Event Notification Report for March 07, 2016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DENSITY GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER

The following was received from Texas via email:

"On March 7, 2016, the Agency [Texas Dept. Of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that while performing routine checks, the shutter on an Ohmart SH-F2 nuclear gauge was stuck in the open position. Open is the normal operation position for the shutter. The gauge contains a 100 millicurie cesium-137 source. The gauge does not create an exposure hazard to the licensee's employees or any member of the general public. The licensee has contacted their service company who will inspect the gauge on March 9, 2016. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas incident # I-9384

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email and facsimile:

"Event Type: Loss of licensed material in a quantity greater than or equal to 1000 times the Appendix C quantities in part 20.

"Notifications: NRG Energy discovered the event on March 7, 2016, [at their Seward, PA location,] and submitted a report to the Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] on March 9, 2016. This event is reportable as per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i).

"Event Description: On Monday March 7, 2016, while conducting the six month inventory check of the radioactive sources at the Seward Power Plant, one tritium exit sign was found missing. The exit sign was installed above a door located in Seward's Fuel Barn. The last inventory check was conducted September 11, 2015, and the exit sign was present at that time. The exit sign was manufactured by EMERG-LITE and was an Everlite series sign. The sign contained between 9.5 - 11.5 Ci of tritium gas at the time of manufacture and was to be replaced before February 2023. The sign was last known to be in good condition and not damaged. No cause for the missing sign has been identified and no exposures have been recorded at this time.

"Cause of the Event: Unknown at this time. The plant is currently searching the site and conducting interviews with personnel.

"Actions: The Department will be following up with the facility for any additional information. The plant is also conducting refresher radiation training to plant personnel. More information will be provided upon receipt."

Pennsylvania Event Report ID No: PA160009.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS AUTO-STARTED ON VALID ACTUATION SIGNAL

"During Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) surveillance testing, the normal 480V Bus 3A supply breaker tripped open. All EDGs auto-started as per plant design. During restoration of normal power to the 480V Buses, 23 EDG output breaker opened on overcurrent. All plant systems responded as per design.

"There was no loss of core cooling since steam generators were coupled with an operational RCP. No other ESF [Engineered Safety Feature] equipment automatically started.

"The 480V Bus 3A normal supply breaker was replaced and the cause of both issues is under investigation.

"Indian Point Unit 2 remains in a stable MODE 5 condition with all 480V Buses energized via normal power. The NRC Resident has been informed."

The licensee will inform the New York Public Service Commission.

ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS) NOT PERFORMED

"During the afternoon of March 7, 2016, UUSA [Urenco USA] operators moved drums containing uranic material into an IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] controlled array. This IROFS requires initial and independent operator verification to ensure a subcritical geometry exists prior to adding any new material to the array. The operators moving the drums did not perform the administrative IROFS; that is, neither an initial nor an independent
verification were completed prior to adding five additional drums to the array.

"UUSA management and nuclear criticality staff have ensured the drums are in a safe and subcritical configuration.

"The drums contain clean up materials contaminated with UF6 at unknown levels of enrichment. A nuclear criticality did not occur. The array is in a subcritical geometry. No external events are affecting this event. No emergencies have been, nor will any be declared.

"No state or other federal agencies will be notified. No press releases are planned.

"Number and types of controls necessary under normal operating conditions: One enhanced sole IROFS. The enhancement is an initial verification and an independent verification of geometry prior to movement of material into the area.

"Number and types of controls which functioned properly under upset conditions: Neither the IROFS initial verification, nor the independent verification of geometry were performed before movement occurred.

"Number and types of controls necessary to restore a safe situation: A member of operations management passed through during a routine plant tour, questioned the operators, and determined that the drums had been placed in a safe geometry in the array without performing the required IROFS surveillance.

"Safety significance of events: Loss of geometry controls preventing criticality.

"Safety equipment status: The array is in a subcritical geometry.

"Status of corrective actions: Corrective actions to be developed."

* * * UPDATE FROM SLAMA TO SHOEMAKER ON 4/13/16 AT 1542 EDT * * *

"Isotopic analysis has been conducted for the material in the stored drums; the uranium enrichment is characterized as depleted. As such, criticality was not possible during the operations and the as-found configuration reported in Event Notification 51776 on March 7, 2016. However, the required IROFS was not implemented. The event is hereby being reclassified as a 24-Hour Event Notification in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(2).

"The previously reported IROFS was available and should have been implemented at the point of storage to ensure safe storage array configuration, thus meeting 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirements. During the ongoing Root Cause Evaluation for this event, it was discovered and documented that an additional IROFS was not implemented during the March 7, 2016 movement evolution. This additional IROFS requires the use of a transfer cart for movement from the point of generation to the point of storage. This cart is to ensure proper spacing between the container and any materials which may be passed during movement. This is a sole administrative IROFS enhanced with initial and independent verifications.

"As stated above, analysis has been completed which characterizes the material as depleted UF6. As such, during the movement of the drums, criticality was not possible. The required IROFS was available, however the failure to implement applicable controls resulted in a situation in which no reliable barrier was in place to provide assurance that interaction control would be maintained during movement. The failure to implement this additional IROFS during movement is hereby classified as a 24-Hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(2). The information required per 10 CFR 70.50 (c)(1) is same as that contained in the event description [of the original notification]."

Notified the R2DO(Bonser) and the NMSS Events Notification Group via email.

UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AIR INTAKES

"The Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system at Byron automatically supplies feedwater to the Steam Generators (SG) to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System following a loss of normal feedwater supply. The AF System consists of a motor driven pump (A) and a diesel driven pump (B) configured into two trains for each unit. Each pump provides 100% of the required AF capacity to the SGs as assumed in the accident analysis. One pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) entry conditions. The diesel driven AF pump is powered from an independent diesel whose combustion air intake is located in the Seismic Category II (non-seismically qualified) Turbine Building but the diesel and pump are located in the Seismic Category I (seismically qualified) Auxiliary Building.

"During the ongoing NRC Component Design Basis Inspection at the sister Braidwood Station, inspectors asked about the acceptability of the diesel combustion air intake being located in the non-seismic Turbine Building. During the review of available documentation related to the AF diesel engine combustion air intake, it was identified that the documentation did not support operation of the diesel with High Energy Line Break (HELB) environmental conditions in the Turbine Building. This has been reviewed and determined to be applicable to Byron Station Units 1 and 2. Specifically, prior evaluations did not account for air displacement by steam release during the event. After running different models for the Turbine Building HELB, diesel driven AF pump operability was supported for all but the Main Feedwater (FW) HELB. For the FW HELB, the best air density obtained failed to remain above the required levels deemed acceptable for engine operation and remained suppressed for extended periods of time. Additional efforts to qualify the FW piping in the Turbine Building for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) to eliminate this piping from HELB considerations were not successful. This condition applies to both Units 1 and 2 but does not affect the motor driven AF pumps. This event does not constitute a loss of safety function at the point of discovery because the Byron opposite train motor driven AF pumps were operable on both Units 1 and 2. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee entered a 72-hour Action Statement and engineering is analyzing the issue.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FATALITY ONSITE

"At the Limerick Generating Station, an individual experiencing a non-occupational illness was taken to a local medical facility. The individual was not contaminated. Subsequently, Limerick was informed that the individual has suffered a fatality."

The individual was a contract employee and was located in a clean break area, within the protected area, when the individual became ill.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and OSHA.