| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/09/2016 - 02/10/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51705 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: FRENCH & PARRELLO ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: WALL TOWNSHIP State: NJ
County:
License #: PI #507834
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHY BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/01/2016
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2016
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER SOURCE SEPARATED FROM SOURCE ROD
The following information was obtained from the State of New Jersey via facsimile:
"[The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection] was informed by a portable gauge licensee of a complete failure of their portable gauge source rod resulting in the sealed source (containing 8 mCi of Cs-137) dropping from the rod onto the ground. The incident occurred at Monmouth University this morning [2/1/16] at a construction site there. The loose source is in a concrete container and locked up at their licensed facility awaiting a lead pig sent overnight from Troxler. A survey has been conducted around the storage area to confirm that exposure there is below public dose limit.
"The licensee's initial report from the field suspected that the failure of the containment was due to the advanced age of the gauge - reported at 20 years."
Event Report ID No.: NJ #16-02-01-1239-01 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51717 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN RASMUSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 02/09/2016
Notification Time: 09:54 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2016
Event Time: 08:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PLANNED MAINTENANCE OF THE PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM
"Planned maintenance of the Plant Computer System (PCS) will cause a loss of emergency assessment capability.
"Beginning February 9, 2016, PCS data will not be available to the following Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) facilities due to planned PCS software modifications:
-Emergency Operations Facility [EOF]
-Backup EOF
-Operations Support Center
"The Emergency Response Data System [ERDS] will also be unavailable.
"The planned maintenance of the PCS is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the duration is expected to be more than 72 hours and the data to the Backup EOF is also affected.
"CPNPP has compensatory measures in place to ensure timely emergency classification, protective action recommendation and emergency notification, as needed.
"The PCS modification is expected to be complete by February 18, 2016. A follow-up ENS [Emergency Notification System] communication will be made when the EOF assessment capability is restored."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51720 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BUCH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/09/2016
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2016
Event Time: 14:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text ECCS DISCHARGE TO RCS VIA CHARGING SYSTEM
"At 1415 EST on 02/09/2016, Sequoyah Unit 1 was at 0 percent power (mode 3, 526F, 2235 psig) when a low steam line pressure Safety Injection actuated from Loop 2 Steam Generator. Prior to this event, the Loop 2 Main Steam Isolation Valve bypass was opened at 1413 EST for main steam line warm up in preparation for unit startup. Loop 2 Main Steam Isolation Valve bypass closed automatically following low steam line pressure Safety Injection.
"Following the Safety Injection, all safety-related equipment operated as designed.
"Current Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure - Unit 1 is currently being maintained in Mode 3 at approximately 517 F and 2235 psig, with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators and decay heat removal via steam generator atmospheric relief valves. There is no indication of any primary to secondary leakage. The electrical alignment is normal with shutdown power supplied from off-site power.
"There is no operational impact to Unit 2.
"The cause of the Safety Injection actuation is under investigation.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Due to RCS pressure, the only system that injected into the RCS was the charging system. The AFW system initiated to feed the steam generators and the Emergency Diesel Generators started but did not load. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51721 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: EDWARD BURNS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/10/2016
Notification Time: 02:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2016
Event Time: 21:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE
"At 2142 [CST] on February 9, 2016, Reactor Building differential pressure did not meet the required 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge due to failure of the control system. At 2205, the Unit 3 Reactor Building Ventilation System was secured and manually isolated. The Reactor Building differential pressure returned to [greater than or equal to] 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge at 2207.
"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 condition A was made due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |