| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/13/2014 - 06/16/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 50174 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UNIVERSAL ENGINEERING SCIENTIST INC
Region: 1
City: LAKE WORTH State: FL
County:
License #: 1136-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RENO FABII
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/05/2014
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2014
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received via email:
"On 6/5/2014 at approximately 1230 [EDT], Troxler gauge, (Model 3430, Serial # 30167) licensed to University Engineering Scientist, Inc. was stolen from a truck parked at a construction site for a new Walmart in Mirimar, FL. The police was notified. There is a possible video of the event."
Florida Incident #: FL14-050
A typical Troxler gauge contains 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50179 | Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: HEALTH IMAGING SERVICES
Region: 1
City: CULLMAN State: AL
County:
License #: RML 1370
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CASON COAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/06/2014
Notification Time: 18:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2014
Event Time: 16:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
PAMELA HENDERSON (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE AT A NUCLEAR MEDICINE FACILITY
The following is a summary of an email received from the State of Alabama:
A fire was reported at a nuclear medicine facility in Cullman, AL at around 1610 CDT. The Nuclear Medicine Tech at Health Imaging Services stated that she had gathered the 2 e-vials (286.8 microCuries of Ba-133, and 195.4 microCuries of Cs-137), PET waste box, and a rod source and took these materials to the Coleman Regional Medical Center [CRMC] for storage. An individual at the Alabama Emergency Management Agency [AEMA] stated that fire personnel had access to radiation survey equipment, and that the incident appeared to be a structure fire and not a radiation event. The Nuclear Medicine Tech at Health Imaging Services stated that she was able to retrieve her survey meter, but it was not functioning properly. She stated that one rod source remained in the scanner (about 1 milliCurie Ge-68), and that the scanner appeared to not be compromised. The Nuclear Medicine Tech at Health Imaging Services stated that she and the RSO from CRMC would return to perform radiation surveys with a properly functioning survey meter later this evening. All sources appeared to be accounted for, except for the rod in the scanner, and appropriate surveys are to be performed later. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50182 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DIEGO SUAREZ
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/09/2014
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2014
Event Time: 07:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RADIATION MONITORING SAMPLE RACK DECLARED NON-FUNCTIONAL
"At 0715 hours PDT on June 9, 2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared non-functional. The cause of the equipment malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures were implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available.
"This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY QUOC VO TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2019 EDT ON 06/14/2014 * * *
"At 1255 PDT on 06/13/2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared functional.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Werner). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50189 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEY TRUDEAU
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/11/2014
Notification Time: 22:42 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2014
Event Time: 14:34 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ONE CONTAINMENT SPRAY TRAIN CHEMICAL ADDITIVE FLOW OUT OF SPECIFICATIONS
"At 1434 [CDT] on 06/11/14, the 1A Containment Spray chemical additive flow was found out of tolerance low during surveillance testing. This resulted in an unanalyzed condition in that insufficient chemical additive flow might have resulted in lower than assumed containment spray Ph values during past periods. The impact of the unanalyzed condition has not been fully evaluated. Based on the above, this is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Engineering analyses are in progress to evaluate the past condition. Actions are in progress to restore the 1A Containment Spray chemical additive flow to within tolerance. The 1B Containment Spray system is operable per Tech Spec 3.6.6 and is capable of providing required chemical additive flow."
The required flow is 30 to 63 gpm. Measured flow was 27 gpm. The last measurement was six years ago.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY JOHN LOGAN TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1803 EDT ON 06/13/2014 * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract EN report #50189 (June 11, 2014). This EN report was made for the 1A Containment Spray chemical additive flow which was found out of tolerance low during surveillance testing. At the time of reporting, it was concluded that this was an unanalyzed condition in that insufficient chemical additive flow may have resulted in lower than assumed containment spray pH values during past periods. This was reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"At approximately 1700 CDT on Thursday, June 12, 2014, Braidwood Generating Station concluded that the prior EN notification could be retracted based on the completion of Engineering Change 398472, 'Evaluation of As-Found Results for 1A Containment Spray NaOH Additive Flow.'
"The Engineering Change concluded that the approval of the alternate source term (AST) license amendment resulted in the elimination of a minimum containment spray (CS) spray pH value. The current containment release analysis does not credit the addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH) to CS spray for fission product removal from the containment atmosphere. The long-term retention of captured fission products in the sump water assumes the sump water pH is greater than 7. This is established by the transfer of the containment spray additive tank (CSAT) contents to the sump during CS system operation. To transfer the maximum CSAT inventory to the sump within 8 hours, a minimum NaOH eductor flow of approximately 10 gpm is required. The minimum NaOH injection flow for the 1A CS eductor system (27.0 ' as-found' and 27.7 'as-left' gpm) exceeded 10 gpm so the eductor injection flows meet the criteria to transfer CSAT inventory to the containment recirculation sump within the expected minimum CS system operating time. The out of tolerance flow values recorded at the time of the initial notification are acceptable.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Daley). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50200 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 06/13/2014
Notification Time: 11:54 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2014
Event Time: 04:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLED WATER
"On 6/13/2014 at 0417 [EDT], Limiting Conditions of Operation were entered on SSES Units 1 and 2 for an inoperable Train of Control Structure Chilled Water for planned maintenance. During clearance order application at 0452 on 6/13/2014, a switching move caused the in service [Division 1] Control Structure Chilled Water Train to trip and be declared inoperable. It was realized that a prior switching move had already rendered the standby train [Division 2] inoperable. There was no equipment failure or misoperation associated with this event. The trip of the running Control Structure Chiller was in accordance with its control logic scheme. This was not identified during the planning phase of this evolution.
"During this time both divisions of Control Structure Chillers were inoperable and were not available to perform the required safety function. This condition also resulted in the inoperability of Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System due to the relationship between some of the equipment. This is a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented fulfillment of Safety Functions and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 8 hour notification.
"The loss of safety functions are based on 1) the SSC is inoperable in a required mode of operation, 2) the inoperability is due to procedural deficiency, and 3) there was no redundant equipment in the same system that was operable.
"One Train of Control Structure Chilled Water and Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System were restored to operable status at 0503 on 6/13/2014."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |