United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Preliminary, Qualitative Human Reliability Analysis For Spent Fuel Handling (NUREG/CR-7017, SAND2010-8464P)

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Publication Information

Manuscript Completed: November 2011
Date Published: February 2012

Prepared by:
Jeffrey D. Brewer1
Paul J. Amico2
Susan E. Cooper3
Stacey M. L. Hendrickson1

1 Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, NM 87185
Operated by Sandia Corporation
for the U.S. Department of Energy

2 SAIC
Abingdon, MD 21009

3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Susan E. Cooper, NRC Project Manager
Susan E. Cooper, NRC Technical Lead

Prepared for:
Division of Risk Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
NRC Job Code: N6026

Availability Notice

Abstract

This report provides material that was originally generated as an interim letter report and that presented a preliminary, qualitative human reliability analysis (HRA) to examine, in a generic manner, how human performance of dry cask storage operations (DCSOs) could plausibly lead to radiological consequences that impact the public and the environment. This material is released in a NUREG/CR format to facilitate dissemination of human failure events that examine, in a preliminary fashion, the misloading of spent fuel into a cask. This report includes the investigation of cask drop scenarios as well as other DCSO human performance aspects. It builds upon previous analyses and subject matter expert interviews to improve understanding of human performance issues that may arise in DCSOs. The scenarios and examinations represent a snap-shot in time and are preliminary to the qualitative HRA of cask drops provided in NUREG/CR-7016 [29]. This report demonstrates that process descriptions of varying levels of detail, when carefully reviewed in light of state-of-the-art understandings of human performance, can enable identification of key operational errors and vulnerabilities that may contribute to errors. It is anticipated that the preliminary, qualitative HRA of DCSOs in this report will enhance the ability to carry out a detailed, plant-specific qualitative HRA of DCSOs.

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