| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/20/2013 - 09/23/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 49340 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BAKER HUGHES
Region: 4
City: BRIGHTON State: CO
County:
License #: CO RML#678-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERI HALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 09/12/2013
Notification Time: 20:17 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - SCRAP METAL SHIPMENT CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On August 13, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received a phone call from Western Metals Recycling indicating a need for a special permit to return a shipment of scrap metal flagged as containing radioactive materials by portal monitor alarms. The shipment originated at Baker Hughes of Brighton, Colorado (CO RML#678-01). The DOT Special Permit (#CO-CO-13-01) was issued on August 13, 2013, with a reading of 0.04 mrem/hr on the outside of the shipment.
"On August 15, 2013, the rolloff was returned to Baker Hughes, where they determined a number of valves and seats from a fluid end of a well fracking site contained the contamination. The Baker Hughes staff tracked the parts back to a site worked in conjunction with ProTechnics (CO RML#545-01) with radioactive tracer material. ProTechnics was contacted and offered to take possession of the material. Baker Hughes reported valves with readings ranging from 0.02 mrem/hr to 1 mrem/hr on contact.
"On August 19, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment's Health Physicists visited the Brighton location of Baker Hughes, where the material was being held, to meet with staff from both Baker Hughes and ProTechnics. The material was identified as Ir-192, using an Identifinder 2 detector, with a dose rate of 0.2 mrem/hr on contact with one of the valves. It was decided ProTechnics would take possession of all parts contaminated with radioactive material in order to decontaminate and store the waste for decay. An amendment or provisional license was necessary for either Western Metals Recycling or Baker Hughes.
"On August 26, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received the survey reports from the Thompsen well site for the dates of concern. The survey reports showed no contamination was detected
"On August 30, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received a full report from Protechnics indicating approximately 0.026 mCi of Ir-192 was recovered from the contaminated equipment and will be held for decay at their Fruita facilities.
"A Notice of Violation will be issued in response to this event."
Colorado State Incident Report I13-09. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49356 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LT. IHLENFELDT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 09/19/2013
Notification Time: 03:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 22:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ACCESS DOORS BRIEFLY OPENED SIMULTANEOUSLY
"While performing the secondary containment airlock door interlock surveillance, the interlock to the main plenum room did not prevent the opening of both doors to the plenum room airlock (DOOR-85 and DOOR-86). The plenum room airlock doors were immediately closed. The time both doors were opened is estimated to be approximately one (1) second.
"When both doors open, Technical Specification surveillance requirement SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and secondary containment was declared inoperable. Secondary containment was declared operable after independently verifying at least one secondary containment access door was closed.
"There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM KIM HOFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1753 EDT ON 9/20/13 * * *
"This update provides additional information on the initial notification of the event. On 9/18/13, while testing secondary containment airlock doors, the interlocks did not prevent opening of both doors simultaneously. With the outer door to the main plenum room open, the inner door was able to be opened. At this point, Technical Specification SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and secondary containment was inoperable. The inner door was closed immediately. While in this condition, the inner door was then opened, and the interlock did not prevent the opening of the outer door. The outer door was closed immediately.
"Secondary containment was declared operable after verifying at least one of the airlock doors was closed.
"There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "
Notified R3DO (Reimer). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49357 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NATHAN PIEPER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 09/19/2013
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2013
Event Time: 04:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"A planned maintenance evolution at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) will remove the emergency power supply to the TSC from service. The TSC would be rendered non-functional with the loss of emergency power. The repair to the power supply is expected to last 2 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Maintenance will be expedited to restore the emergency power supply to service.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC emergency power supply has been restored to normal operation.
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM TIM ERGER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1325 EDT ON 9/22/13 * * *
The TSC EDG remains unavailable due to emergent work. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Riemer). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49363 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LT IHLENFELDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 09/19/2013
Notification Time: 23:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2013
Event Time: 17:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE DUE TO STEAM LEAK
"On 9/19/2013, during the performance of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) quarterly pump and valve surveillance, a steam leak was discovered. HPCI had previously been declared inoperable due to planned maintenance. As a result of the steam leak, HPCI remains inoperable.
"Action taken: 14 days Required Action TS 3.5.1.J.2 remains in effect and corrective actions are in progress.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49364 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS PEAK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 05:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2013
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF AN EMERGENCY SIREN
"On 9/19/13 at approximately 2230 EDT, Emergency Siren 602 inadvertently actuated. Berrien County Dispatch was notified by local residents at 2237 EDT. The cause of the actuation is under investigation but believed to be due to rain water intrusion. The siren was subsequently disconnected by a station technician to prevent further erroneous actuation. The siren remains out of service and is the only siren out of service within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). There are a total of 70 sirens.
"This notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification, as a four (4) hour report. The Operations Shift Manager was notified of the actuation on 9/20/13 at 0340 EDT.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49365 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BACKUS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 08:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2013
Event Time: 06:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text AUXILIARY BUILDING SPECIAL PARTICULATE IODINE NOBLE GAS (SPING) MAINTENANCE
"On September 20th, 2013 at approximately 0645CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' both Mid and High Range [radiation monitors] non-functional for maintenance on the Mid range. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building SPING non-functionality due to the maintenance.
"The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify and classify an Emergency Action Level for offsite radiation conditions).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL BACKUS TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1453 EDT ON 9/20/13 * * *
The maintenance required the replacement of the Geiger Muller (GM) detector. The GM detector requires a 12-hour burn in time. The detector is expected to be returned to service at approximately 1900 CDT on 9/21/13.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO (Riemer).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE IRLBECK TO CHARLES TEAL AT 2121 EDT ON 9/21/13 * * *
At 2019 CDT on 9/21/13 the SPING system has been returned to service.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49369 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COBBLEDICK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 13:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PRESS RELEASE NOTIFICATION
"A press release is being made today by the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company regarding routine inspections of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's concrete shield building.
"These routine inspections of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's concrete shield building conducted to date have confirmed that the building continues to maintain its structural integrity and ability to safely perform its functions."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
* * * UPDATE FROM GERALD WOLF TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1623 EDT ON 9/20/13 * * *
"The press release originally provided to the NRC was revised prior to release to the public to update the inspections completed to date."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO (Riemer). |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49370 | Rep Org: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR
Region: 3
City: CHANHASSEN State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DUYEN HAM
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 ISSUE ON ROSEMOUNT MODEL 710DU TRIP UNITS
The following is a summary of the information received from Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) via facsimile:
In August 2013, Rosemount conducted normal, transient and accident radiation testing on a sample of Model 710DU Trip Units (master and slave) to verify radiation performance of some commercial grade semiconductor components. The results indicated that post-exposure radiation performance may not meet the criteria established in their previously published Qualification Report D8200037. This affects all transmitters shipped from RNII since June 1983.
Per RNII's Model 710 Trip/Calibration System Discontinuance Letter dated September 14, 2011, RNII stopped accepting purchase orders as of December 31, 2012. At this time RNII is no longer accepting orders and no corrective actions are being taken.
These transmitters were purchased by:
Carolina Power and Light/Duke Energy, Commonwealth Edison Co., Constellation Energy Group, Inc., DTE Energy Services, Inc., Energy Northwest, Entergy Nuclear, LLC, Exelon Generation Co., LLC, Gavial, General Physics Corp., GE Nuclear Energy, Georgia Power Co./Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Harlo Corp., Knolls Atomic Power Lab, Long Island Lighting Co., Mercury Co. of Norwood, Inc., Mississippi Power & Light Co., Nebraska Public Power District, NextEra Energy/FPL Energy, Northern States Power/XCEL Energy, Inc., NuTherm International, Inc., PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Progress Energy Carolinas, LLC/Duke Energy, PSEG Nuclear, LLC, Public Service Electric & Gas, Singer Co., Tennessee Valley Authority, Texas Municipal Power Agency, United Controls and Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
Name and address of the individual providing the information:
Mr. Marc D. Bumgarner
Vice President & General Manager
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
8200 Market Boulevard
Chanhassen, MN 55317 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49371 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE KLEVORN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNANALYZED LEAKAGE OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE CONTROLLED LEAKAGE DEVICES
"On September 9, 2013, during the A1R17 Braidwood Station Unit 1 refueling outage, the as-found leakage of the controlled leakage devices (1RH01SA and 1RH01SB) for the safety injection (SI) system ECCS sump containment isolation valves (1SI8811A and 1SI8811B) were determined to not be 'leak tight' as described in the UFSAR. Since there was only minor leakage from the isolation valves or the associated residual heat (RH) system piping (1-2 drops/month from 1SI8811A and no leakage from 1SI8811B), there was no actual impact on offsite dose or long-term ECCS operation. However, further evaluation has concluded that there was a potential to exceed the assumed leakage limits of the Alternate Source Term (AST) calculation.
"The RH system is classified as a closed system outside containment meaning the system is designed to accommodate a single active failure (i.e., the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to close) and still maintain an adequate isolation barrier to release recirculation water outside containment. The encapsulation device is intended to capture and limit leakage from a potential leak in the 1SI8811A/B or piping. The controlled leakage device is built to the same standards as the remainder of the RH system recirculation water outside containment. The design function is to limit potential offsite dose due to leakage of recirculation water outside containment. This is not a specified safety function and there are no Technical Specification requirements for these devices. The encapsulation devices do not perform a containment function and are not a principle safety barrier. As there was only minor ECCS system leakage at the time of discovery, there was no impact on past offsite dose or long-term ECCS operation.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the as-found leakage of the controlled leakage devices could have allowed RH leakage to exceed the calculated limits for ECCS systems outside containment.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49372 | Rep Org: ABB, INC.
Licensee: ABB, INC.
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text ABB SOLID STATE CIRCUIT SHIELD AND POWER SHIELD RELAYS SHIPPED WITH INCORRECT CERTIFICATES OF CONFORMANCE
The following information was obtained from ABB, Inc. via facsimile:
"This notification is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii). Solid State Circuit Shield Relays (27, 40, 47, 60, 81, 25V, 27/59, 27D, 27H, 27N, 46D, 46Q, 47H, 50H, 59G, 87M) and Power Shield (K-Line) Relays containing CMOS technology Integrated Circuits (IC's) have been shipped with Certificates of Conformance (CoC's) that incorrectly state that they are qualified to 100,000 rads.
"On July 23, 2013, ABB discovered that the above radiation tolerance value had been incorrectly communicated to customers due to a reference to an incorrect document. ABB failed to update the reference document following the Part 21 notification dated July 28, 1994. ABB's investigation showed that this issue dates back to the beginning of production of solid state relays in the Coral Springs facility in 2009 when the CoC format changed to include this information. As such, the CoC's that ABB provided incorrectly identified the radiation tolerance as 100,000 rads rather than 1,000 rads.
"All qualification documents and future CoC's will be reviewed to ensure proper record of radiation tolerance is maintained. This review is to be completed by Dec 31, 2013
"ABB will notify the affected customers for the listed relays that they should review their applications which require total radiation tolerance greater than 1,000 rads to determine the effects of a possible device malfunctioning on the system.
"ABB does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), we are making this notification simultaneously to our customers so they may evaluate this issue, pursuant to 10 CFR 21(a).
"Any customers finding that [ABB's] qualification level is insufficient will be advised to contact [ABB's] customer support line at 1-800-222-1946 or 1-954-752-6700 for discussion of remedial action.
"This information was provided by:
Dennis Batovsky
Managing Director
ABB, Inc.
4300 Coral Ridge Drive
Coral Springs, FL 33065" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49373 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT RUSH
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2013
Event Time: 09:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation | Event Text SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS REVEALS NONCOMPLIANCE FOR A FIRE OUTSIDE DIESEL ROOM
"During the performance of a focused area self assessment (FASA) for the Clinton Power Station Fire Protection Program, the FASA team identified a noncompliance with the Safe Shutdown Analysis for a fire outside the Diesel Generator (DG) rooms (i.e., Fire Zone CB-1e, CB-1f, CB-2 and CB-4). The CO2 panels for each DG train are all located in the same area outside the DG engine bay rooms (i.e., 737' Control Building) and a fire in this area could cause fire damage to all three CO2 panels and/or wiring such that a trip (short) could be initiated to all three DG Ventilation (VD) fans. Loss of the VD fans (1VD01CA, B and C) results in loss of cooling in the DG rooms and ultimately loss of the diesels. This constitutes an Unanalyzed Condition that Significantly Affects Plant Safety.
"Compensatory measures are in-place that will allow these VD trips to be overridden and the VD fans to be restarted from the Main Control Room.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49374 | Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DON DETTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2013
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL DESIGN BASIS FLOODING ISSUES RELATED TO BATTERY ROOM WALL PENETRATIONS AND CABLE VAULT FLOOR DRAINS
"On 9/20/2013 at 1600 EDT, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant determined that there was a potential for flooding of both battery rooms during a design basis flood due to unqualified wall penetration material and partially blocked cable vault floor drains. Testing of underground cable vault drain lines failed to demonstrate that they could pass the required flow due to debris accumulation. The penetrations are below grade and approximately five feet above the bottom of the vault floor. During a design basis flood, water could flow through the holes in the vault manhole covers and fill up the vaults to the level of the penetrations. Since the penetration barriers do not appear to be qualified for flooding, leakage into Battery Room B could be expected. Battery Room A and Battery Room B have a normally closed emergency fire door between them that allows water to pass under the door into Battery Room A where a sump pump exists. It is not currently known if the sump pump capacity would have been able to mitigate flooding of both battery rooms. The discovery of this condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The 125VDC system is currently Operable. Current weather forecasts do not predict the conditions necessary for flooding. Additionally, compensatory measures have been implemented to provide barriers to water entry into the vault manholes until corrective actions are implemented.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49375 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRYAN BERGEON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/21/2013
Notification Time: 19:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2013
Event Time: 15:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF COMMERCIAL AND ENS COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO AN AREA PHONE OUTAGE
"At 1531 CDT, Byron Station was contacted via NARS [Nuclear Accident Reporting System] phone line by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) that an issue exists for the phone systems in the Byron area. Byron subsequently contacted lEMA via the NARS phone and was able to communicate with lEMA. At 1536 CDT, the ENS phone was verified to not be functioning and at 1541 CDT NRC Headquarters was contacted via Byron Main Control Room cell phone to report the failure of the ENS and commercial phones. The Byron Station Main Control Room cell phone is functioning normally. The loss of ENS and commercial phone capability is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The cause of the loss of phone capability is not known but is under investigation and an update will be provided upon restoration."
ERDS has been verified as operable and the licensee is transmitting data.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49376 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 09/22/2013
Notification Time: 23:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2013
Event Time: 20:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text TRANSPORT OF POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED WORKER OFFSITE
"On 09/22/2013 at 1940 CDT, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) requested an offsite ambulance via the 911 system for medical assistance for an individual in the radiologically controlled area. The person was treated as potentially contaminated because a complete survey to confirm the absence of contamination was not completed prior to transport of the individual. An ambulance arrived on site at 1956 CDT and departed the site at 2036 CDT to the Red Wing Minnesota Hospital. PINGP radiation protection personnel accompanied the individual to the hospital. A survey at the hospital determined that the individual was not contaminated.
"This is considered a transport of a potentially contaminated individual requiring an 8 hour ENS Notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii).
"The Prairie Island Indian Community was notified of the transport of an individual by ambulance.
"This is considered a notification of another government agency and an event that may have potential interest to the media requiring a 4 hour ENS Notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | |