| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/05/2014 - 11/06/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 50572 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURG State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1176
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/29/2014
Notification Time: 12:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JACK GUTTMANN (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE CAN NOT BE RETRACTED
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email:
"The Department's [PA Department of Radiation Protection] Southwest Office informed the Central Office of this event on October 28, 2014. This event is reportable to the Department within 24-hours per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2), and within 30 days as per 10 CFR 34.101(a)2.
"While radiographing a pipe in the field, a crew had an incident where the camera fell and crimped the guide tube, and the source could not be retracted. The area was immediately secured after the event, and recovery operation initiated. The recovery was completed within two hours. Using long handled pliers under lead sheets, the licensee was able to un-crimp the guide tube and retract the source back into the camera. The readings with the lead sheets in place were in the range of 10 to 15 milli-roentgen per hour (mR/h). Electronic dosimetry readings of those involved with the recovery were provided to the Department [Radiation Protection], with no whole body results above 40 mR.
"Camera Information:
Model: AEA / QSA 880 Delta
Serial#: D12920
"Source Information:
Model: AEA / QSA A424-9
Serial #: 11088G
Isotope: lr-192
Activity: 99 Ci
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: The camera was not tied down to the pipe, it slid off the supporting structure, fell, and crimped the guide tube.
"ACTIONS: The licensee was able to un-crimp the guide tube and retract the source back into the camera. The Department plans a reactive inspection."
PA Event Report ID No.: PA140022 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50575 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CAPITAL ULTRASONICS, LLC
Region: 4
City: WALKER State: LA
County:
License #: LA-15838-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/29/2014
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JACK GUTTMANN (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE CANNOT BE RETRACTED
The following information was provided by the State of Louisiana via fax:
"On September 12, 2014, LA DEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] received a notification from the [licensee] Radiation Safety Officer [RSO]. [The RSO] stated a crew was making exposures at a fab shop [in Walker, LA] at approximately 1730 CDT. The exposure device was on an I-beam when the device slid off of the beam onto the front guide tube outlet connection. The radiographer realized the source could not be retracted back into the shielded position.
"The lead radiographer contacted the RSO and received instructions on how to secure/shield the area from potential/unnecessary exposures. An assistant RSO, was dispatched to the site to perform the retrieval and he arrived approximately 1830 CDT. [The assistant RSO] was able to retract/shield the source when he removed the crimped drive cable. The source retrieval was completed approximately 1920 CDT. The crew members exposures were both less than 30 mrem and the assistant RSO's exposure was less than 100 mrem.
"The exposure device and associated equipment (crank out control and source guide tube) were shipped to QSA Global for a materials evaluation. The equipment was evaluated and passed the quality assurance requirements for Type B radiography equipment. The male connector on the source guide tube was replaced and was returned to the customer. The equipment involved in the incident and returned to the customer after the repair and evaluation: QSA 880 Delta, s/n D9829. QSA source model A424-9, Ir-192 source, s/n 16863C with an activity of 69 Ci. QSA control model SAN88225R and a Swivel End Stop QSA GST TAN48906.
"[The licensee] is Departmental [LA DEQ] approved and licensed to perform source retrievals."
License No.: LA-15838-Lol, AI#s. 12540; 165525.
Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-140010 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50576 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: INEOS ABS CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: ADDYSTON State: OH
County:
License #: 31201310002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/29/2014
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2014
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
JACK GUTTMANN (NMSS)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURES FOR NON-OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS
The following information was provided by the State of Ohio via email:
"At 1530 EDT on 10/28/14, an INEOS Supervisor noticed that the indicator for the High-High Level gauge for the tank in the DIN1 reactor showed that the gauge was in the open position. The gauge shutter was closed immediately upon this discovery. The level gauge contains a 1 Ci Cs-137 source (assay date 1993).
"The open shutter could have caused exposures to non-occupational workers who were working in the area performing cleaning and maintenance. The tank had been emptied for cleaning and contractors have been entering the tank for maintenance. Workers would have passed through the beam while using the access ladder to gain entry to the tank to perform their work. At the time of the original notification by the licensee, it was unknown how many individuals might have been exposed and for how long. The licensee was advised to take prompt action to determine the exposure to the individuals and it was recommended that he contact a CHP Health Physics Consultant as soon as possible.
"ODH [Ohio Department of Health] responded on 10/29/14. Investigation determined that work actually began on 10/26/14 and that five (5) individuals were involved, all non-occupational workers. Any exposure would have been primarily from passing through beam on access ladder enroute to work in tank, which was taking place approximately 25 feet below the beam inside the tank. There was one (1) individual who was performing a maintenance task in or near the beam for approximately 15 minutes at a distance of approximately 12 inches from the gauge.
"Licensee has contacted a local gauge manufacturer which has experienced staff available to assist with dose reconstruction.
"Information on gauge and source model/type/serial number not available at time of this entry. More information to follow as available.
"Initial investigation would indicate that exposures may exceed allowances for non-occupational workers, but not at a level that would result in serious health issues."
Ohio Item Number: OH140012 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50578 | Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA , LAS VEGAS
Region: 4
City: LAS VEGAS State: NV
County:
License #: 03-13-0305-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ADRIAN HOWE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/29/2014
Notification Time: 19:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2014
Event Time: 16:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
JACK GUTTMANN (NMSS)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE IN RADIOCHEMISTRY LAB CAUSES CONTAMINATION OF FUME HOOD
"On October 28, 2014 at 1615 PDT, a fire started in a fume hood in radiochemistry lab MSM 173 hood 2 [located at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas]. The researcher was working with uranium, which is pyrophoric. The fire damaged a container of used pipettes containing Tc-99 (maximum of 150 microCi), which resulted in contamination of the fume hood. The damage to the container and loss of integrity of the licensed material resulted in this report.
"The lab was immediately closed and surveys performed. There were no personnel or airborne contamination detected. The two HEPA filters for the fume hood exhaust prevented a release to the environment. The [licensee] issued a Stop Work order for all radiochemistry labs and initiated an investigation and will follow-up with additional reports to the Nevada Radiation Control Program." |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 50594 | Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: MARK WOLF
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 11/05/2014
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2014
Event Time: 19:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
LEN WERT (DEPR)
ROBERT JOHNSON (NMSS)
CATHY HANEY (NMSS)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Event Text DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION - ALERT DECLARATION NOT MADE DURING EVENT INVOLVING URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE LEAK
"On 10/26/14, Honeywell declared a 'Plant Emergency' at 1935 [CDT] in accordance with the Honeywell Emergency Response Plan due to a [Uranium Hexafluoride] UF6 leak on a primary cold trap. The incident was mitigated and the 'All clear' was declared at 0216 on 10/27/14. There were no injuries related to the incident. After review of additional observations and other evidence not directly involved with the response, Honeywell has determined that the event should have been upgraded at 1942 [CDT] on 10/26/14, to an 'Alert' classification per our classification criteria. This notification constitutes the NRC notification related to the incident. Honeywell is currently investigating the cause of the incident."
The licensee has notified NRC Region II and will notify state and local authorities. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50595 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 11/05/2014
Notification Time: 17:17 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2014
Event Time: 11:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ZONES 2 AND 3 UNINTENTIONALLY CROSSTIED
"On November 5, 2014 at 1115 [EST], Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Building) was unintentionally crosstied to Secondary Containment Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) for several seconds during passage of personnel through a personnel airlock. Secondary Containment Zone 2 & Zone 3 ventilation remained in service and stable.
"LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered and exited based on the prohibited crosstie of Secondary Containment Zones. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires that at least one door remain closed for airlocks where two doors are provided when an access opening between Secondary Containment Zones is being used for exit and entry.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50596 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HENRY TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 11/05/2014
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2014
Event Time: 13:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION REGARDING APPENDIX R PROCEDURES
"On November 5, 2014, during a review of recommended procedure changes, TVA determined procedures for Appendix R fires did not include all the required operator manual actions to address inadvertent opening of the pressurizer spray valves. Failure to secure the reactor coolant pumps or auxiliary spray would invalidate Appendix R assumptions for not overfilling the pressurizer during an Appendix R event. Failure to take all the required actions would place WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] Unit 1 in an unanalyzed condition.
"The three affected procedures have been revised on 11/5/2014, to correct the condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50597 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RYAN MEREMA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/06/2014
Notification Time: 04:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2014
Event Time: 19:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SIX UNIT 2 CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNITS INOPERABLE
"Six (6) U2 CRD [Control Rod Drive] HCU [Hydraulic Control Unit] accumulators were identified with riser brackets that were installed incorrectly. This issue impacts U2 CRD HCU accumulators only. The incorrect riser bracket installation could challenge the ability of the CRD hydraulic control unit to perform its design function during a seismic event.
"Identified U2 control rods associated with HCU accumulators that had riser brackets installed incorrectly were declared inoperable. This condition has been corrected since initial identification, restoring all control rods to operable status. Reference IR 2407342.
"This notification is made pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) regarding the reportability of multiple failures that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified." | |