Event Notification Report for January 04, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/03/1999 - 01/04/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
35214
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35214
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: HOWARD SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: HOWARD SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/05/1999
Notification Time: 03:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/1999
Event Time: 20:51 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/1999
Notification Time: 03:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/1999
Event Time: 20:51 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
JOSEPH TAPIA (R4)
JOSEPH TAPIA (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE CCW SYSTEM MAY NOT MEET ITS REQUIREMENT TO OPERATE FOR 7 DAYS WITHOUT MAKE-UP FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT.
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE:
"AT SAN ONOFRE, THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEM IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE COOLING FOR 7 DAYS WITHOUT MAKE-UP. CCW TRAINS 'A' AND 'B' ARE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED; THE NON-CRITICAL LOOP IS NOT SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED."
"UNIT 2 ENTERED MODE 5 AT APPROXIMATELY 0544 PST ON JANUARY 3, 1999, FOR A PLANNED REFUELING/MAINTENANCE OUTAGE. AT 2051 ON JANUARY 4, 1999, WHILE UNIT 2 WAS IN MODE 5, SCE DETERMINED THAT ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE BETWEEN CCW TRAIN 'B' AND THE CCW NON-CRITICAL LOOP OBSERVED DURING A [TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION] SURVEILLANCE EXCEEDED ITS ACCEPTABLE LIMIT FOR OPERATION IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4, AND TRAIN B CCW COULD HAVE BEEN INOPERABLE PRIOR TO SHUT DOWN. TESTS WERE PERFORMED TO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS LEAKAGE EXISTED DURING OPERATION IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4 PRIOR TO PLANT SHUT DOWN. HOWEVER, THE TESTS WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THE LEAKAGE DID NOT EXIST PRIOR TO SHUT DOWN. DURING THE PAST CYCLE OF PLANT OPERATION, IF A SEISMIC EVENT WERE TO HAVE OCCURRED WHILE TRAIN 'A' WAS OUT OF SERVICE, THERE WAS A POTENTIAL FOR THE CCW TO FAIL TO MEET ITS REQUIRED 7 DAYS OF OPERATION WITHOUT MAKEUP. THEREFORE, SCE IS CONSERVATIVELY MAKING THIS REPORT AS A NON-EMERGENCY 4-HOUR REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) - A CONDITION THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE CCW.
"CCW IS PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS SUPPORT FUNCTION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING IN MODES 5 AND 6. THE ISOLATION VALVES' ACTUATORS WERE DISCONNECTED, THE VALVES WERE MANUALLY SEATED. THE MEASURED LEAKAGE WAS WELL BELOW THE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL FOR OPERATION IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4. THE ACTUATORS WERE RE-CONNECTED TO PROVIDE FOR REMOTE OPERATION. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IS ON-GOING.
"UNIT 3 IS IN MODE 1 AND UNAFFECTED BY THIS CONDITION."
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
* * * UPDATE 1835 EST ON 2/3/99 FROM HOWARD SMITH TO S.SANDIN * * *
THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:
"SUBSEQUENT DIAGNOSTIC TESTS WERE PERFORMED AND THE CAUSE OF THE LEAKAGE WAS DETERMINED TO BE INSUFFICIENT SEATING LOAD FOR VALVE HV6213. THIS VALVE'S LEAKAGE WAS ACCEPTABLE FOLLOWING ITS LAST TECH SPEC REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TEST. SCE WAS NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE WHEN THE VALVE SEATING LOAD CHANGED. THEREFORE, BASED ON THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN NUREG-1022, REV 1 THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED A FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST AND FAILED WHEN FOUND. BECAUSE THE CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED IN AN OPERATIONAL MODE WHERE CCW TECH SPEC DOES NOT APPLY, THIS CONDITION IS NOT REPORTABLE."
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. NOTIFIED R4DO(JONES).
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE:
"AT SAN ONOFRE, THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEM IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE COOLING FOR 7 DAYS WITHOUT MAKE-UP. CCW TRAINS 'A' AND 'B' ARE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED; THE NON-CRITICAL LOOP IS NOT SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED."
"UNIT 2 ENTERED MODE 5 AT APPROXIMATELY 0544 PST ON JANUARY 3, 1999, FOR A PLANNED REFUELING/MAINTENANCE OUTAGE. AT 2051 ON JANUARY 4, 1999, WHILE UNIT 2 WAS IN MODE 5, SCE DETERMINED THAT ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE BETWEEN CCW TRAIN 'B' AND THE CCW NON-CRITICAL LOOP OBSERVED DURING A [TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION] SURVEILLANCE EXCEEDED ITS ACCEPTABLE LIMIT FOR OPERATION IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4, AND TRAIN B CCW COULD HAVE BEEN INOPERABLE PRIOR TO SHUT DOWN. TESTS WERE PERFORMED TO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS LEAKAGE EXISTED DURING OPERATION IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4 PRIOR TO PLANT SHUT DOWN. HOWEVER, THE TESTS WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THE LEAKAGE DID NOT EXIST PRIOR TO SHUT DOWN. DURING THE PAST CYCLE OF PLANT OPERATION, IF A SEISMIC EVENT WERE TO HAVE OCCURRED WHILE TRAIN 'A' WAS OUT OF SERVICE, THERE WAS A POTENTIAL FOR THE CCW TO FAIL TO MEET ITS REQUIRED 7 DAYS OF OPERATION WITHOUT MAKEUP. THEREFORE, SCE IS CONSERVATIVELY MAKING THIS REPORT AS A NON-EMERGENCY 4-HOUR REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) - A CONDITION THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE CCW.
"CCW IS PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS SUPPORT FUNCTION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING IN MODES 5 AND 6. THE ISOLATION VALVES' ACTUATORS WERE DISCONNECTED, THE VALVES WERE MANUALLY SEATED. THE MEASURED LEAKAGE WAS WELL BELOW THE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL FOR OPERATION IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4. THE ACTUATORS WERE RE-CONNECTED TO PROVIDE FOR REMOTE OPERATION. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IS ON-GOING.
"UNIT 3 IS IN MODE 1 AND UNAFFECTED BY THIS CONDITION."
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
* * * UPDATE 1835 EST ON 2/3/99 FROM HOWARD SMITH TO S.SANDIN * * *
THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:
"SUBSEQUENT DIAGNOSTIC TESTS WERE PERFORMED AND THE CAUSE OF THE LEAKAGE WAS DETERMINED TO BE INSUFFICIENT SEATING LOAD FOR VALVE HV6213. THIS VALVE'S LEAKAGE WAS ACCEPTABLE FOLLOWING ITS LAST TECH SPEC REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TEST. SCE WAS NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE WHEN THE VALVE SEATING LOAD CHANGED. THEREFORE, BASED ON THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN NUREG-1022, REV 1 THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED A FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST AND FAILED WHEN FOUND. BECAUSE THE CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED IN AN OPERATIONAL MODE WHERE CCW TECH SPEC DOES NOT APPLY, THIS CONDITION IS NOT REPORTABLE."
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. NOTIFIED R4DO(JONES).