Event Notification Report for January 05, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/04/1999 - 01/05/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
352193522035215352163521735218
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35219
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 16:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 16:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
SUSAN SHANKMAN, EO (NMSS)
FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS (FAX)
EPA, DOT/NAT RES CTR (FAX)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
SUSAN SHANKMAN, EO (NMSS)
FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS (FAX)
EPA, DOT/NAT RES CTR (FAX)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- Connecticut notified that 840 gallons of waste water containing trace amounts of tritium leaked into Niantic Bay -
At 0200 on 01/04/99, a leak in a heater loop for the Unit 3 'A' waste test tank (WTT) was discovered. Waste water in the WTT contained radioactivity and boric acid. The leak (approximately 1 - 2 gallons per minute) was isolated. Initial indications were that this waste water was contained within the yard drain system. Upon subsequent investigations, it was determined that, conservatively estimated, 840 gallons of liquid (4% of tank volume) leaked from the WTT. A berm surrounding the tank had been installed due to a prior leak but did not contain this leak. Sampling performed at discharge serial number DSN-006 taken after the event indicated the presence of tritium.
Based on the above, it is believed that waste water from this leak flowed to a nearby yard drain and then discharged to Niantic Bay via DSN-006. The waste water from this leak contained radioactivity which is not addressed in the Millstone NPDES permit at DSN-006 nor are the WTTs listed as a source of waste water for DSN-006. Additionally, upon subsequent surveys of the storm drain system, tritium was detected at the DSN-006 sample point. As a result, this event was reported by the licensee to the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Spills Division and Permitting Division and local officials.
The licensee plans to inform the NRC resident inspector.
At 0200 on 01/04/99, a leak in a heater loop for the Unit 3 'A' waste test tank (WTT) was discovered. Waste water in the WTT contained radioactivity and boric acid. The leak (approximately 1 - 2 gallons per minute) was isolated. Initial indications were that this waste water was contained within the yard drain system. Upon subsequent investigations, it was determined that, conservatively estimated, 840 gallons of liquid (4% of tank volume) leaked from the WTT. A berm surrounding the tank had been installed due to a prior leak but did not contain this leak. Sampling performed at discharge serial number DSN-006 taken after the event indicated the presence of tritium.
Based on the above, it is believed that waste water from this leak flowed to a nearby yard drain and then discharged to Niantic Bay via DSN-006. The waste water from this leak contained radioactivity which is not addressed in the Millstone NPDES permit at DSN-006 nor are the WTTs listed as a source of waste water for DSN-006. Additionally, upon subsequent surveys of the storm drain system, tritium was detected at the DSN-006 sample point. As a result, this event was reported by the licensee to the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Spills Division and Permitting Division and local officials.
The licensee plans to inform the NRC resident inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35220
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FREDERICK SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FREDERICK SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 15:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/27/1999
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 15:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/27/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
AUTOMATIC START OF AN ANNULUS EXHAUST GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM FAN DURING TRAIN RESTORATION
While returning the Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS) train 'B' to standby readiness from secured status, the 'B' exhaust fan automatically started when the fan control switch was placed in the 'standby' position. The licensee believes that the initiating signal may not have been valid and that the cause may have been a faulty flow switch. Reportability is still under investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE at 1047 on 01/27/99 by Fred Smith to Dick Jolliffe * * *
The initiating signal for the 'B' exhaust fan could not be reproduced. Through the process of analysis and testing, licensee engineering personnel determined that the most suspect component that malfunctioned and caused the initiating signal was a flow switch in the discharge of the AEGTS train 'A'. A review of the data available and observations by the operating crew indicated that no actual low flow or LOCA signal existed. Therefore, the initiation was determined to be caused by an invalid signal.
Licensee engineering personnel determined that AEGTS is considered part of the Reactor Building Ventilation System (RBVS), consistent with the UFSAR. The invalid low flow signal that was the most likely cause of the AEGTS train 'B' initiation is not considered an ESF actuation signal.
The AEGTS (ESF actuation system) initiation was caused by an invalid signal that initiated the system as an RBVS and thus, the licensee desires to retract this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Operations Officer notified R3DO Tony Vegel.
While returning the Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS) train 'B' to standby readiness from secured status, the 'B' exhaust fan automatically started when the fan control switch was placed in the 'standby' position. The licensee believes that the initiating signal may not have been valid and that the cause may have been a faulty flow switch. Reportability is still under investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE at 1047 on 01/27/99 by Fred Smith to Dick Jolliffe * * *
The initiating signal for the 'B' exhaust fan could not be reproduced. Through the process of analysis and testing, licensee engineering personnel determined that the most suspect component that malfunctioned and caused the initiating signal was a flow switch in the discharge of the AEGTS train 'A'. A review of the data available and observations by the operating crew indicated that no actual low flow or LOCA signal existed. Therefore, the initiation was determined to be caused by an invalid signal.
Licensee engineering personnel determined that AEGTS is considered part of the Reactor Building Ventilation System (RBVS), consistent with the UFSAR. The invalid low flow signal that was the most likely cause of the AEGTS train 'B' initiation is not considered an ESF actuation signal.
The AEGTS (ESF actuation system) initiation was caused by an invalid signal that initiated the system as an RBVS and thus, the licensee desires to retract this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Operations Officer notified R3DO Tony Vegel.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35215
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BORGEN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BORGEN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/1999
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
CHRIS GRIMES, NRR (EO)
JOSEPH GIITTER, AEOD (IRD)
JOHN HANNON, NRR (EO)
WAYNE STORE (FEMA)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
CHRIS GRIMES, NRR (EO)
JOSEPH GIITTER, AEOD (IRD)
JOHN HANNON, NRR (EO)
WAYNE STORE (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNUSUAL EVENT, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP, AND PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DUE TO AN EXPLOSION OF A STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
At 1311 CST, a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip occurred due to an explosion of the '1M' station auxiliary transformer. The licensee's fire brigade responded to the subsequent fire and extinguished the fire within several minutes. The '1R' reserve transformer (which is located next to the '1M' transformer) was also lost possibly due to its proximity to the explosion. The loss of both the '1M' and 1R' transformers (which are located outside of the main turbine building) caused the loss of non-safeguards buses 11, 12, 13, and 14. This in turn caused the loss of all condensate and feedwater pumps, circulating water pumps, and reactor coolant pumps. Auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated as required. All Unit 1 safeguards buses remained energized from normal offsite power. All rods fully inserted upon receipt of the reactor trip. There were three first out indicators (low-low steam generator pressure on the 11 steam generator, steam generator low-low level on the 12 steam generator, and high flux rate trip), and the exact causes of the reactor trip and transformer explosion are currently under investigation. There were no emergency core cooling system actuations, and none were expected. All systems functioned as required, and there were no personnel injuries.
Unit 1 is currently stable in Hot Shutdown. Normal charging and letdown, auxiliary spray and one pressurizer heater, and natural circulation are being used to maintain primary system inventory, pressure, and transport control. Auxiliary feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped to atmosphere. There is no indication of steam generator tube leakage. Efforts are currently underway to restore power to non-safeguards buses 13 and 14.
Unit 2 was unaffected by this event. It is currently operating at 60% reactor power following performance of an outage, and power ascension is in progress.
At 1340 CST, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event due to conditions warranting increased awareness by the plant operations staff. This was later revised to be conditions hazardous to plant operations (near or onsite explosion). The licensee currently plans to terminate the Unusual Event when one reactor coolant pump has been returned to service.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the applicable state and local agencies. The licensee may also issue a press release.
******************** UPDATE AT 1953 EST ON 01/05/99 FROM TIM BORGEN TO TROCINE ********************
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1843 CST. Unit 1 is currently in a stable condition meeting all technical specification requirements. Power has been restored to the 11, 12, 13, and 14, non-safeguards buses via back feed from the '2R' transformer. The 12 reactor coolant pump was started at 1835 CST, and the licensee plans to start the 11 reactor coolant pump within a few minutes. The circulating pumps were restored to service several hours ago, and the licensee plans to restore condensate pumps shortly.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the applicable state and local agencies. The licensee may also issue a press release tomorrow. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Clayton), NRR EO (Hannon), AEOD IRD (Giitter), and FEMA (Ken Ciboch).
At 1311 CST, a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip occurred due to an explosion of the '1M' station auxiliary transformer. The licensee's fire brigade responded to the subsequent fire and extinguished the fire within several minutes. The '1R' reserve transformer (which is located next to the '1M' transformer) was also lost possibly due to its proximity to the explosion. The loss of both the '1M' and 1R' transformers (which are located outside of the main turbine building) caused the loss of non-safeguards buses 11, 12, 13, and 14. This in turn caused the loss of all condensate and feedwater pumps, circulating water pumps, and reactor coolant pumps. Auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated as required. All Unit 1 safeguards buses remained energized from normal offsite power. All rods fully inserted upon receipt of the reactor trip. There were three first out indicators (low-low steam generator pressure on the 11 steam generator, steam generator low-low level on the 12 steam generator, and high flux rate trip), and the exact causes of the reactor trip and transformer explosion are currently under investigation. There were no emergency core cooling system actuations, and none were expected. All systems functioned as required, and there were no personnel injuries.
Unit 1 is currently stable in Hot Shutdown. Normal charging and letdown, auxiliary spray and one pressurizer heater, and natural circulation are being used to maintain primary system inventory, pressure, and transport control. Auxiliary feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped to atmosphere. There is no indication of steam generator tube leakage. Efforts are currently underway to restore power to non-safeguards buses 13 and 14.
Unit 2 was unaffected by this event. It is currently operating at 60% reactor power following performance of an outage, and power ascension is in progress.
At 1340 CST, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event due to conditions warranting increased awareness by the plant operations staff. This was later revised to be conditions hazardous to plant operations (near or onsite explosion). The licensee currently plans to terminate the Unusual Event when one reactor coolant pump has been returned to service.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the applicable state and local agencies. The licensee may also issue a press release.
******************** UPDATE AT 1953 EST ON 01/05/99 FROM TIM BORGEN TO TROCINE ********************
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1843 CST. Unit 1 is currently in a stable condition meeting all technical specification requirements. Power has been restored to the 11, 12, 13, and 14, non-safeguards buses via back feed from the '2R' transformer. The 12 reactor coolant pump was started at 1835 CST, and the licensee plans to start the 11 reactor coolant pump within a few minutes. The circulating pumps were restored to service several hours ago, and the licensee plans to restore condensate pumps shortly.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the applicable state and local agencies. The licensee may also issue a press release tomorrow. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Clayton), NRR EO (Hannon), AEOD IRD (Giitter), and FEMA (Ken Ciboch).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35216
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY HASTINGS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY HASTINGS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/1999
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
CHRIS GRIMES, EO (NRR)
JOHN HANNON, EO (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRD)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
CHRIS GRIMES, EO (NRR)
JOHN HANNON, EO (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- UNIT 1 SHUTTING DOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE SI SYSTEM DUE TO FROZEN RECIRCULATION LINE -
UNIT 1 IS AT 100% POWER, AND UNIT 2 IS DEFUELED IN A REFUELING OUTAGE.
A PORTION OF THE UNIT 1 SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS' RECIRCULATION LINE TO THE UNIT 1 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK APPEARS TO BE FROZEN DUE TO A LOSS OF HEAT TRACING DURING EXTREMELY COLD WEATHER. THIS CONDITION RENDERS BOTH TRAINS OF THE UNIT 1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE. THE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS USE THE SAME RECIRCULATION LINE AND ARE ALSO RENDERED INOPERABLE. THE CONDITIONS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 15.3.0.B APPLY, AND THIS CONDITION APPEARS TO BE REPORTABLE AS A CONDITION THAT IS OUTSIDE THE PLANT DESIGN BASIS.
THE ACTION STATEMENT FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 15.3.0.B REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO INITIATE ACTION WITHIN 1 HOUR TO PLACE UNIT 1 IN HOT SHUTDOWN WITHIN 7 HOURS OF ENTERING THIS SPECIFICATION AND IN COLD SHUTDOWN WITHIN 37 HOURS.
THE LICENSEE IS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO THAW THE LINE.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
****************** UPDATE AT 1615 EST ON 01/05/99 FROM RANDY HASTINGS TO TROCINE ******************
The licensee initiated the technical specification required load reduction at 1506 CST on 01/05/99.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton), NRR EOs (Grimes and Hannon),and AEOD IRD (Giitter).
****************** UPDATE AT 2132 EST ON 01/05/99 FROM JOHN CELL TO TROCINE ******************
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Enforcement discretion was requested [at approximately 1625 CST] and granted [at approximately 1820 CST] by the NRC regarding the [Unit 1] shutdown required by the frozen [recirculation] line. Unit 1 is presently at 23% reactor power. Plans are to raise reactor power to 30% and hold.
"Actions underway include [a] 50.59 evaluation of an alternate recirculation path that will restore the operability of one [safety injection] pump. An operability determination is being written to evaluate the operability of the [containment spray pumps] without the recirculation line. These actions are expected to be completed before the expiration of the enforcement discretion at 0140 CST [on 01/06/99]."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Clayton), NRR EO (Hannon), and AEOD IRD (Giitter).
* * * UPDATE AT 0152 EST ON 01/06/99 FROM JOHN SELL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The original frozen line has been thawed and is being maintained warm by fluid circulation. An alternate [safety injection] pump recirculation path is currently being utilized, which restores the Unit 1 'B' [safety injection] pump to operable [status]. The use of this path is supported by a 50.59 evaluation and an operability determination. The same operability determination restores both Unit 1 [containment spray pumps] to operable status with minor compensatory measures."
"Unit 1 is being returned to 100% reactor power. The unit is in a 72-hour [limiting condition for operation] until the normal [safety injection] recirculation path is restored, which will allow the 'A' [safety injection] pump to be declared operable. This is anticipated later today after restoration procedures are approved and the [safety injection recirculation] line heat tracing is restored."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this update by the licensee. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton) and NRR EO (Hannon).
UNIT 1 IS AT 100% POWER, AND UNIT 2 IS DEFUELED IN A REFUELING OUTAGE.
A PORTION OF THE UNIT 1 SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS' RECIRCULATION LINE TO THE UNIT 1 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK APPEARS TO BE FROZEN DUE TO A LOSS OF HEAT TRACING DURING EXTREMELY COLD WEATHER. THIS CONDITION RENDERS BOTH TRAINS OF THE UNIT 1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE. THE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS USE THE SAME RECIRCULATION LINE AND ARE ALSO RENDERED INOPERABLE. THE CONDITIONS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 15.3.0.B APPLY, AND THIS CONDITION APPEARS TO BE REPORTABLE AS A CONDITION THAT IS OUTSIDE THE PLANT DESIGN BASIS.
THE ACTION STATEMENT FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 15.3.0.B REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO INITIATE ACTION WITHIN 1 HOUR TO PLACE UNIT 1 IN HOT SHUTDOWN WITHIN 7 HOURS OF ENTERING THIS SPECIFICATION AND IN COLD SHUTDOWN WITHIN 37 HOURS.
THE LICENSEE IS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO THAW THE LINE.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
****************** UPDATE AT 1615 EST ON 01/05/99 FROM RANDY HASTINGS TO TROCINE ******************
The licensee initiated the technical specification required load reduction at 1506 CST on 01/05/99.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton), NRR EOs (Grimes and Hannon),and AEOD IRD (Giitter).
****************** UPDATE AT 2132 EST ON 01/05/99 FROM JOHN CELL TO TROCINE ******************
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Enforcement discretion was requested [at approximately 1625 CST] and granted [at approximately 1820 CST] by the NRC regarding the [Unit 1] shutdown required by the frozen [recirculation] line. Unit 1 is presently at 23% reactor power. Plans are to raise reactor power to 30% and hold.
"Actions underway include [a] 50.59 evaluation of an alternate recirculation path that will restore the operability of one [safety injection] pump. An operability determination is being written to evaluate the operability of the [containment spray pumps] without the recirculation line. These actions are expected to be completed before the expiration of the enforcement discretion at 0140 CST [on 01/06/99]."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Clayton), NRR EO (Hannon), and AEOD IRD (Giitter).
* * * UPDATE AT 0152 EST ON 01/06/99 FROM JOHN SELL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The original frozen line has been thawed and is being maintained warm by fluid circulation. An alternate [safety injection] pump recirculation path is currently being utilized, which restores the Unit 1 'B' [safety injection] pump to operable [status]. The use of this path is supported by a 50.59 evaluation and an operability determination. The same operability determination restores both Unit 1 [containment spray pumps] to operable status with minor compensatory measures."
"Unit 1 is being returned to 100% reactor power. The unit is in a 72-hour [limiting condition for operation] until the normal [safety injection] recirculation path is restored, which will allow the 'A' [safety injection] pump to be declared operable. This is anticipated later today after restoration procedures are approved and the [safety injection recirculation] line heat tracing is restored."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this update by the licensee. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton) and NRR EO (Hannon).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35217
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM O'MEARA
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM O'MEARA
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 15:17 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 15:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 15:17 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 15:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A SMALL STEAM LEAK ON A MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER DRAIN TANK
The licensee plans to notify the State Department of Labor Licensing and Regulation of a small steam leak on the 11 moisture separator reheater drain tank, which is an ASME Section VIII pressure vessel. There is no indication of steam generator tube leakage, there is no effect on plant operations, and there were no personnel injuries. The area has been cordoned off as a precaution, but the licensee does not expect the tank to catastrophically fail. There are two welds for the 1-inch pad on top of the tank that are still holding, and the licensee stated that the steam leak appears to be coming from an inside weld through a tell tail on the 1-inch pad. The outside welds appear to be intact.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The licensee plans to notify the State Department of Labor Licensing and Regulation of a small steam leak on the 11 moisture separator reheater drain tank, which is an ASME Section VIII pressure vessel. There is no indication of steam generator tube leakage, there is no effect on plant operations, and there were no personnel injuries. The area has been cordoned off as a precaution, but the licensee does not expect the tank to catastrophically fail. There are two welds for the 1-inch pad on top of the tank that are still holding, and the licensee stated that the steam leak appears to be coming from an inside weld through a tell tail on the 1-inch pad. The outside welds appear to be intact.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35218
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF MOSHER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF MOSHER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 15:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 13:56 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/1999
Notification Time: 15:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/1999
Event Time: 13:56 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
LEN WERT (R2)
LEN WERT (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING INOPERABILITY OF THE SPILLWAY EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1356 hours on 01/05/99, the Federal Emergency Regulatory Commission (FERC) was notified of the inoperability of the North Anna spillway emergency diesel generator in accordance with the requirements of 18CFR12.10(a). The diesel generator failed its operability test due to the engine water temperature being below the acceptable range of 165 - 195°F. Water temperature during the test was 155°F. A work request has been initiated to identify and correct the cause of this problem in a timely manner. The diesel generator remains available."
The licensee stated that the spillway emergency diesel generator is not safety related and that the units are not in any limiting conditions for operation as a result of this issue.
In addition to the FERC, the licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1036 1/7/98 FROM M. WHALEN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"At 0820 hours on 1/7/99, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was notified to retract a previous notification made at 1356 hours on 1/5/99. The previous notification was made as a result of declaring the North Anna spillway diesel generator inoperable due to engine water temperature being below the acceptance range. Further evaluation and consultation with the diesel vendor determined the spillway diesel generator was in fact operable and able to perform its design function."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee. Notified R2DO (Wert).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1356 hours on 01/05/99, the Federal Emergency Regulatory Commission (FERC) was notified of the inoperability of the North Anna spillway emergency diesel generator in accordance with the requirements of 18CFR12.10(a). The diesel generator failed its operability test due to the engine water temperature being below the acceptable range of 165 - 195°F. Water temperature during the test was 155°F. A work request has been initiated to identify and correct the cause of this problem in a timely manner. The diesel generator remains available."
The licensee stated that the spillway emergency diesel generator is not safety related and that the units are not in any limiting conditions for operation as a result of this issue.
In addition to the FERC, the licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1036 1/7/98 FROM M. WHALEN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"At 0820 hours on 1/7/99, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was notified to retract a previous notification made at 1356 hours on 1/5/99. The previous notification was made as a result of declaring the North Anna spillway diesel generator inoperable due to engine water temperature being below the acceptance range. Further evaluation and consultation with the diesel vendor determined the spillway diesel generator was in fact operable and able to perform its design function."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee. Notified R2DO (Wert).