED THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY APPROVAL (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED IN THE X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY. NCSA-0705_064, TITLED 'SEAL CAN HANDLING AND STORAGE IN X-705,' REQUIREMENT #10 STATES: A GROUP OF SEAL CAN CANS SHALL BE KEPT AT LEAST FOUR (4) FEET FROM OTHER URANIUM-BEARING MATERIALS (INCLUDING OTHER GROUPS OF SEAL CANS). THE FLM DISCOVERED THAT OTHER POTENTIALLY URANIUM-BEARING MATERIAL (G-17 PROCESS VALVES) WERE BEING STORED WITHIN TWO (2) FEET OF THE SEAL CANS IN AN APPROVED STORAGE AREA.

"THE BASES FOR NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY ARE MASS, ENRICHMENT, MODERATION, AND INTERACTION CONTROL. MASS OF U-235 IS LIMITED BY THE PHYSICAL SIZE OF THE VOID SPACE INSIDE THE SEALS AND BY ENSURING THAT NO VISIBLE CONTAMINATION EXISTS ON ANY SEAL THAT IS PUT INTO A SEAL CAN. ENRICHMENT OF THE URANIUM IN ALL SEAL CANS HANDLED UNDER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS NCSA IS LIMITED TO LESS THAN 20% U-235. MODERATION IS CONTROLLED BY PROHIBITING THE INTRODUCTION OF MODERATING MATERIALS INTO THE SEAL CANS. INTERACTION IS CONTROLLED BY LIMITING THE NUMBER OF SEAL CANS THAT MAY BE GROUPED TOGETHER AND BY LIMITING THE MINIMUM SPACING AMONG SEAL CAN GROUPS AND OTHER URANIUM-BEARING MATERIALS.

"THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.

"PROPER SPACING WAS RESTORED BY FACILITY OPERATORS UNDER THE DIRECT OBSERVATION OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY ENGINEERING. THIS ACTION WAS COMPLETED AT 1030 HOURS."

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SITE REPRESENTATIVE WERE INFORMED BY PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35316
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/25/1999
Notification Time: 20:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/1999
Event Time: 07:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TONY VEGEL (R3)
MIKE BELL (NMSS)
Event Text
24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN NOTIFICATION INVOLVING FAILURE TO OBSERVE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:

"At 0755 on 1-25-99, it was determined that work had been performed in C-337 on Unit 4 Cell 2 Stage 1 A-line instrument boss on 1-23-99 without two pre-penetration independent Non-Destructive Analyses (NDA) being performed as required by Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment (NCSA) GEN-10-02. A single pre-penetration NDA was performed which indicated the categorization to be Uncomplicated Handling (UH). The pre-penetration NDA measurements are used to independently verify that the mass of uranium contained within the adjacent system is an always safe mass and can be categorized as UH. The pre-penetration NDAs are required to be performed prior to penetrating the system of an off-stream cell component greater than 5-inches in diameter. Since the independent NDA was not performed prior to making the penetration, double contingency was not maintained.

"A second NDA was performed on 1-25-99 which indicated through independent verification that no unsafe mass was present at the location of the penetration.

"This event is submitted in accordance with Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a, as an NRC Bulletin 91-01, Supplement 1."

The NRC resident inspector was informed, and the Department of Energy site representative will be informed by Paducah personnel.