| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/20/2016 - 06/21/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 51944 | Rep Org: NUCLEAR LOGISTICS INC
Licensee: NUCLEAR LOGISTICS INC
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County: TARRANT
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH | Notification Date: 05/19/2016
Notification Time: 19:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/21/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 INTERIM EVALUATION OF A DEVIATION - CONTACTOR FAILURE
The following was received via FAX:
On May 18, 2016, Nuclear Logistics INC. (NLI) determined that a contactor failure that occurred at the Shearon Harris plant had failed due to an auxiliary contact chatter present on the seal-in circuit for the coil voltage. The auxiliary contact chatter was caused by the loss of the shading
coils. NLI will be submitting a full report on the issue to the NRC within 60 days.
The contactor that failed was a Size 4 Eaton Freedom Series with a special coil for degraded voltage condition.
Reference Number: P21-05192016
NLI reported that the following plants have these types of contactor's:
Region 2: Oconee, Turkey Point, Shearon Harris and North Anna
Region 4: Columbia and Waterford
* * * UPDATE AT 1832 EDT ON 06/20/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO DANIEL MILLS * * *
The following is excerpted from the licensee submission:
"The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect: The Contactor that failed in service is a Size 4 Eaton Freedom Series with an AZZ/NLI special coil for meeting specific degraded voltage conditions.
"Extent of condition: Size 3, 4 and size 5 Eaton Freedom Series contactors or starters with an NLI special degraded voltage coil that have been supplied by AZZ/NLI since December 2010.
"NLI procured the commercial grade contactors and installed the special coil that was required to achieve the specific degraded voltage condition. The units were qualified, dedicated and supplied for safety related applications. The contactors were commercially procured from Eaton, the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).
"For contactors/starters utilized in continuous duty applications. the OEM shading coils on the contactor core ... have the potential to become loose and fall off. If the shading coils are not in the intended location on the core, there is the potential for excessive chatter to occur on the normally open auxiliary contacts that are closed when the contactor is energized.
"The safety function of the contactor is to reliably supply uninterrupted power (no contact chatter) to a load on demand. For special degraded voltage applications, the NLI supplied contactor is equipped with an NLI special coil that replaces the OEM coil.
"When the contactor/starters that have the special coil installed are utilized in a continuous duty operation (continuously energized greater than 60 minutes) the special coil reaches a higher temperature than the original manufacturer's coil. The increased heat is potentially causing degradation of the acrylic resin that is utilized by the manufacturer to hold the OEM shading coils onto the OEM core. After the acrylic resin is no longer providing a secure hold on the shading coils, the shading coils can then become loose from the iron core.
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
"Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance
"Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
"7410 Pebble Drive
"Ft. Worth, TX 76118"
AZZ/NLI Part 21 Report No: P21-05192016, Rev. 0
Plants potentially impacted include Oconee, Shearon Harris, Columbia, Turkey Point, North Anna, and Waterford.
Notified R4DO (Rollins), R2DO (Musser) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors group (via email). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 51998 | Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: DAVID SPANGLER
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH | Notification Date: 06/10/2016
Notification Time: 12:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2016
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A CHEMICAL PROCESSING MALFUNCTION
"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: High enriched scrap fuel material is processed in BWXT NOG-Lynchburg's Uranium Recovery facility to reclaim as much of the uranium as possible. The material is dissolved in acid and transferred to a series of horizontal columns where the acid is neutralized. The solution may be transferred to a set of accountability weigh columns for measurement prior to entering the uranium extraction process. The solution is subsequently transferred to a series of horizontal feed columns. Process water is used to periodically flush the horizontal columns during cleanup for materials accountability.
"On June 9, 2016, a BWXT Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer was notified that a bluish tint had been observed in the favorable geometry process water connection to the horizontal columns. By procedure, a blue dye is added to the acid to aid in its identification in the event of a spill. Further evaluation determined that the favorable geometry process water line was directly connected to the horizontal column system and the presence of the blue dye indicated a potential backflow of uranium bearing solution into the water line. The favorable geometry water line is under constant water pressure. The valves controlling the water flow are normally closed. There is also a check valve in the line to prevent backflow. The line is supplied from a favorable geometry header on the mezzanine above. The header supplies water to other processes in Uranium Recovery, including an unfavorable geometry hot water heater.
"The Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) was reviewed and an accident sequence for this potential backflow could not be identified. On June 9, 2016 at 1330 [EDT] it was the determined the accident sequence was unanalyzed and not properly documented in the ISA. Although IROFS [Items Relied on for Safety] listed for other accident sequences were applicable to the backflow scenario, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were not maintained. As documented in the ISA, criticality was not 'highly unlikely.'
"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: Backflow into the favorable geometry water line can only be achieved by a forced flow to overcome the water pressure in the line. The only source for this pressurized flow is during the transfer from the accountability weigh columns to the horizontal column system. The solution is transferred using an air diaphragm pump. A trained and qualified operator opens the valve to initiate the transfer of solution from the accountability weigh columns to the horizontal columns (an uncredited control). The transfer of solution to the horizontal columns is monitored by a trained and qualified operator (an uncredited control). The water heater is substantially upstream of the supply line to the horizontal columns. The direction of flow of the process water in the supply header is away from unfavorable geometry hot water heater. The process water header is a favorable geometry (a credited IROFS). An operator checks the process water pressure on a daily basis (a credited IROFS). If the above existing IROFS and uncredited controls were considered in an ISA accident sequence, the likelihood of a criticality could be demonstrated to be highly unlikely. However, these uncredited controls are not designated as IROFS. Although the as-found condition presented no safety concern, the scenarios as documented in the ISA did not demonstrate that the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event.
"Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1), 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.'
"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A section of the piping from the process water supply header was removed to physically isolate the process water supply from the horizontal columns. Criticality is no longer credible. The hot water heater is the only unfavorable geometry connected to the process water system in the Uranium Recovery facility. The hot water heater was assayed with a gamma survey instrument in several locations along the bottom and up the sides. No counts above background were detected. In addition, multiple liquid samples were taken from the bottom of the water heater and a cartridge filter housing prior to the hot water heater. All samples were well counted and determined to be below the Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA). An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Region II personnel. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51999 | Rep Org: GRACE PACIFIC LLC
Licensee: GRACE PACIFIC LLC
Region: 4
City: HONOLULU State: HI
County:
License #: 53-21273-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FELICIA SOUZA
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/10/2016
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2016
Event Time: 03:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED BY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
A Troxler Model 4640B gauge was run over by a steam roller and damaged at a jobsite at the Kona, HI airport. The licensee established a perimeter around the damaged gauge and the RSO approached using a radiation survey meter. The RSO placed the damaged gauge in its case and will transfer it to a secure location until it can be returned to the manufacturer. The gauge contains 0.8 mCi of Cesium-137. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52025 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/20/2016
Notification Time: 15:27 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2016
Event Time: 12:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ELEVATED TRITIUM DETECTED ONSITE
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) because the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is in the process of informing the Alabama Radiological Protection Department, Alabama Department of Environmental Management, Limestone County Emergency Management Department, and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) of recent groundwater monitoring results at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative.
"There are no indications of any impacts to any off-site drinking water source as indicated by Browns Ferry's off-site groundwater monitoring well samples.
"TVA has taken immediate action to address the apparent leak following the detection of elevated tritium levels from on-site groundwater monitoring wells and will be monitoring affected wells on an increased frequency. No elevated tritium levels have been detected from off-site monitoring locations, and the public is not at risk.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52026 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/20/2016
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/20/2016
Event Time: 15:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 32 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
"On June 20, 2016 at 1540 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor tripped due to [reaching the] automatic Lo-Lo steam generator trip [setpoint] on [the] #4 steam generator. Concurrent with the reactor trip the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.
"All control and shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater and main steam dump systems. The station is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.
"The cause is currently under investigation.
"This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."
There was no effect on Unit 1. | |