United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Information Notice No. 81-29: Equipment Qualification Testing Experience

                                                            SSINS No.: 6835 
                                                            Accession No.: 
                                                            8103300414     
                                                            IN 81-29       

                                UNITED STATES
                        NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                    OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
                           WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
                                     
                             September 24, 1981

Information Notice No. 81-29:   EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION TESTING 
                                   EXPERIENCE 

The following Test Summary Report numbers 1 through 10 summarize information
received by NRC during the period from April 1, to August 31, 1981 regarding
adverse results from equipment testing. It should be noted that only the 
adverse test results that have come to the attention of NRC during this 
period are provided. Adverse test results obtained during the equipment 
development phase is not required to be reported to NRC. NRC does not intend
to publish successful qualification test results except for equipment 
previously published as an adverse test result. Those successful tests will 
only be published as they are voluntarily brought to the attention of NRC by
industry. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 2 of 11      

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 1 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: Limitorque Valve Operator, Type SMB, Size 00 

Test Facility: Limitorque Corporation 

Cognizant Design and/or Test: Westinghouse Electric Corporation 

Failed Component: Valve Operator Drive Motor (manufactured by Reliance 
  Electric Co.) 

Type of Test: Environmental Qualification of SMB Class Valve Operators per 
  IEEE 323-1974 (Harsh Environment) and IEEE 382-1972 

Description of Failure(s): 

     Failures 1 & 2 (Dates: 2/28/81 and 4/7/81) 
     Motors failed during attempted valve operator cycling 9 hours and 21 
     hours, respectively, after initiation of steam spray during performance
     of the high-energy line break (HELB) accident profile. Complete valve 
     operators had been pre-aged in accordance with IEEE 323-1974. 

     Failure 3 (Date: 5/1/81) 
     Motor failed during attempted valve operator cycling 10 days after 
     initiation of steam spray for HELB accident profile. No pre-aging had 
     been performed. 

Failure Mode: Failures were mechanical (motor bearings) and electrical 
  (stator winding). There was evidence of steam and chemical flow-through in
  the motor. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Motor modifications, test chamber
  design environmental profile requirement review for possible reduction in 
  maximum test temperature may be required for corrective action. 

Generic Implications: Similar units, including units in operation, have 
  successfully passed environmental qualification in accordance with IEEE 
  323-1971 and earlier standards under less severe test conditions. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 3 of 11      

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 2 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: ITT Barton Lot 4 Transmitters, Group A 

Test Facility: Westinghouse - Forest Hills 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Westinghouse Electric Corporation 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: Environmental Qualification of ITT Barton Lot 4 Transmitters, 
  Group A (3 Pressure and 3 Differential Pressure Transmitters Tested, 
  4/6/81 through 4/27/81) 

Description of Failure(s): 

     1.   Two DP transmitters exhibited noisy output followed by erroneous 
          output during second temperature ramp of the HELB accident 
          profile. Output returned to normal over the following 24 hours, 
          but the failure recurred at end of postaccident period on one 
          unit. 

     2.   One pressure transmitter exhibited noise and erroneous output for 
          forty minutes during the second temperature ramp of HELB accident 
          profile. Its output then returned to normal for the remainder of 
          the test. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Manufacturer is investigating the
  failures, concentrating on aging methodology, test setup, and duplicating 
  test conditions to establish failure mechanisms. 

Generic Implications: Units are identical to Lot 2 units that have 
  successfully passed environmental qualification in accordance with IEEE 
  323-1971. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 4 of 11      

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 3 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: D. G. O'Brien Electrical Penetration Assembly, Model K Connectors

Test Facility: Sandia National Laboratories/Division 4445 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: NRC/RES, IE 

Failed Component: Conductors shorted at connector 

Type of Test: Simulated LOCA Environmental Test to Examine Methodology 

Description of Failure(s): The grommet used in the connector expanded as the
  result of exposure to high aging and loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) 
  environmental temperatures. The extrusion of the grommet sealing material 
  stripped insulation from the conductors resulting in electrical grounding 
  during the steam/chemical spray test conditions. (See also IE Information 
  Notice 81-20.) 

Failure Mode: Insulation was removed as a result of the force of the 
  expanding grommet material. Connector assemblies were retightened prior 
  and subsequent to thermal aging. This process contributed to the failure. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Additional testing of the 
  connector is being performed by Duke Power Co. and will be reviewed by 
  NRC. No additional testing will be performed by NRC on the electrical 
  penetration assembly. 

Generic Implications: Application of Model K connectors is limited to the 
  Catawba, McGuire and Yankee Rowe facilities. qualification tests to 
  earlier standards were successfully performed by Duke Power and D. G. 
  O'Brien on the Model K connectors for the McGuire plant. (See IE 
  Information Notice 81-20 for more detailed information regarding earlier 
  qualification.) 
.

                                                        IN 81-29          
                                                        September 24, 1981 
                                                        Page 5 of 11      

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 4 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: Dresser Safety Valve, Model 317009NA 

Test Facility: Combustion Engineering (CE) 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute 
  (EPRI) 

Failed Component: Not identified 

Type of Test: Performance Testing for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Relief
  and Safety Valves 

Description of Failure(s): On June 3, 1981, a full-pressure steam test was 
  performed on the subject safety valve. During the test, the valve did not 
  close at the predetermined pressure and reopened at a pressure below the 
  original set point after the valve had closed. The valve did not meet 
  EPRI's safety valve screening criteria. 

Failure Mode: Disassembly of the valve disclosed galling of guiding surfaces
  and damaged internal parts. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Undergoing evaluation 
  Generic Implications: EPRI advises the following: (1) no operating plant 
  has this valve installed; and (2) the following unlicensed plants plan to 
  utilize them -- Bellefonte 1 & 2; cherokee 1, 2,3; Palo Verde 1, 2, 3; 
  Perkins 1, 2, 3; and WPPSS 2 & 4. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 6 of 11      

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 5 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: Dresser Safety Valve, Model 31739A 

Test Facility: Combustion Engineering  

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute 
  (EPRI) 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: Performance Testing for PWR Relief and Safety Valves 

Description of Failure(s): On June 25, 1981, a high ramp rate, high back 
  pressure steam test was performed on the subject valve. During the test, 
  rated flow was not achieved. The valve did not meet the EPRI valve 
  screening criteria. 

Failure Mode: Not determined 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Continue testing and data 
  evaluation. 

Generic Implications: EPRI advises the following: the Dresser 31739A safety 
  valve is being used or will be used on the following plants--Calvert 
  Cliffs 1 & 2; Palisades, Midland 1 & 2; Oconee 1, 2, & 3; Crystal River 3; 
  TMI-1; and Millstone 2. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 7 of 11      

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 6 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: Dresser Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Model No. 31533VX-30 

Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program 

Description of Failure(s): On May 19 and 20, 1981, a full-pressure water 
  seal simulation test was performed. On May 20, 1981, full-pressure steam 
  and full-pressure water seal simulation tests were performed on the 
  subject valve. During the water tests, the valve remained open for 2 
  seconds (5/19/81) and 75 seconds (5/20/81) after receipt of a closure 
  signal. The valve did not meet the EPRI screening criteria (failure to 
  close on demand). 

Failure Mode: Not determined. Disassembly and inspection did not reveal 
  damage that might affect the ability of the valve to open or close on 
  demand. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Continue testing and data 
  evaluation. 

Generic Implications:Information indicates the valve is to be installed in 
  CE and B&W PWRs. Fort Calhoun has loop seals upstream of Dresser PORVs. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 8 of 11      

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 7 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: Target Rock Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Mode 80X-006-1 

Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program 

Description of Failure(s): On April 29, 1981, a full-pressure (2500 psi) 
  loop seal simulation test was performed on the subject valve. During the 
  water test, the valve remained open for 12 seconds upon deenergizing the 
  valve for closure, and then closed. The valve did not pass EPRI's 
  screening criteria. 

Failure Mode: Not determined. Disassembly did not reveal any damage that 
  would affect future testing. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Continue testing and data 
  evaluation. 

Generic Implications: Information indicates that there are presently no 
  valves of this design in operating plants but they are planned for use in 
  some plants under construction. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 9 of 11      

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 8 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: Control Components Inc. (CCI) PORV 

Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute 
  (EPRI) 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Program 

Description of Failure(s): On July 1 and 2, 1981, during steam tests 
 utilizing spring force only for valve closure, valve remained open for 
 approximately 3 seconds prior to closure. The valve did not pass EPRI's 
 screening criteria. 

Failure Mode: Not determined 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Continue testing and data 
  evaluation. 

Generic Implications: Information indicates that the CCI PORV is being used 
  or will be used on McGuire 1 & 2 and Catawba 1 & 2. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 10 of 11     

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 9 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: Crosby Safety Valve 3K6 

Test Facility: Combustion Engineering 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute 
  (EPRI). 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: Steam, Low and High Ramp Rate, High Back Pressure Test 

Description of Failure(s): 

  8/11/81 - Shortly after test initiation the valve experienced oscillations
            (chattering). 

  8/13/81 - During steam test, performed at low and high ramp rates, valve 
            closed at a pressure lower than the EPRI blowdown criteria of 
            2250 psia (approx. 2210 psia). 

  8/7/81 - Valve oscillated during set-point check using air-assist devices.

Failure Mode: Not determined 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Not determined 

Generic Implications: Information indicates that the Crosby Safety Valve 3K6
  is being used or will be used on St. Lucie 1 & 2 and Fort Calhoun. 
.

                                                         IN 81-29          
                                                         September 24, 1981 
                                                         Page 11 of 11     

     Equipment Qualification Notice No. 10 - Test Summary Report No. 1 

Equipment: ASCO Solenoid Valves 

Test Facility: ASCO/Isomedix, Inc./Wyle Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Automatic Switch Co. (ASCO) 

Failed Component: Viton Elastomer Seals in NP 8300 Series Valves 

Type of Test: Radiation Simulation for Design Basis Event (DBE) 

Description of Failure(s): Recent radiation simulation tests resulted in 
  failure of the valves to shift position. The Viton seals break down when 
  submitted to gamma radiation exposure in excess of 20 megarads, adhere to 
  the brass surfaces, and prevent solenoid operation. 

Failure Mode: Solenoid valve will not shift position upon receipt of an 
  operating signal. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Replace Viton Elastomers with 
  Ethylene Propylene elastomers on valves required to operate under accident
  conditions following a DBE. [Note: Ethylene Propylene Elastomers do not 
  break down when exposed to postulated normal service plus DBE gamma 
  radiation dose rates. Information Notice No. 80-11 addressed replacement of
  Ethylene Propylene Elastomers with Viton Elastomers because of failures 
  resulting from inadvertent oil entrainment.]. 

Generic Implications: All ASCO Valves Series NP 8300 with Viton Elastomers 
  use in Class 1E circuits and are exposed to gamma radiation in excess of 
  20 megarads. Additional information will be issued following receipt of 
  the vendors final test report. 

Attachment:
Recently issued IE Information Notices 

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, November 12, 2013