| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/12/2014 - 06/13/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 50171 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STRUCTURAL METALS INC
Region: 4
City: SEGUIN State: TX
County:
License #: L02188
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 06/04/2014
Notification Time: 09:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2014
Event Time: 06:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
FSME RESOURCES (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- DAMAGED GAUGE
The following information was received by the State of Texas by email:
"On June 3, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that the licensee had a damaged Berthold LB300ML gauge (S/N 10004). The gauge had been hit with molten steel and damage had been done to attachment points ('ears') for a locking mechanism and carrying handle. No damage to the 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source (S/N 1374-07-11) or the gauge shutter occurred. The gauge is scheduled for repair on June 5, 2014. Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I-9198 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50174 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UNIVERSAL ENGINEERING SCIENTIST INC
Region: 1
City: LAKE WORTH State: FL
County:
License #: 1136-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RENO FABII
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/05/2014
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2014
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received via email:
"On 6/5/2014 at approximately 1230 [EDT], Troxler gauge, (Model 3430, Serial # 30167) licensed to University Engineering Scientist, Inc. was stolen from a truck parked at a construction site for a new Walmart in Mirimar, FL. The police was notified. There is a possible video of the event."
Florida Incident #: FL14-050
A typical Troxler gauge contains 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50191 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN JARRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 06/12/2014
Notification Time: 09:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2014
Event Time: 04:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text MASONEILAN ACTUATORS DISCOVERED TO FAIL-CLOSED INSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED FAIL-OPEN CONFIGURATION
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the deviation of a basic component from manufacturing purchase specifications.
"On 04/18/2014, during pneumatic actuator replacement for Emergency Feedwater [EFW] valve EFW-224A (EFW to Steam Generator #1 Primary Flow Control Valve), it was identified that the fail action of the actuator was incorrect in that it was in a fail-closed instead of fail-open configuration. The actuator model, as identified in Waterford 3 site receipt/acceptance document and the actuator's name plate data, was a Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F, which is specified as a fail-open actuator. However, the actuator was discovered to have a fail closed action, which is indicative of a Masoneilan model 48 actuator.
"The fail-action of these Masoneilan Sigma-F actuators can be changed in accordance with its technical manual TDM120.0565 with no additional parts; therefore, Waterford 3 corrected the fail action of EFW-224A's replacement actuator (to fail-open) and ensured the handwheel indicator was corrected prior to entering mode 4.
"Two of these actuators were received and accepted as Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F (fail-open) actuators in September of 2010, both of which were labeled as such, yet configured in the fail-closed action. One of these two actuators remains in the warehouse and has been placed on hold. The vendor, Dresser Masoneilan, has been notified in writing on May 12, 2014.
"On 6/9/2014 at approximately 1600 CDT, Entergy concluded that for those potential applications of this valve operator model in the EFW system, had they been installed without correcting the deviation, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard in that it could have prevented fulfillment of EFW safety function, and therefore reportable under 10CFR PART 21. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed on 06/11/2014."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50197 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM ENGLISH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 06/12/2014
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2014
Event Time: 12:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INADEQUATE DC CABLE PROTECTION COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN
"Postulated event could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment.
"This is a non-emergency notification.
"While operating at 100 percent power in mode 1, Harris plant personnel determined that inadequate cable protection exists in control cables for a DC powered main turbine lube oil pump. A short circuit could cause excessive current through affected cables, potentially resulting in overheating. The affected cables pass through the Control Room and other areas and could adversely affect safe shutdown. Compensatory measures (hourly fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant which ensures continued public safety.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50198 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 06/12/2014
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2014
Event Time: 14:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SYSTEM RESTORATION ERROR CAUSES BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM TO BE INOPERABLE
"On 6/12/2014, [multiple Limiting Condition of Operations] LCOs were entered on SSES Units 1 and 2 for an inoperable Division 2 train of Control Structure Chilled Water starting at 1344 EDT for the planned performance of a flow surveillance. During restoration steps at 1444 EDT on 6/12/2014, a Division 1 Control Structure Chilled Water control switch was mistakenly manipulated which caused the redundant operable train to be declared inoperable. During this time both divisions of Control Structure Chillers were inoperable and were not available to perform the required safety function. This is a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function and is reportable under [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 8 hour notification.
"The loss of safety function is based on 1) the SSC is inoperable in a required mode of operation, 2) the inoperability is due to personnel error, and 3) there was no redundant equipment in the same system that was operable.
"The Division 1 train of Control Structure Chilled Water was restored to operable status at 1446 EDT on 6/12/2014."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |