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Current Event Notification Report for June 05, 2025

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/04/2025 - 06/05/2025

EVENT NUMBERS
57735 57741
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 57735
Rep Org: Sononuclear of Puerto Rico
Licensee: Sono-Nuclear of Puerto Rico
Region: 1
City: San Juan   State: PR
County:
License #: 52-24937-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Pedro Torres
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 05/29/2025
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2025
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - Lost/Stolen LNM>1000x
Person (Organization):
Dimitriadis, Anthony (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
Event Text
LOST SOURCE

The following is a summary of information obtained from Sono-Nuclear of Puerto Rico via phone and email:

The licensee received two doses of Pluvicto (Lu-177), each in its own shielded vial, in a single shipping container. One dose was administered without issue, with all contents related to the used dose properly discarded.

The second dose, with an initial activity of 200 mCi, was left to decay for approximately 24 hours for a target final activity of 160 mCi. The dose was left in the original shipping container which had been stripped of all radioactive material transport index labels as usually done when discarding empty boxes after extracting the lead case containing the vial.

On May 29, 2025, at 0701 EDT, a nuclear medicine staff technologist noticed that the shipping container containing the second dose was not in the locked hot lab. The technologist realized that the container was discarded as regular garbage by mistake.

From the licensee's preliminary investigation, it was determined that after work the janitorial staff placed what was thought to be an empty box inside a regular trash bag and discarded it in the waste compactor. The discarded dose vial was enclosed in its protective lead container inside the shipping container. The dose vial was not directly handled, opened, or manipulated by nuclear medicine staff or any other office staff including the janitorial crew. The container was compacted with other waste.

The licensee tried to gain access to the inside of the waste compactor where the box containing the dose was discarded. The licensee was unsuccessful due to not having an access door or space to retrieve items. The licensee is seeking assistance from the company that services the waste compactor.

This waste compactor is located in the far back of the Hospital San Francisco parking lot away from any buildings or parking lots. To assess the radiation exposure of the area, the licensee surveyed the exterior of the waste compactor with maximum readings obtained between 6-7 microrem/hour.

The licensee notified their facility radiation safety officer, medical director, and Hospital San Francisco security staff about the incident.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf


Power Reactor
Event Number: 57741
Facility: Hatch
Region: 2     State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: John Long
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 06/04/2025
Notification Time: 00:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2025
Event Time: 21:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Blamey, Alan (R2DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 100
Event Text
UNIT 1 HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2137 EDT on 06/03/2025, while Unit 1 was at 98 percent power in mode 1, the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine stop valve failed to open as required when testing the auxiliary oil pump, resulting in the HPCI system being declared inoperable. The cause of the turbine stop valve failing to open is under investigation. HPCI does not have a redundant system, therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Reactor core isolation cooling and low-pressure emergency core cooling systems were operable during this time.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to Unit 2."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, June 5, 2025