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Event Notification Report for January 22, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/21/1999 - 01/22/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3530035301353023530335304353073530835298

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35300
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 10:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
BORIC ACID SYSTEM PIPING MAY NOT BE MAINTAINED AT PROPER TEMPERATURE.

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"CA-P-1A/B discharge piping heat trace is not maintaining adequate temperatures. FSAR sec 9.2.1.2 states, 'Further, all piping, pumps, and valves associated with the boric acid mix tank and the reclaimed boric acid storage tanks to transport boric acid solution from them to the makeup and purification system are provided with redundant electrical heat tracing to ensure that the boric acid solution will be maintained 10 [°]F or more above its crystallization temperature. The electrical heat tracing is controlled by the temperature of the external surface of the piping systems.' Temperature readings on the surface of the pipe ranged between 97.4 [°]F and 171 [°]F. The heat trace setpoints are 160 [°]F. Based on recent chemistry samples as high as 17,400 ppm and the crystallization curve, Figure 1A in OP 1104-47B, the required temperature to prevent crystallization would be 117 [°]F. Adding 10 [°]F would require a minimum 127 [°]F for the boric acid solution."

"The heat trace requirement is to ensure the boron does not crystallize and prevent flow to the makeup tank. Quarterly [in-service] testing is performed for CA-P-1A/B (most recently in November 1998). Although the required solution temperature may not be being maintained, testing has shown that these lines are not blocked and are functioning."

"Because the temperature of the boric acid solution within the subject piping cannot be confirmed via direct measurement or analysis at this time to be at or above 127 [°]F, this condition has been identified as being potentially outside the design basis of the plant and was reported to the NRC within 1 hour in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(ii)."

"The chemical addition system pumps are currently out of service due to maintenance being performed on the system, unrelated to the heat tracing. The system in-service test is planned to be performed when the system is returned to service. The chemical addition system in-service test performed last November found the system performed as required at that time."

"An analysis is planned to be performed to determine if the temperature of the boric acid solution within the chemical addition system piping is at or above the specified temperature."

"Plans are underway to install, if necessary, additional insulation and, if necessary heat tracing, to ensure the fluid temperature is maintained at the correct temperature."

"The potential outside design basis condition has been documented in CAP T1999-0052 via the GPU Nuclear, Appendix B, corrective action program."

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35301
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/1999
Event Time: 12:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
Event Text
SINGLE FAILURE COULD PREVENT COMPLETE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DURING VENTING.

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"At approximately 12:10 hours on January 22, 1999, it was determined that during containment pressure relief, the containment isolation function could not be completely achieved if there [was] a containment isolation signal, coupled with the single failure of containment isolation valve PCV-1190 to close. The potential for this to occur exists since initiation of pressure relief results in three-way solenoid valve SOV-1280 (a one-inch valve with ports on [the] weld channel supply line between PCV-1190 and PCV-1191) changing position to isolate [the] weld channel and vent the line between the containment isolation valves (PCV-1190 and PCV-1191) to atmosphere. If a postulated accident event were to occur that resulted in a containment isolation signal, PCV-1190 must close before an interlock with SOV-1280 would allow that valve to change position and supply weld channel gas between the containment isolation valves. Thus, during the pressure relief, a single failure of PCV-1190 to close on a containment isolation signal could result in a one-inch vent path, which would be a monitored release path and filtered by the [primary auxiliary building] exhaust system."

"Immediate corrective action taken will administratively require the closure of a manual valve ( PCV-1110-8) any time that PCV-1190 is in the open position thereby precluding a pathway for [the] containment atmosphere to communicate with the environment."

This condition was discovered in response to an event reported by Indian Point 3. (Refer to event #35298 for additional information.) The licensee is continuing its evaluation to identify any other primary containment isolation valves which may be affected.

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35302
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEITH WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 13:28 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DON COOL, NMSS (EO)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
Event Text
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT AN NCSA IN BUILDING X-326 BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PROCEDURE FOR OPERATION OF CALIBRATION BUGGIES

This event was reported per NRC Bulletin 91-01 as a 4-hour notification.

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:

"On 01/22/1999 at 0930 hours during the on-going plant-wide search for abandoned equipment, three (3) calibration buggies (all of different design) were discovered in the X-326 [process building] building which may meet the fissile material limits. All three (3) buggies meet the requirements of NCSA-Plant069; but the NCSA was not implemented in the X-326 building because there was not a procedure for operation of the calibration buggies. The identified equipment has had a boundary set up around them, and the anomalous NCS condition report is complete."

"Spacing and geometry of the components on the buggies were controlled such that the requirements of Plant069 were met."

"The calibration buggies found do not violate the requirements of NCSA-Plant069. The problem was the failure to flow down the requirements of the NCSA into a procedure for the operation of the buggies. The problem was in the implementation of the NCSA. The NCSA states that it is for use in building X-326, but [it] was never implemented in that building."

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35303
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Glenn H. Stewart
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
DISCOVERY THAT A FIRE INDUCED FAULT COULD IMPACT EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On 01/21/99, at 1545 hours, an Engineering review determined that in the event of a fire in Fire Area 64, 'Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water Equipment Area,' a fire induced fault in the 480-VAC power cable to the 2B Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water (RECW) pump motor could open the load center (LC) breaker to its associated motor control center (MCC) which would impact equipment required for safe shutdown in the event of a fire in that area. At that time, it was believed that this situation could only occur if the 2B RECW pump was operating at the time of the fire. The 2B RECW pump currently is not operating. This condition is due to less than adequate circuit breaker coordination which is limited to a small region on the time-current coordination curve for the LC breaker and the MCC breaker. On 01/22/99, at 1400 hours, further investigation revealed that fire-induced damage to an auto-start pressure switch in the control circuit for the 2B RECW pump located in the affected fire area could create a hot short that would cause the pump to auto-start resulting in the identified impact on safe shutdown equipment. This represents a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant and is reportable as a 1-hour notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). This condition is also considered a noncompliance with the Fire Protection Program as described in the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 9A.6.1.1, and is reportable as a violation of LGS, Unit 2, Operating License Condition 2.C.(3), 'Fire Protection.' Accordingly, this notification is also being made within 24 hours as required by LGS, Unit 2, Operating License Condition 2.E. This condition has existed since June 22, 1989, the date of issuance of the Low Power Operating License for LGS, Unit 2. This condition does not effect the operability of the 2B RECW pump or the affected MCC based on the application of single failure criterion which limits an electrical failure to a single division of safety-related power. A fire watch has been established in the affected fire area as an appropriate compensatory measure."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 35304
Rep Org: INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC.
Licensee: BARKER MICORFARADAS, INC
Region: 4
City: Nebraska City   State: NE
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN BROSEMER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/1999
Event Time: 14:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
Event Text
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION BY INTEGRATED RESOURCES OF 10-CFR-PART-21 NOTIFICATION

INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC., CALLED TO MAKE A PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO ISSUE A 10-CFR-PART-21 NOTIFICATION ON THEMSELVES. DRESDEN STATION SENT SQUARE ROOT CONVERTERS (DRESDEN STATION HAS ABOUT 100 OF THESE SQUARE ROOT CONVERTERS) TO INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC., FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS BECAUSE AFTER ABOUT 5 YEARS OF USE, THESE SQUARE ROOT CONVERTERS START TO FAIL. ALL THE SQUARE ROOT CONVERTERS ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED. NINE (9) OF THE SQUARE ROOT CONVERTERS WERE TESTED. FAILURE ANALYSIS DETERMINED THAT ALL FIVE (5) OF THE ALUMINUM ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORY SPARGUE ELECTRIC CO. (MODEL #TE1302 WITH MANUFACTURE DATE CODE OF 9322H) FAILED. ALL THE OTHER SQUARE ROOT CONVERTERS' FAILURE POINT IS WHERE THE SQUARE ROOT CONVERTER COULD NOT BE CALIBRATED PROPERLY. THE SQUARE ROOT CONVERTERS ARE BEING SENT BACK TO THEIR MANUFACTURER (BARKER MICROFARADS, INC., LOCATED IN HILLSVILLE, VA) TO DETERMINE THE FAILURE MECHANISM OF THE SQUARE ROOT CONVERTERS. INTEGRATE RESOURCES, INC., STATED THAT THEY EXPECTED THE RESULTS OF THE FAILURE MECHANISM OF THE SQUARE ROOT CONVERTS TO BE SENT TO THEM NEXT WEEK.

INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC., SAID THAT NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 HAS ONE SAFETY-RELATED SQUARE ROOT CONVERTER AND ONE SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTION GENERATOR AND THAT FITZPATRICK HAS TWO SAFETY-RELATED BASIC CONTROLLERS. THESE TWO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THE POTENTIAL FAILURE OF THESE DEVICES.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35307
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RUSS GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/1999
Event Time: 16:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 95 Power Operation 95 Power Operation
Event Text
EMERGENCY PAGING SYSTEM AND INTERNAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM ARE INOPERABLE.

For unknown reason at this time, the emergency paging system and the plant's internal telephone system became inoperable at 1617 EST. The emergency paging system is used to call plant personnel to the plant in case there is an emergency. The automatic telephone system is operable, and it can automatically call plant personnel if they are needed. The licensee can call offsite, and the ENS (emergency notification system) telephone system is fully operable. The licensee said that they own the emergency paging system, and they are presently troubleshooting the system.

The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event notification.

*** UPDATE ON 01/22/99 AT 2001 EST FROM RICK TAKEN BY MacKINNON ***

The emergency paging system and the plant's internal telephone system were returned to service at 1840 CST.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. The R4DO (Powers) was notified by the NRC operations officer.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35308
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3     State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/1999
Event Time: 17:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
WILLIAM BATEMAN (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 95 Power Operation
Event Text
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO WESTINGHOUSE BREAKER CONCERNS

Due to 4160-Volt Westinghouse 50-DH-350 breaker concerns on the Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps, Technical Specification 15.3.5.-2.14.b and Technical Specification 15.3.5-2.16, items a and b, were entered, and this requires Unit 1 to be in a Hot Shutdown condition within 8 hours from 1600 CST. The licensee said that this concern was part of a Ginna event sent out for Westinghouse review. The licensee believes there is a laminated plate in the shoot of the breaker that has a varnish which is holding the laminated plates on. At this point, there is a concern about the operability of the breakers. The laminated plates have been found to degrade over time, and these plates can slide down and prevent the breakers from opening/closing. Reactor coolant pumps, main feedwater pumps, and the '1A05' emergency bus have the Westinghouse 50-DH-350 breakers.

The only emergency operating piece of equipment out of service is the 'P38A' (motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump), which is out if service for repairs. It should be back in service within the next 2 hours. The electrical grid is stable, and since Unit 2 is in a refueling outage, it is not affected by the breaker problem.

The NRC resident inspector was informed of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35298
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: C. KOCSIS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 09:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/1999
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
SINGLE FAILURE COULD PREVENT COMPLETE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DURING VENTING (Refer to event #35301 for a similar event on Unit 2.)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"At approximately 0915 hours on January 22, 1999, it was determined that during containment pressure relief, the containment isolation function could not be completely achieved if there [was] a containment isolation signal, coupled with the single failure of containment isolation valve VS-PCV-1190 to close. This would occur since initiation of pressure relief results in three-way valve PS-SOV-1280 (a one-inch valve with one-inch ports on the weld channel supply line between VS-PCV-1190 and VS-PCV-1191) changing position to isolate [the] weld channel and vent the line between the containment isolation valves (VS-PCV-1190 and VS-PCV-1191) to atmosphere. If a postulated event were to occur that resulted in a containment isolation signal, VS-PCV-1190 must close before an interlock with PS-SOV-1280 would allow that valve to change position and supply weld channel gas between the containment isolation valves. Thus, during pressure relief, a single failure of VS-PCV-1190 to close on a containment isolation signal could result in a one-inch vent path. Immediate corrective action was taken to administratively restrict containment pressure relief until corrective action to assure containment integrity during containment pressure relief can be established such as isolation using an installed weld channel manual isolation valve. This is a condition that resulted, during past containment pressure relief operations, in Indian Point 3 being outside the plant design basis for containment isolation."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.