| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/24/2015 - 06/25/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 51120 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR A POSTULATED FIRE
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.
"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.
"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.
"In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205.
"In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1634 EDT ON 6/17/2015 * * *
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in two Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.
"1) In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 1 RCIC components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1105. The postulated failure would impact Path 2 (HPCI) operation. Therefore, in the current analysis for the credited safe shutdown method for high pressure injection may be affected for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105.
"2) In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same two options for Torus Water Level Indication: 2T48-R622A and 2T48-R622B. Only one of these two components is required to succeed, however both would be impacted by a postulated fire in Fire Area 2104. Consequently, both credited paths of Unit 2 Torus Water Level Indication could potentially be affected due to a fire in Fire Area 2104. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2104.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10084753, CR 10084757."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (HAAG).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/24/15 AT 2114 EDT * * *
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Generator Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in five Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.
"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve A, 1E11-F015A, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop A in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1404. RHR Loop B is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1412 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1412. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1412. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2404. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.
"CR 10088142"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (O'Donohue). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 51157 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: GERDAU AMERISTEEL
Region: 1
City: JACKSONVILLE State: FL
County:
License #: NONE
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RENO FABII
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/16/2015
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SOURCE FOUND IN SCRAP METAL
The following report was received via e-mail:
"Scrap alarm was received at Gerdau Ameristeel, Jacksonville. Scrap bales were from KAS Metals (1912 Elman St. Orlando). Radiation surveys conducted with a Radcomm read 500 mR/hr at the front of trailer and 300 mR/hr at 2 meters. Readings in the cab were 10 mR/hr. All reading and units were confirmed. Due to the reading exceeding DOT levels the load was not granted an exemption and was left in a secure area until Bureau [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] personnel arrive. The driver left Orlando at 1030 EDT and arrived in Jacksonville at 1430 EDT. The driver [works for] for CPG Enterprises."
Florida event number: FL15-057
* * * UPDATE ON 6/16/15 AT 1208 EDT * * *
The following was received via e-mail:
"The source was found to be a broken Troxler handle assembly, [containing] 8 mCi of Cs-137, Dated April 1999, Serial# 50-5034, (ALT 60-5034) 1.5 R/hr [on contact] Issued Sample Tag # Z-011"
Notified R1DO (Bickett) and NMSS Events Notification (email). |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51160 | Rep Org: US FDA Ctr for Toxicological Resear
Licensee: US FDA Ctr for Toxicological Resear
Region: 4
City: State: AR
County: Jefferson
License #: 03-15093-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANNY FORBUSH
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/16/2015
Notification Time: 18:01 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text SEALED SOURCE FOUND IN SHIPMENT OF SCRAP MATERIAL
The licensee (US FDA) sent a shipment of scrap material which had been generated onsite, to a scrap recycling facility in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The scrap facility detected a device containing radioactive material in the shipment. The device was returned to the licensee who identified the device as an Alnor Dewpointer. The source was removed from the device and the exposure rate was measured as 4.2 mR/hr on contact. The source is being stored pending disposal. The isotope is unknown, but is suspected to be either Radium 226 or Americium 241. The licensee has contacted the State of Arkansas. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51162 | Rep Org: ECS MID-ATLANTIC, LLC
Licensee: ECS MID-ATLANTIC, LLC
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN State: MD
County:
License #: 19-31269-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRVIN FISCHER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 06/17/2015
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2015
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(4) - FIRE/EXPLOSION
| Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE INVOLVED IN AUTOMOBILE FIRE
A licensee employee working at a job site in Claymont, Delaware went to leave the job site at 1500 EDT on June 16, 2015. The employee got in his vehicle and turned on the ignition. A fire started under and around the dashboard. The employee exited his vehicle and called 911 and the licensee Radiation Safety Officer. The local fire department responded. The front portion of the vehicle had been totally engulfed. The vehicle trunk, where the gauge was stored, received heat and smoke damage. The carrying case of the gauge was partially melted. No visible damage occurred to the gauge itself. The gauge was transported to a service vendor for inspection and repair if needed.
The gauge was a Troxler 3440 Moisture/Density gauge, serial number 20118, containing an 8 mCi Cesium-137 source and a 40 mCi Am-241source.
The licensee notified NRC R1(Ragland), Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control, Division of Waste and Hazardous Substances, Emergency Prevention and Response Section, and Delaware Health and Social Services, Division of Public Health. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51178 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RAYMOND MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/24/2015
Notification Time: 19:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2015
Event Time: 11:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO OPEN HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK DOORS
"On June 16, 2015 at 1145 EDT while in Mode 1 at 100% power steady-state conditions, two fire doors between the Reactor Auxiliary building (RAB) and steam tunnel were opened under administrative controls to support maintenance. These doors are credited in high energy line break equipment qualification and internal flooding analyses and opening of the doors is not addressed in the analyses. A high energy line break in the steam tunnel with the doors open could result in equipment in the RAB experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable.
"The event was determined to be reportable on June 24, 2015 at approximately 1550 [EDT]. During that reportability evaluation, it was determined that the doors may have been in a similar condition multiple times in the May-June time frame.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or system that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |