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> 2015
> February 26
Current Event Notification Report for February 26, 2015
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/25/2015 - 02/26/2015
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50351 |
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
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Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2015
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
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Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
90 |
Power Operation |
90 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER WALLS
"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected.
"Condition Reports: 850802, 850819"
In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Condition Report: 898908."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ernstes).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised.
"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Freeman).
* * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities."
Condition Report: 10000607
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Desai).
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2315 EST ON 1/15/2015 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the conditions identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity was performed of a fire wall for conditions similar to those reported on 12/12/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1008 - Unit 1 AC Inverter Room and Fire Area 0001 to consider the barrier nonfunctional. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
Condition Report: 10013077
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA AT 2025 EST ON 1/21/2015 * * *
"During review and closeout of fire barrier and penetration seals work orders and surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity initially described in Event # 50351, the following conditions were identified that in the event of a postulated fire in the respective fire areas listed both safe shutdown paths could be compromised.
"Unit 2 Control Bldg. el. 130', gap in the grout around conduit penetration between fire areas 2013 and 2015
"Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. el. 130', open conduit between fire areas 1203C and 1105
"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in the Unit 2 fire area and will remain in place until the affected barrier areas are repaired. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 1 areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. Subsequent similar condition(s) found when performing remaining inspections that meet the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Condition Report 10015417
"Condition Report 10015437"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (McCoy).
* * * UPDATE FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EST ON 2/4/15 * * *
"During the review of fire barrier surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, some degradation was observed on the east wall of fire area 2006. These nonconforming issues observed on the affected fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 2 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
CR 10021623
Notified R2DO (HAAG).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1823 EST ON 2/18/15 * * *
"During performance of work package closeouts to support the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, the following fire barriers were identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria:
- Three penetrations separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1013 and 0040
- A fire wall deficiency in the wall separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1015 and 1013
"These nonconforming issues observed on the affected penetrations and fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10028364
"CR 10028366"
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).
* * * UPDATE AT 2035 EST ON 02/25/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *
"During the review and closeout of a work package performed as part of the 'extent of condition' for the inspection activity initially described in EN #50351, a fire penetration seal was identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria. This penetration seal is located in the 2C Diesel Generator (DG) room and passes between Fire Area 2407 and 2408.
"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 2 Areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10032202"
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour). |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50828 |
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: WALMART
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County: LOS ANGELES
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOJI ORTEGO
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
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Notification Date: 02/17/2015
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/12/2015
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2015
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
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This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3
" level of radioactive material.
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
Walmart store #2949 in Long Beach, CA, reported the loss of two exit signs containing tritium. The signs were replaced with non-tritium exit signs and were scheduled to be collected for disposal. The production date and activity of the missing signs are unknown at this time.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Part 21 |
Event Number: 50848 |
Rep Org: DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
Licensee: ASEA BROWN BOVARI
Region: 1
City: MILLSTONE State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARYLOU CALDERONE
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
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Notification Date: 02/25/2015
Notification Time: 10:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2015
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
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Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
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Event Text
ABB K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER SECONDARY CLOSE LATCH BINDING
The following was received from the licensee via email:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) concerning a defect identified in ABB K-Line secondary close latches at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3). A written report to the NRC will follow within 20 days.
"On January 12, 2015, during the overhaul of an ABB K600 load center circuit breaker at MPS3, a defect in a new safety-related secondary close latch (Part No. 716610K01, Batch No. 0000150471) was identified when the latch did not fit properly into the breaker mechanism. The vertical piece on the front edge of the latch was contacting the manual close lever. Upon closer inspection, it was found that the angle of the bend in the secondary close latch was not correct, causing it to bind on the manual close lever when actuated. When the manual close lever was actuated, it too would bind due to the secondary latch pressing it into the left mechanism side sheet.
"Of the eight (8) additional secondary close latches in stock in the Millstone warehouse, all four (4) latches from Batch No. 0000150471, as well as two (2) latches from Batch No. 0000153854, were found to have improper bends. The two (2) remaining latches from Batch No. 0000119420 were found to have the correct bend angle.
"DNC determined that the defect meets the criteria of a substantial safety hazard since it could prevent a breaker from staying open following a trip signal.
"DNC notified ABB of this defect on January 22, 2015. Following this notification, one of the defective latches was returned to the vendor for evaluation." |
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