Event Notification Report for March 30, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/29/2016 - 03/30/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
51839518335183651837
Agreement State
Event Number: 51839
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION, INC.
Region: 3
City: DAYTON State: OH
County:
License #: 03320 99 0006
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION, INC.
Region: 3
City: DAYTON State: OH
County:
License #: 03320 99 0006
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/31/2016
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2016
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA STUCK SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of Ohio by email:
"On March 30, 2016 at approximately [1250 EDT] the Bureau of Environmental Health and Radiation Protection (BEHRP) received a phone call from licensee's RSO that an industrial radiography crew working on a water tank construction job in Groveport, Ohio had a source stuck in the guide tube of a QSA Model 880D camera and were unable to retrieve the back into the camera. The source in use was 75 Curies of Iridium-192. The incident occurred at approximately [1225 EDT]. The stuck source was discovered after a shot time had ended and the radiography crew attempted to crank the source back in to the camera. The radiography crew conducted surveys of the area and moved boundaries out 2 mR/hr or less. The cause of the stuck source was due to a magnetic stand becoming dislodged during radiography operations, which fell onto the guide tube, crimping it, and preventing retraction of the source."
* * * UPDATE:FROM STEPHEN JAMES TO VINCE KLCO ON 3/31/2016 AT 1631 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *
"A BEHRP inspector was immediately dispatched to the job-site and arrived there at approximately [1320 EDT]. The inspector met with the licensee's customer and reviewed the actions taken by the radiography crew to establish new barriers and prevent access to the site. The licensee's trained retrieval personnel dispatched to the site arrived a short time later. After a thorough review of the incident and work area, the licensee's response team was able to retrieve the source, which was completed at approximately [1600 EDT] that afternoon. The maximum dose received by any individual involved in the recovery effort was 50 mR. The camera and guide tube will be returned to manufacturer for repair.
"QSA Global Camera,Serial Number-D8042; Source Serial Number-29222G.
"Ohio Event- OH160002"
Notified the R3DO (Pelke) and the NMSS Events Notification via email.
The following information was received from the State of Ohio by email:
"On March 30, 2016 at approximately [1250 EDT] the Bureau of Environmental Health and Radiation Protection (BEHRP) received a phone call from licensee's RSO that an industrial radiography crew working on a water tank construction job in Groveport, Ohio had a source stuck in the guide tube of a QSA Model 880D camera and were unable to retrieve the back into the camera. The source in use was 75 Curies of Iridium-192. The incident occurred at approximately [1225 EDT]. The stuck source was discovered after a shot time had ended and the radiography crew attempted to crank the source back in to the camera. The radiography crew conducted surveys of the area and moved boundaries out 2 mR/hr or less. The cause of the stuck source was due to a magnetic stand becoming dislodged during radiography operations, which fell onto the guide tube, crimping it, and preventing retraction of the source."
* * * UPDATE:FROM STEPHEN JAMES TO VINCE KLCO ON 3/31/2016 AT 1631 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *
"A BEHRP inspector was immediately dispatched to the job-site and arrived there at approximately [1320 EDT]. The inspector met with the licensee's customer and reviewed the actions taken by the radiography crew to establish new barriers and prevent access to the site. The licensee's trained retrieval personnel dispatched to the site arrived a short time later. After a thorough review of the incident and work area, the licensee's response team was able to retrieve the source, which was completed at approximately [1600 EDT] that afternoon. The maximum dose received by any individual involved in the recovery effort was 50 mR. The camera and guide tube will be returned to manufacturer for repair.
"QSA Global Camera,Serial Number-D8042; Source Serial Number-29222G.
"Ohio Event- OH160002"
Notified the R3DO (Pelke) and the NMSS Events Notification via email.
Agreement State
Event Number: 51833
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ATC GROUP SERVICES, INC
Region: 1
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 2962-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL NORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Licensee: ATC GROUP SERVICES, INC
Region: 1
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 2962-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL NORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 03/30/2016
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2016
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Florida via email:
"A Troxler Gauge was run over by heavy equipment at a construction site. The Type B container case was broken open exposing the source. [A Florida State] Inspector was sent to the scene to investigate."
State of Florida Incident Number: FL16-047
The following information was received from the State of Florida via email:
"A Troxler Gauge was run over by heavy equipment at a construction site. The Type B container case was broken open exposing the source. [A Florida State] Inspector was sent to the scene to investigate."
State of Florida Incident Number: FL16-047
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51836
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GLENN BENJAMIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GLENN BENJAMIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/30/2016
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2016
Event Time: 15:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2016
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2016
Event Time: 15:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE OUTSIDE REQUIRED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VALUE
"At approximately 1545 CDT on 3/30/16, the Main Control Room received numerous annunciators that indicated a trip of the Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (ERAT) Static VAR Compensator (SVC) caused by a voltage transient on the 138 kV feed due to thunderstorms in the area. As a result of the voltage transient, the Division 1 Fuel Building ventilation (VF) system isolation dampers closed causing a trip of VF supply and exhaust fans. With no running VF fans, secondary containment differential pressure rose to slightly greater than 0 inches water gauge which exceeded the Technical Specification requirement of greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. The Control Room entered EOP-8, Secondary Containment Control. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored within Technical Specification requirements at 1550 CDT by starting the Standby Gas Treatment HVAC (VG) system.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
"At approximately 1545 CDT on 3/30/16, the Main Control Room received numerous annunciators that indicated a trip of the Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (ERAT) Static VAR Compensator (SVC) caused by a voltage transient on the 138 kV feed due to thunderstorms in the area. As a result of the voltage transient, the Division 1 Fuel Building ventilation (VF) system isolation dampers closed causing a trip of VF supply and exhaust fans. With no running VF fans, secondary containment differential pressure rose to slightly greater than 0 inches water gauge which exceeded the Technical Specification requirement of greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. The Control Room entered EOP-8, Secondary Containment Control. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored within Technical Specification requirements at 1550 CDT by starting the Standby Gas Treatment HVAC (VG) system.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51837
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL RAYBURN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL RAYBURN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/31/2016
Notification Time: 00:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2016
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2016
Notification Time: 00:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2016
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"On March 30, 2016, at 1715 EDT, with the Unit shutdown and in Mode 6 for refueling, evidence of leakage was identified on a 3/4-inch flexible braided piping connection on Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-1, and this issue was determined to be reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage. This flexible piping is for RCP 1-1 first stage seal cavity vent line, and is categorized as ASME Section III Class 2 piping. The leakage was identified due to the discovery of a small amount of boric acid (approximately 1/2 teaspoon) on the welded end connection of the flexible piping. No active leakage was identified at the time of discovery with the Reactor Coolant System depressurized and approximately 110 degrees F.
"Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.13, 'RCS Operational Leakage,' does not apply in the current plant condition (Mode 6). The cause and resolution of the leakage are under evaluation. This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On March 30, 2016, at 1715 EDT, with the Unit shutdown and in Mode 6 for refueling, evidence of leakage was identified on a 3/4-inch flexible braided piping connection on Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-1, and this issue was determined to be reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage. This flexible piping is for RCP 1-1 first stage seal cavity vent line, and is categorized as ASME Section III Class 2 piping. The leakage was identified due to the discovery of a small amount of boric acid (approximately 1/2 teaspoon) on the welded end connection of the flexible piping. No active leakage was identified at the time of discovery with the Reactor Coolant System depressurized and approximately 110 degrees F.
"Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.13, 'RCS Operational Leakage,' does not apply in the current plant condition (Mode 6). The cause and resolution of the leakage are under evaluation. This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."