Event Notification Report for January 21, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/20/1999 - 01/21/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
352993530535288352893529035291352923529335294352953529635297
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35299
Rep Org: U.S. ARMY
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 4
City: FT. SHAFTER State: HI
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 4
City: FT. SHAFTER State: HI
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 09:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 09:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
EXCESSIVE SURFACE CONTAMINATION OF SEALED SOURCE
The U.S. Army Radioisotope Committee, located in Rock Island, IL, reported the following incident that occurred at Fort Shafter, HI. Wipe tests of a chemical agent monitor containing a 10-mCi Ni-63 source indicate that the sealed source is leaking. Count rates of up to 17,586 dpm/100 cm² were recorded. The device has been removed from service.
The U.S. Army Radioisotope Committee, located in Rock Island, IL, reported the following incident that occurred at Fort Shafter, HI. Wipe tests of a chemical agent monitor containing a 10-mCi Ni-63 source indicate that the sealed source is leaking. Count rates of up to 17,586 dpm/100 cm² were recorded. The device has been removed from service.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35305
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TECHNICAL WELDING
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L02187
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HELEN WATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: TECHNICAL WELDING
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L02187
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HELEN WATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
EXPOSURE GREATER THAN TEDE OF 5 REM (Refer to event #35306 for a similar event.)
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE TO THE NRC OPERATION CENTER FROM THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL (TDH-BRC) AS AN AGREEMENT STATE REPORT:
"INCIDENT #7411 - TECHNICAL WELDING, PASADENA, TX, L02187, NOTIFIED TDH-BRC OF A 5.5-R 1998 ANNUAL EXPOSURE TO A RADIOGRAPHER. 4.560 R WAS [RECEIVED] DURING THE 12/98 MONITORING PERIOD. THE LICENSEE RECEIVED A VERBAL REPORT FROM THE BADGE PROCESSOR ON 01/21/99. THE TDH-BRC IS INVESTIGATING."
THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE FACSIMILE.
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE TO THE NRC OPERATION CENTER FROM THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL (TDH-BRC) AS AN AGREEMENT STATE REPORT:
"INCIDENT #7411 - TECHNICAL WELDING, PASADENA, TX, L02187, NOTIFIED TDH-BRC OF A 5.5-R 1998 ANNUAL EXPOSURE TO A RADIOGRAPHER. 4.560 R WAS [RECEIVED] DURING THE 12/98 MONITORING PERIOD. THE LICENSEE RECEIVED A VERBAL REPORT FROM THE BADGE PROCESSOR ON 01/21/99. THE TDH-BRC IS INVESTIGATING."
THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE FACSIMILE.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35288
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD STRAYER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD STRAYER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 09:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 05:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/1999
Notification Time: 09:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 05:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM MAY NOT HAVE PERFORMED INTENDED FUNCTION DUE TO DAMPER PROBLEM.
While preparing to replace the solenoid valve for standby gas treatment (SBGT) system damper PO-20466 (reactor building supply to SBGT), the damper did not open when the control room hand switch was placed in the "open" position. However, the damper did open when the pneumatic supply to the solenoid valve was isolated. This damper opens automatically upon a SBGT system initiation to provide a flow path from the Unit 2 reactor building. The SBGT system would still have had a flow path from the Unit 2 refuel floor and equipment cell exhaust areas upon an initiation. In addition, the Unit 2 refuel floor currently has direct communication with the Unit 2 reactor building because the refuel floor equipment hatch is removed.
The licensee reported this event because the failure of the damper to open could have prevented the SBGT system from performing its intended function. The licensee is performing calculations to determine whether the failure would have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function. The damper is currently open, and the pneumatic supply to the solenoid valve has been isolated. The licensee plans to continue activities to replace the solenoid valve.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE AT 1625 ON 02/05/99 FROM DENNIS BURGARD TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Licensee engineering personnel have performed an evaluation to determine whether the failure of the reactor building isolation damper would prevent the SBGT system from performing its safety function. This evaluation demonstrates that the failure of the damper for reactor building area ventilation to open would not prevent the SBGT system from performing its required safety function. Because the design basis function was not lost, the licensee desires to retract this event notification.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Julian Williams).
While preparing to replace the solenoid valve for standby gas treatment (SBGT) system damper PO-20466 (reactor building supply to SBGT), the damper did not open when the control room hand switch was placed in the "open" position. However, the damper did open when the pneumatic supply to the solenoid valve was isolated. This damper opens automatically upon a SBGT system initiation to provide a flow path from the Unit 2 reactor building. The SBGT system would still have had a flow path from the Unit 2 refuel floor and equipment cell exhaust areas upon an initiation. In addition, the Unit 2 refuel floor currently has direct communication with the Unit 2 reactor building because the refuel floor equipment hatch is removed.
The licensee reported this event because the failure of the damper to open could have prevented the SBGT system from performing its intended function. The licensee is performing calculations to determine whether the failure would have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function. The damper is currently open, and the pneumatic supply to the solenoid valve has been isolated. The licensee plans to continue activities to replace the solenoid valve.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE AT 1625 ON 02/05/99 FROM DENNIS BURGARD TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Licensee engineering personnel have performed an evaluation to determine whether the failure of the reactor building isolation damper would prevent the SBGT system from performing its safety function. This evaluation demonstrates that the failure of the damper for reactor building area ventilation to open would not prevent the SBGT system from performing its required safety function. Because the design basis function was not lost, the licensee desires to retract this event notification.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Julian Williams).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35289
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM FRAWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM FRAWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 06:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 06:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC TURBINE/REACTOR TRIP DURING TROUBLESHOOTING
"During troubleshooting activities to isolate the source of a ground on a 480VAC load center, the power source to the main turbine trip interlocks was inadvertently deenergized. As a result, the main turbine tripped, resulting in an automatic reactor trip - reactor power was above P9 (50% power). All equipment performed as expected; all control rods fully inserted, and the auxiliary feedwater system actuated automatically on low steam generator levels (expected to occur upon a reactor trip from high power levels)."
The licensee also reported that several steam generator PORVs lifted following the trip; this is expected following a trip from this power level. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
***Update on 01/21/99 at 1700 ET by Frawley taken by MacKinnon***
On investigation it was determined that no steam generator PORVs lifted following the reactor trip.
R4DO (Dale Powers) notified.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this update by the licensee.
"During troubleshooting activities to isolate the source of a ground on a 480VAC load center, the power source to the main turbine trip interlocks was inadvertently deenergized. As a result, the main turbine tripped, resulting in an automatic reactor trip - reactor power was above P9 (50% power). All equipment performed as expected; all control rods fully inserted, and the auxiliary feedwater system actuated automatically on low steam generator levels (expected to occur upon a reactor trip from high power levels)."
The licensee also reported that several steam generator PORVs lifted following the trip; this is expected following a trip from this power level. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
***Update on 01/21/99 at 1700 ET by Frawley taken by MacKinnon***
On investigation it was determined that no steam generator PORVs lifted following the reactor trip.
R4DO (Dale Powers) notified.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this update by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35290
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 12:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 12:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT CERTAIN AUXILIARY BUILDING DOORS WOULD NOT RELIEVE PRESSURE AS DESIGNED FOLLOWING A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (HELB).
"The Prairie Island HELB analysis assumes that certain doors open to mitigate the pressure and temperature response. A calculation to reconstitute blow out pressure of the doors in the vent path was unable to verify doors would perform their HELB assumed function of opening to mitigate auxiliary building pressures. Latch pins on the stationary side of the doors do not allow the doors to swing open when required by the HELB event. Preliminary results from the calculation indicate damage would occur to other safety related structures. The doors will be unlatched to allow this pressure release to occur bringing the plant within the analysis. Category 1 doors 134, 184, 133, and 182 were declared inoperable per TS 3.6.E.1."
Both units will remain in the 24-hour TS LCO until the latch pins are removed. Hourly fire watches are assigned while the doors are unlatched. The licensee has long-term corrective actions under review. This condition was discovered during an on-going design review.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The Prairie Island HELB analysis assumes that certain doors open to mitigate the pressure and temperature response. A calculation to reconstitute blow out pressure of the doors in the vent path was unable to verify doors would perform their HELB assumed function of opening to mitigate auxiliary building pressures. Latch pins on the stationary side of the doors do not allow the doors to swing open when required by the HELB event. Preliminary results from the calculation indicate damage would occur to other safety related structures. The doors will be unlatched to allow this pressure release to occur bringing the plant within the analysis. Category 1 doors 134, 184, 133, and 182 were declared inoperable per TS 3.6.E.1."
Both units will remain in the 24-hour TS LCO until the latch pins are removed. Hourly fire watches are assigned while the doors are unlatched. The licensee has long-term corrective actions under review. This condition was discovered during an on-going design review.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35291
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE BANNISTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE BANNISTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 14:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 10:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 14:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 10:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
BOB DENNIG, NRR (EO)
DALE POWERS (R4)
BOB DENNIG, NRR (EO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
161kV incoming line declared inoperable.
Report required by Technical Specification 2.7(2) c. as a result of declaring 161kV incoming line inoperable. Declaring 161kV inoperable renders both house service transformers T1A3 and T1A4 inoperable (feed vital onsite buses). 161kV is energized, and breakers 110 and 111 did not open, but cannot be brought back-in-house until lockout 86X/FT/161, which tripped, is reset.
A contractor performing modification work in the Fort Calhoun Station switchyard was trenching, and the trencher caught a cable buried approximately 4 inches underground. This cable supplies 161kV fast transfer secondary potential transformer alarm circuit.
All 4160 v buses successfully fast transferred to the onsite 22kV power source, and Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-31, "All 4160V Buses fed From 22kV," was entered.
A new cable is being run, and should be completely installed and tested by mid-afternoon, allowing transfer back to 161kV. A relay exists that might be able to be bypassed, which would allow 161kV to be brought back into the plant.
All Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed and the non-Q Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is also fully operable.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by the licensee.
****Update on 01/21/99 at 1602 ET by Bannister taken by MacKinnon****
The cable damaged in the Fort Calhoun switchyard has been replaced; the lockout relay, 86X/FT/161, has been reset; and the plant is now back in its normal electrical lineup with 161kV supplying both house service transformers T1A3 and T1A4 at 1440 CT. Technical Specification 2.7.(2) c. and Abnormal Operating Procedure APO-31 were exited. R4DO (D. Powers) & NRR EO (Dennig) notified.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event update by the licensee.
Report required by Technical Specification 2.7(2) c. as a result of declaring 161kV incoming line inoperable. Declaring 161kV inoperable renders both house service transformers T1A3 and T1A4 inoperable (feed vital onsite buses). 161kV is energized, and breakers 110 and 111 did not open, but cannot be brought back-in-house until lockout 86X/FT/161, which tripped, is reset.
A contractor performing modification work in the Fort Calhoun Station switchyard was trenching, and the trencher caught a cable buried approximately 4 inches underground. This cable supplies 161kV fast transfer secondary potential transformer alarm circuit.
All 4160 v buses successfully fast transferred to the onsite 22kV power source, and Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-31, "All 4160V Buses fed From 22kV," was entered.
A new cable is being run, and should be completely installed and tested by mid-afternoon, allowing transfer back to 161kV. A relay exists that might be able to be bypassed, which would allow 161kV to be brought back into the plant.
All Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed and the non-Q Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is also fully operable.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by the licensee.
****Update on 01/21/99 at 1602 ET by Bannister taken by MacKinnon****
The cable damaged in the Fort Calhoun switchyard has been replaced; the lockout relay, 86X/FT/161, has been reset; and the plant is now back in its normal electrical lineup with 161kV supplying both house service transformers T1A3 and T1A4 at 1440 CT. Technical Specification 2.7.(2) c. and Abnormal Operating Procedure APO-31 were exited. R4DO (D. Powers) & NRR EO (Dennig) notified.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event update by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35292
Rep Org: COMMONWEALTH OF MASS
Licensee: AMERSHAM
Region: 1
City: Burlington State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: R. FAIRFULL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: AMERSHAM
Region: 1
City: Burlington State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: R. FAIRFULL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
FRED COMBS, NMSS (EO)
EASTON, NMSS
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
FRED COMBS, NMSS (EO)
EASTON, NMSS
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
The following facsimile was received from Massachusetts:
"The Radiation Control Program was notified at approximately 11:00 a.m. today that a package exceeding transportation limits had been received by AEA Technology (formerly Amersham Corp.) this morning.
"The following facts were reported:
1. package was from their parent company in England
2. max reading was 820 mr/hour; Transportation Index of 18
3. package consisted of outer packaging, with styrofoam intermediate insert, containing a lead pot
4. lead pot contained three cesium sealed sources - total of 9 curies
5. sources were not braced within the pot
6. readings varied with package orientation range of 540-820 mr/hr
"The Radiation Control Program dispatched an inspector to the AEA Technology facility in Burlington Massachusetts this afternoon to investigate."
See HOO log book for phone number.
The following facsimile was received from Massachusetts:
"The Radiation Control Program was notified at approximately 11:00 a.m. today that a package exceeding transportation limits had been received by AEA Technology (formerly Amersham Corp.) this morning.
"The following facts were reported:
1. package was from their parent company in England
2. max reading was 820 mr/hour; Transportation Index of 18
3. package consisted of outer packaging, with styrofoam intermediate insert, containing a lead pot
4. lead pot contained three cesium sealed sources - total of 9 curies
5. sources were not braced within the pot
6. readings varied with package orientation range of 540-820 mr/hr
"The Radiation Control Program dispatched an inspector to the AEA Technology facility in Burlington Massachusetts this afternoon to investigate."
See HOO log book for phone number.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35293
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: UMPHREY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: UMPHREY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 16:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 15:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 16:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 15:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM MAY NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE ACCIDENT MITIGATION WHILE MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED ON SYSTEM.
Penetration room ventilation system does not provide adequate protection to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident during the maintenance activities on the system due to system design. At the present time the licensee is investigating corrective actions to be taken to corrective this problem.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Penetration room ventilation system does not provide adequate protection to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident during the maintenance activities on the system due to system design. At the present time the licensee is investigating corrective actions to be taken to corrective this problem.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35294
Rep Org: U.S. ARMY
Licensee: U. S. ARMY
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM MOHS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: U. S. ARMY
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM MOHS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1)(ii) - MATL >5X LOWEST LIMIT
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1)(ii) - MATL >5X LOWEST LIMIT
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
MIKE BELL, NMSS (EO)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
MIKE BELL, NMSS (EO)
U S ARMY M137 telescope found to have tritium contamination.
An M137 telescope was received at Fort Campbell, KY on 12/21/98. The telescope outer cover was removed on 01/13/99 at which time it was found that at least one tritium vial inside the telescope was broken. Wipes taken of the telescope and the surrounding area were sent to Rock Island Arsenal, IL to be counted for tritium activity. Today, (01/21/99), the results of the highest reading wipe was determined to be 6E06 DPM. Nobody at this time is known to have been contaminated, but bioassays of personnel who have come into contact with the telescope are being or will be taken. The telescope was shipped out of Galesburg, IL to Macomb, IL, then from Macomb, IL to Springfield, IL. The telescope then passed through Ft. Drum, NY, and on to Fort Campbell, KY.
An M137 telescope was received at Fort Campbell, KY on 12/21/98. The telescope outer cover was removed on 01/13/99 at which time it was found that at least one tritium vial inside the telescope was broken. Wipes taken of the telescope and the surrounding area were sent to Rock Island Arsenal, IL to be counted for tritium activity. Today, (01/21/99), the results of the highest reading wipe was determined to be 6E06 DPM. Nobody at this time is known to have been contaminated, but bioassays of personnel who have come into contact with the telescope are being or will be taken. The telescope was shipped out of Galesburg, IL to Macomb, IL, then from Macomb, IL to Springfield, IL. The telescope then passed through Ft. Drum, NY, and on to Fort Campbell, KY.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35295
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/1999
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
Material for deionized water supply valve changed
During storeroom valve stock review, the licensee discovered that valve materials for a deionized water supply line containment isolation valve had changed. Specifically, the diaphragm material had changed. The design value for the original material was 200° F at 200 psi. The new valve was rated at 150° F at 300 psi. This valve inside containment and another valve outside containment are normally closed during operation. Further evaluations are underway.
Containment integrity has been verified by ensuring the valve outside containment is locked shut.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED ON 2/2/99 AT 1122 EST BY MIKE MEYER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
After further investigation, the licensee determined that valve 1DI-11 and the outside containment isolation valve (1DI-19) are locked closed during times that containment integrity is required. Therefore, even if the improper ratings of the valve would have resulted in the valve failing during a design bases accident, containment integrity would have been maintained by the normally locked closed valve outside containment.
Therefore, this condition does not result in a condition of the plant being outside its design basis and this event notification is retracted.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Thomas Kozak).
During storeroom valve stock review, the licensee discovered that valve materials for a deionized water supply line containment isolation valve had changed. Specifically, the diaphragm material had changed. The design value for the original material was 200° F at 200 psi. The new valve was rated at 150° F at 300 psi. This valve inside containment and another valve outside containment are normally closed during operation. Further evaluations are underway.
Containment integrity has been verified by ensuring the valve outside containment is locked shut.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED ON 2/2/99 AT 1122 EST BY MIKE MEYER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
After further investigation, the licensee determined that valve 1DI-11 and the outside containment isolation valve (1DI-19) are locked closed during times that containment integrity is required. Therefore, even if the improper ratings of the valve would have resulted in the valve failing during a design bases accident, containment integrity would have been maintained by the normally locked closed valve outside containment.
Therefore, this condition does not result in a condition of the plant being outside its design basis and this event notification is retracted.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Thomas Kozak).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35296
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ED HYNE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ED HYNE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
Emergency diesel generators, while running unloaded, may have failed to energize emergency buses in the event of a unit trip with the 115 kV supply out of service.
A fire in the plant's hydrogen storage facility (event # 35275 on 01/14/99) resulted in a decision to remove the 115 kV reserve power supply from service to safely suppress the fire. The Emergency diesel generators were started per plant surveillance procedure ST-9D to demonstrate operability as required by Technical Specifications. A decision was made to allow the emergency diesel generators to run unloaded for a period of time with the 115 kV reserve power out of service but available. A later review of the emergency diesel generator protective scheme indicates the possibility that one or more of the emergency diesel generators may have failed to energize the emergency buses in the event of a unit trip with the 115 kV supply out of service. Further evaluation of this scenario is continuing to determine any necessary procedural changes.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by the licensee.
A fire in the plant's hydrogen storage facility (event # 35275 on 01/14/99) resulted in a decision to remove the 115 kV reserve power supply from service to safely suppress the fire. The Emergency diesel generators were started per plant surveillance procedure ST-9D to demonstrate operability as required by Technical Specifications. A decision was made to allow the emergency diesel generators to run unloaded for a period of time with the 115 kV reserve power out of service but available. A later review of the emergency diesel generator protective scheme indicates the possibility that one or more of the emergency diesel generators may have failed to energize the emergency buses in the event of a unit trip with the 115 kV supply out of service. Further evaluation of this scenario is continuing to determine any necessary procedural changes.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35297
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSEPHINE BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSEPHINE BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 00:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 18:25 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Notification Time: 00:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/1999
Event Time: 18:25 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
This notification is a courtesy call regarding a safeguards system degradation related to a computer. Compensatory measures were taken immediately upon discovery. (Refer to the HOO log for additional details.)
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.
*** UPDATE ON 01/22/99 AT 1430 EST FROM ART WELLS TAKEN BY MacKINNON ***
After further review, the licensee made this a loggable report. The secondary alarm system is back in service.
The NRC resident Inspector will be notified of this event update by the licensee. The R4DO (Powers) was notified by the NRC operations officer.
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.
*** UPDATE ON 01/22/99 AT 1430 EST FROM ART WELLS TAKEN BY MacKINNON ***
After further review, the licensee made this a loggable report. The secondary alarm system is back in service.
The NRC resident Inspector will be notified of this event update by the licensee. The R4DO (Powers) was notified by the NRC operations officer.