|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/23/2015 - 04/24/2015
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50891 |
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TERRY BRANDT
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS |
Notification Date: 03/13/2015
Notification Time: 18:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2015
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
"This condition is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). On 3/12/15, during surveillance testing on LPCI [Low Pressure Coolant Injection] Loop Select Instrumentation, a degraded component was discovered. At 1230 CDT on 3/13/15, LPCI was declared INOPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. All remaining ECCS systems remain available and operable.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * UPDATE AT 0210 EDT ON 03/14/15 FROM SCOTT AREBAUGH TO S. SANDIN * * *
"At 0105 CDT on 3/14/15, the subject component has been replaced and retested with satisfactory results. LPCI INOPERABLE condition was exited at 0105 CDT and the LPCI System is OPERABLE."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orth).
* * * RETRACTION AT 1737 EDT ON 04/23/15 FROM BOB MURRELL TO DONG PARK * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/13/15 at 1859 EDT. Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of an event where Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) was declared inoperable due to the discovery of a degraded LPCI Loop Select timing relay.
"Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the LPCI Loop Select timing relay was tested in a configuration that affected time delay measurements. This testing configuration was revised in 2012 following a modification to the LPCI Loop Select Logic, STP 3.3.5.1-29. The inadequate testing configuration adversely affected the time delay when the test equipment was installed. A revision to STP 3.3.5.1-29 was completed to resolve the inadequate testing configuration. Subsequent bench testing, performed to mimic plant installed configuration, of the affected relay, was completed. This testing demonstrated that the relay could be tested in a manner that provided acceptable results, and it has been concluded that the relay would have performed its required safety function up to when it was tested on 3/13/15.
"Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Valos). |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50986 |
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: ROXBURY State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 04/15/2015
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2015
Event Time: 15:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI) |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCOVERED AT A TRANSFER STATION
The following information was excerpted from a Commonwealth of Massachusetts facsimile:
A radiation source was detected in a trash load at the Roxbury Transfer Station (RTS) by radiation detectors at the transfer station entrance. The RTS consultant performed a survey to separate the radiation source from the remainder of the trash. The consultant transported radioactive trash to Atlantic Nuclear (MA license #56-0477) to perform isotope identification. Atlantic Nuclear' s analysis indicates the radiation source contains about 90 microCuries of Ra-226. A dose rate of 15 millirem/hour was measured at about 1 inch from the object. The consultant separated the single object from the trash bag. The source is stored at Atlantic Nuclear and is waiting for proper disposal.
The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] continues to investigate and considers this event to be open.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50987 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: THERMO PROCESS INSTRUMENTS LP
Region: 4
City: SUGAR LAND State: TX
County:
License #: L03524
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 04/15/2015
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE CAPSULE BREACHED RESULTING IN CONTAMINATED AREA AND INDIVIDUAL
"On April 15, 2015, the licensee notified the Agency that on April 14, 2015, one of its technicians was removing a cesium-137 source, with a current activity of 694 millicuries (original activity was 1200 millicuries in 06/1991), from an Ohmart SHLG-1 nuclear gauge. When he opened up the gauge, the source was ruptured. The cause of the rupture has not yet been determined. Areas of the workroom and the technician were contaminated. The technician was immediately [externally] decontaminated. The licensee swabbed the technician's nasal passages and found contamination. The licensee has sent the technician's dosimetry for immediate processing and is in the process of determining the internal dose estimate. Surveys confirmed that no contamination was carried outside the work room. Cleanup and surveys of the workroom are being performed. Access has been restricted since the incident. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.
Texas Incident I-9302
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO DAN LIVERMORE AT 1326 ON 04/21/15 * * *
"Currently 3 homes of employees have been found to have contamination, characterization has not been performed. Various articles of clothing have been confiscated by the company and residents have been moved to hotels, with all objects brought along cleared.
"The room in which the incident occurred has been sealed off. Additional licensee personnel have arrived to assist with surveys and cleanup. Assay of the source to determine what activity remains within the capsule has not yet been performed. Interviews of involved individuals are ongoing.
"Full body counts have been performed with initial readings of 4.86 mrem CEDE for one employee and 290 mrem CEDE for another."
Notified R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events Notification via email. |
| Non-Agreement State |
Event Number: 50990 |
Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: KUPARUK State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAT PETTIJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 04/16/2015
Notification Time: 19:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2015
Event Time: [YDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM |
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
ANTHONY HSIA (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
STEVE SUGARMAN (DOE) |
Event Text
POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO RADIOGRAPHER
A radiographer dropped his film badge on the floor before his first exposure. The floor was approximately three feet below the collimator for a two minute exposure. After his second exposure, he found his film badge. The licensee's RSO had the film developed with a result of 14.069 Rem. The source was Ir-192 at 78.6 Ci. Estimated dose by the licensee and REAC/TS expected a dose of closer to one and a half Rem. The licensee is continuing his investigations because of this discrepancy. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50998 |
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 04/20/2015
Notification Time: 21:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
90 |
Power Operation |
90 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF EN #50351
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- A gap ¬" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)
- Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)
- A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)
- A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)
- At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately ¬" tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K)
- Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately ¬" tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105)
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired.
"CR 10058276; CR 10058278
"The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional:
- A gap ¬" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M)
- A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M)
- A gap ¬" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A ¬" x «" defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104)
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired.
"CR 10058277
"The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONG PARK ON 4/23/15 AT 1654 EDT * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). No seal material was seen between the sleeve and the cinderblock on the north side of penetration.
- A void 1" tall, 1" wide, and 7" deep was found in the south upper corner under a concrete beam at column line T12 above penetration 1Z43H941D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040).
- At penetration 1Z43H1139D, it appears that combustible neoprene insulation is used around the pipe within the plane of the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). Combustible materials would not be part of a rated pen seal.
- A gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was observed at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013).
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10060228"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey). |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51004 |
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 04/23/2015
Notification Time: 05:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2015
Event Time: 02:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
M/R |
Y |
2 |
Startup |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A SECONDARY PLANT TRANSIENT
"On April 23, 2015 DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to an uncontrolled cooldown due to two (2) failed open steam dump valves. The cause of the failure is still under investigation.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) Tech Spec Required Shutdown, as a four (4) hour report; 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report; and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), as an eight (8) hour report.
"The electrical grid is stable and Unit 2 continues to be supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam generator Power Operated Relief Valves due to steam dump valves being manually isolated. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.
"The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified."
There is no indication of primary to secondary leakage and there is no impact on Unit 1. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51005 |
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: APRIL RICE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK |
Notification Date: 04/23/2015
Notification Time: 13:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2015
Event Time: 15:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY |
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Under Construction |
0 |
Under Construction |
| 3 |
N |
N |
0 |
Under Construction |
0 |
Under Construction |
Event Text
VIOLATION OF THE FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM
A contract employee supervisor willfully acted to avoid a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual left the construction site after the notification to report to the fitness-for-duty office. The employees access to the plant has been terminated.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51006 |
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK DICKERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK |
Notification Date: 04/23/2015
Notification Time: 18:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2015
Event Time: 10:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
SAFETY SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION
"At 1050 [CDT] on 4/23/2015, an equipment malfunction resulted in DAEC [Duane Arnold Energy Center] declaring the Division 1 Essential Electrical Bus inoperable. The LPCI [ Low Pressure Coolant Injection] system was inoperable but available as part of a planned evolution at the time of the malfunction. Declaring the Essential Electrical Bus inoperable caused the 'A' Core Spray System to be considered inoperable. LPCI and 'A' Core Spray being inoperable simultaneously constituted a loss of safety function. The 'B' Core Spray system remained operable and available. The equipment malfunction was resolved promptly, allowing the Division 1 Essential Electrical Bus to be returned to an operable status.
"The notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee entered and exited TS LCO 3.5.1 condition B. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51008 |
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HILDEBRANDT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 04/24/2015
Notification Time: 00:15 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2015
Event Time: 17:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO WORKER FATALITY NOT RELATED TO PLANT OPERATION
"This notification is being reported to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of an on-site fatality of a contract employee. In addition, the contracting company plans to notify the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of a fatality per 29 CFR 1904.39.
"At approximately 1717 CDT on 4/23/15, a 911 call was received in the Control Room regarding a contract employee who was found unresponsive and unattended in a temporary break room set up on the Turbine Deck during the Unit 1 refueling outage. Resuscitation by first responders and paramedics from a nearby town was unsuccessful. Resuscitation efforts were suspended at 1750.
"The Houston County Sheriff's Office was notified at approximately 1800 and they responded to the site at 1822. The county coroner was notified and arrived on site at 1850.
"[Farley Nuclear Plant] received notification at approximately 2035 that the contractor company intended to notify OSHA.
"A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Unit 1 remains in Mode 6 and Unit 2 remains in Mode 1 at 100% power." |
|