| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/12/2014 - 09/15/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 50371 | Rep Org: ABB, INC
Licensee: ABB, INC
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/15/2014
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text NOTICE OF DEVIATION REGARDING K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER SECONDARY CLOSE LATCH
The following information was excerpted from a facsimile received from ABB, Inc:
"This letter provides notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with a secondary close latch, part number 716610K01, used in K-Line 225/800 and 1600/2000 amp electrically operated Model 7 circuit breakers. This does not affect previous models of these same breakers that have not been upgraded to include the interlocking primary and secondary close latches. It also does not affect manually operated Kline breakers or K3000/4000 circuit breakers. Information is provided as specified in 10CFR21 paragraph 21.21(d)(4).
"Notifying individual: Jay Lavrinc, Vice President & General Manager, ABB (Medium Voltage Service), 2300 Mechanicsville Road, Florence, SC 29501
"Identification of the Subject component: ABB part number 716610K01 secondary close latch. This secondary close latch is used on new legacy K-Line Model 7 electrically operated circuit breakers. It is also used during breaker refurbishments when a secondary close latch is required to be replaced because of damage or wear. The secondary close latch is available as a component part and is also used in K-Line Model 7 up-grade kits.
"If a breaker is sent in for refurbishment the primary and secondary latches are replaced unless it is required in the customer PO that they not be replaced unless they are damaged or worn.
"Nature of the deviation: During outgoing inspection a breaker went trip free during the operational phase of the testing procedure. The inspector found that the cam attached to the top of the secondary close latch, 716610K01, was not properly riveted in place. The head of the rivet was not pushed down flush against the side of the cam. Since the rivet was not seated properly, the other end of the rivet did not project through the other side of the latch and therefore the bradded end of the rivet was not deformed in a manner to sufficiently apply the required holding force to keep the cam in its proper and secure operating position.
"Corrective actions include:
a. Perform 100% inspection all part number 716610K01 secondary close latches in inventory to identify the nonconforming latches. (Action complete)
b. Trained inspectors and breaker assemblers on identifying this condition (Action Complete)
c. Contact primary vendor to investigate cause and correct on future orders. (Action Complete)
d. Verified that this is the only assembly with bradding that this vendor provides. (Action complete)
e. Notification of the potential existence of this deviation to affected customers (Action to be completed by 18 August 2014)
"Affected Customers: Constellation Energy, DTEEnergy, Entergy Operations, Exelon Corporation
"Recommendations: It is recommended that affected Licensees that have received latches that were identified as having been provided from parts that fall under this notification take the following actions:
"If the latch is in their inventory as a component, in a kit or in a breaker that is not currently in use it is suggested that the secondary trip latch be inspected for this condition. Inspection should include visual inspection of the rivets to confirm they are properly seated and bradded and physical manipulation of the cam to determine that it is securely held in place in the assembly.
"If a suspect latch is installed in a breaker that is currently installed and energized we recommend that at their next maintenance cycle, the secondary close latch in the breaker be inspected for this condition.
"We currently cycle Kline breakers that are refurbished approximately 55 close/open operations before they ship from the Florence facility. New breakers get at least that many operations or more. If a breaker has shipped out of the Florence facility during this period it is unlikely that the breaker would get through inspection without failing with a latch that is improperly riveted. ABB cannot guarantee that no latch on a breaker that shipped is affected but we do not see it as a likely occurrence with the testing that the breaker is subjected to prior to shipment. There have been no field failures reported that were attributed to this manufacturing issue."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID BROWN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON AT 1654 EDT ON 9/12/14 * * *
The following information was received from ABB Inc. via email;
"This amendment is being issued to correct 2 errors in the original notification:
1. This 'secondary close latch' was mistakenly referred to as a 'secondary trip latch' in Section 7 [of the report].
2. The manner in which the problem was detected was described improperly as a breaker 'went trip free' when in fact, the breaker 'failed to close'. This is from Section 5 [of the report].
"This [amendment] letter is being submitted to ensure accurate information has been reported. There have been no reported field failures and affected customers have been notified."
For questions, contact;
David Brown
QA Engineer, ABB Inc.
Ph: (843) 413-4782
Notified R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Azua), and Part 21 Group via email. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 50425 | Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: TONY ENGLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 09/04/2014
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
FUELS OUO GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO POTENTIAL MATERIAL TRANSFER CART TIPPING
"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: On September 4, 2014 at approximately 1100 [EDT], a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer identified a safety concern. While working to consolidate information in the safety basis for the safe geometry storage and transport carts, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed that did not meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Tipping or impact of a cart during transport had not been considered as a credible upset condition.
"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: At B&W's NOG-L [Nuclear Operations Group] facilities, safe geometry storage and transport carts are used to transfer uranium bearing materials between radiologically controlled areas. The carts are typically used to transfer scrap and waste materials in favorable volumes less than or equal to 2.5 liter containers to the Drum Count Area for 235U assay. Because the 235U content of such containers is not known until they have been assayed, they are referred to as 'unknowns' and are subject to a net weight limit. These containers are limited to a maximum of 7,000 grams net weight (approximately 15 pounds) of uranium bearing material in any form.
"There are forty storage locations on a cart, twenty per side. The locations on each side are arranged in an array of 4 columns, each column contains 5 storage locations. During transport each column of storage locations is protected by closure of a door. The four column doors on each side of the cart are secured by a common locked bar.
"The NCS evaluation of the safe geometry storage and transport carts did not address possible tipping during transit. Although unlikely, it is believed at this point the event is credible. If a cart were to tip, no controls were identified to retain the containers on the cart. Although the doors on the cart are secured by a robust locking bar, this action is taken for security purposes and is not credited as an IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety]. Assuming the containers on the cart were fully loaded (7 kg net weight) with a U-metal water mixture at optimum H/X and the cart tipped over, and more than three containers fell out of the cart, a configuration could result that would exceed the keff safety limit of 0.95 in NRC License SNM-42 for a single contingency.
"The requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) states in part: '... the risk of nuclear criticality accidents must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety.'
"Therefore the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) would not be maintained during this credible abnormal condition.
"The as-found condition had no actual safety significance. There was no immediate risk or threat to the safety of the workers, the public, or the environment as a result of this condition. The safe geometry storage and transport carts did not contain any uranium bearing materials. There was no actual tipping event. The carts were immediately removed from service.
"Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1)--Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.
"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The carts have been removed from service. An investigation of the root causes of this condition is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the facility NMSS Project Manager (Baker). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50429 | Rep Org: WA OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GEORESOURCES, LLC.
Region: 4
City: AUBURN State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0549-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 09/05/2014
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Washington via email:
"On Thursday, September 4, 2014, [Washington State] Emergency Response Duty Officer received a call from the Radiation Safety Officer of GeoResources, LLC. She informed [Washington State] that a portable gauge was run over by heavy equipment in a construction area. The gauge operator was within a few feet of the gauge and tried to stop the driver of the front end loader but could not and had to jump out of the way for his own safety. Because of the circumstances, there will be no citations of the radiation safety program. [A Washington State inspector] drove to the location and assisted the RSO and gauge operator. The mangled gauge was put into a 55 gallon drum surrounded by soil. The highest external surface of the drum was 80 mR/hr. For health and safety purposes and the short distance to transport the drum from the construction site to the licensee's facility, a decision was made to transport the drum without DOT Yellow III package labeling and vehicle placarding, while escorted by the state inspector. The drum was put into a secured room while waiting for the consultant to come the next day (today). A consultant from Northwest Technical Services is communicating with Instrotek and R.L. Carriers for transport and disposal."
WA Incident # WA-14-037
The gauge contained 0.050Ci AM-241 and 0.010Ci Cs-137 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50450 | Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID LOCKWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 13:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT CAUSES AN INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"At 1313 [EDT] on 7/26/14, the plant experienced an electrical transient on bus EK-1-B1 (safety-related 120 volt AC distribution panel) that resulted in partial Balance of Plant Division 2 isolation signals and alarms received in the Control Room.
"The following component actuations occurred: valve 1P50F140 closed, resulting in a trip of Containment Vessel Chilled Water C; valve 1G41F140 closed, isolating the Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up return from the containment building upper pools; valve 1B33F019 closed, isolating Reactor Water sampling; valve 1D17F071B closed, isolating the Drywell Atmosphere Radiation Monitor; valve 1D17F081B closed, isolating the Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor; valves 1G61-F030, 1G61-F150, 1G61-F075, and 1G61-F165 closed, isolating the Containment and Drywell Floor and Equipment drain sumps; valve 1G50-F272 closed isolating the Reactor Water Cleanup Backwash Receiving Tank: 1M25F020B, Control Room HVAC Inboard supply damper, closed and Division 2 indicated an auto initiation (M25-S12, Auto Initiate Active amber light was on).
"This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, this notification is provided via a 60 day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.
"The event meets reporting criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation valve signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. All affected systems functioned as expected in response to the electrical transient on bus EK-1-B1 that resulted in the partial Balance of Plant Division 2 isolation signals. The valves were reopened in accordance with plant procedures. The failure mechanism that caused the electrical transient was a failed capacitor in regulating transformer EFB1B2. The capacitor was replaced and tested with satisfactory results.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50452 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BOB RUSH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 16:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"The following information is provided as 60 day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of Division 1 Shutdown Service Water (SX) and an invalid actuation signal for Division 1 Containment Isolation Group 12. This event occurred on July 26, 2014, at 1648 CDT. As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) this notification is made via telephone.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that actuated were:
On July 26th, during lightning strikes on the switchyard grid system, the Division 1 SX (Shutdown Service Water) auto-started as a result of momentary loss of power to the Low Pressure Auto Start Relay. A lightning strike causing voltage transients also caused a Division 1 Group 12 Containment Isolation signal affecting DIV 1 Hydrogen monitor.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
Upon receiving the invalid signal from momentary loss of power, for Division 1 SX and Group 12 Containment Isolation signal, the systems responded as expected for existing plant conditions. For group 12 isolation, [Containment Monitoring] 1CM011/12/47 and 48 valves closed from their normally open position. For DIV 1 Shutdown Service Water (SX), the start of the Shutdown Service Water (SX) pump and alignment of valves operated as expected. The actuation was considered a complete Division 1 SX and Division 1 Group 12 Containment Isolation actuation.
"Containment Isolation Signals:
The following Group 12 valves closed and associated shunt trips occurred on a loss of power to [Radiation Monitors] 1RIX-PR001A/1C: 1CM011, 1CM012, 1CM047, and 1CM048.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
Upon receiving the invalid signal from momentary loss of power, Division 1 SX and Containment Isolation signals started and functioned successfully.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50454 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: MARK REID
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 20:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2014
Event Time: 15:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text STORED FUEL MAY NOT MEET FUEL SPECIFICATIONS OR LOADING CONDITIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 CASK SYSTEM
"Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) identified the potential for stored fuel that does not meet the fuel specifications or loading conditions of the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System. Investigation into the cause of a Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) actuation on the morning of 9/12/2014 led to sampling of helium circulating through the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC-24-060) as part of the Forced Helium Dehydration process in the final stages of cask loading. Sample results indicated the presence of Kr-85. Kr-85 is a fission product that indicates the potential for the fuel that does meet the selection criteria for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System.
"All fuel assemblies loaded into MPC-24-060 were checked to confirm their intact status (a cask Certificate of Conformance requirement) as part of the selection process. Each assembly's status as intact is based on in-mast sipping and/or ultrasonic testing performed subsequent to their final operating cycle. Results of these sipping and ultrasonic test campaigns are maintained in a comprehensive engineering report used to verify assembly status during cask fuel selection.
"Per the CoC for the Hi-STORM 100 Cask System, Appendix B, Section 1.0, the definition of 'INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLY' is a fuel assembly without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks, and which can be handled by normal means. Given the presence of Kr-85 along with the fuels history, it cannot be confirmed that all fuel assemblies meet the definition of 'Intact' and would not meet the CoC
Requirements for Fuel to be stored in the HI-STORM 100 SFSC System (Section 2.1.1)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50455 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STANLEY STONE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 09/13/2014
Notification Time: 09:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2014
Event Time: 03:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FIRE PENETRATION DID NOT MEET APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS
"A fire penetration on the Unit 1 reactor building 158 foot elevation was discovered to be degraded such that the associated wall would not meet Appendix R requirements as a 3-hour barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in either of the affected fire areas, separated by the affected penetration, both Unit 1 safe shutdown paths could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be corrected.
"Condition Report: 865615"
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50456 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY SAND
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/14/2014
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2014
Event Time: 02:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 88 | Power Operation | 51 | Power Operation | Event Text OPERATION IN UNANALYZED REGION OF THE POWER TO FLOW MAP
"At 0226 CDT on September 14, 2014, MNGP [Monticello Nuclear Generating Station] experienced a trip of the 12 Reactor Recirc Pump. The subsequent power drop and lowering of recirculating water flow resulted in the plant being outside of the analyzed region of the Power to Flow Map. Operators promptly restored operation within the analyzed region per procedural guidance. This event has been determined to be a condition where the plant was in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii). The plant is in stable condition at 51% power and the health and safety of the public were not affected. The investigation of the cause of this event is in progress."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |