| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/28/2013 - 07/01/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 49139 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: METAL INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: MARION State: NC
County:
License #: GL 056-0600-0
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 06/20/2013
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING Sr-90 SOURCE IDENTIFIED DURING STATE INSPECTION
"The facility is a General License: 056-0600-0G that went out of business effective June 1, 2012. [North Carolina State] did an inspection on June 11, 2013 and [the licensee] had no records of inventory or sources or records of disposal. [The state] was able to determine from [state] records that [the licensee] had disposed of all sources except one on [the licensee's] inventory dated 6/13/1995. [The missing device contains] a Sr-90 [source] with a less than 25 micro Curie source, S/N 49874, that was purchased from CMI. [The state] called CMI and the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] did not have any records of [the device] being disposed. The source is lost and missing so [the state] is filing this incident with the NRC today."
North Carolina Incident Report Number: 13-12. The state considers this incident to be closed.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49142 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY KUDO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 06/23/2013
Notification Time: 20:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PRE-PLANNED FACILITY UPGRADES
"On June 24, 2013, at 0000 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) will be unavailable due to a pre-planned facility upgrade project. The TSC is expected to be restored to operational status on July 1, 2013.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures, and the TSC staff will be located at a preplanned alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC has been restored to operational status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The upgrades will require structural changes to the TSC.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/30/13 AT 2020 EDT FROM FRED POLLAK TO HUFFMAN * * *
"The Technical Support Center functionality has been restored as of 1953 EDT on 6/30/13. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
R2DO (Franke) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49152 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICK KERRONE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/28/2013
Notification Time: 04:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2013
Event Time: 17:58 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 65 | Power Operation | 65 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY AND DIVISION 3 DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE FOR 20 MINUTES
"At 1758 [PDT] on June 27, 2013, an alarm signaling heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) trouble in the Division 3 diesel and high pressure core spray (HPCS) room was received in the main control room. Follow-up investigation determined that the switch for the normal room supply fan (DMA-FN-32) was off. It is believed that the switch may have been inadvertently mispositioned during ongoing work in the vicinity. A worker was moving a vacuum nearby and stopped when he heard the local alarm. Columbia Generating Station is performing further investigation to determine if there are other possibilities for DMA-FN-32 control switch being mispositioned.
"The fan was returned to service at 1819 [PDT]. An Operation's supervisor was present when returning the switch to ON and verified the switch operated as expected. Loss of DMA-FN-32 results in both the HPCS diesel (DG-3) and the HPCS system being inoperable due to inadequate cooling of those systems. Offsite power for Division 3 was verified to be operable while DG-3 was inoperable. The loss of the HPCS system results in the loss of safety function for a single train system and thus is reportable under the 10 CFR 50.72 sections noted above.
"Appropriate Technical Specification actions were entered and exited for DG-3 and HPCS inoperability times. There was no radiological release associated with this event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49153 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MATT KERCHENSAUT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/28/2013
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2013
Event Time: 07:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DOOR INTERLOCK MALFUNCTION RESULTED IN BRIEF LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"At 0749 CDT on June 28, 2013, indication was received in the Control Room that two Secondary Containment doors, in one access opening, were opened simultaneously. The interlock mechanism preventing both doors from operating simultaneously did not operate as expected. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2. As a result, entry into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 Condition A was made due to Secondary Containment being declared inoperable.
"The doors were secured at 0749 CDT [total time with both doors open was 7 seconds] and Secondary Containment was declared operable.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49154 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL BOTTORFF
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/28/2013
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2013
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO OFFSITE ELECTRICAL FAULT
"On June 28, 2013 at 1330 [EDT], Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped due to an electrical fault causing a main generator lockout and subsequent turbine trip. The electrical fault generated an 'A' Main Bank Transformer Differential Relay actuation. Suspected cause is due to an offsite fault.
"This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Concurrent with the reactor trip the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"All Control and Shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater, steam dumps and the main condenser. The station is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."
There were no primary or secondary relief valve actuations during the plant transient. The cause of the electrical fault is being investigated. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49155 | Rep Org: ULTRA ELECTRONICS, NSPI
Licensee: ULTRA ELECTRONICS, NSPI
Region: 4
City: ROUND ROCK State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ADAM GAITHER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/28/2013
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - LINEAR INDICATIONS/CRACKS IN PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FLANGE FORGING
"Description of the Deviation or Failure to comply that is being evaluated:
Linear indications/cracks were discovered in the flange forging on four N-E13DM pressure transmitters recently supplied by Ultra Electronics, NSPI to Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), Fort Calhoun Station FC-1-5 Plant. These transmitters with the identified indications had been received by Fort Calhoun but were not installed. Three of the four transmitters have been returned to Ultra Electronics, NSPI for evaluation and analysis. At this time, the fourth transmitter is in process of being returned for additional evaluation.
"Evaluation Status:
Ultra Electronics, NSPI has performed an initial assessment and determined that the indication/crack penetrates the forging beyond the specified minimum wall thickness. At this time Ultra Electronics, NSPI is in the process of contracting a third party metallurgical research laboratory to assist with evaluation and root cause analysis. Ultra Electronics, NSPI will supply forging samples to the metallurgical research laboratory for analysis including material/composition characteristics as well as the structure and physical characteristics of the indications. Ultra Electronics, NSPI will continue to work with the forging vendor to determine root cause and the extent of the affected material.
"Completion of the Evaluation:
The evaluation is expected to be completed on or before August 31, 2013" |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 49156 | Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: ROSS LINDBERG
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/28/2013
Notification Time: 20:13 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2013
Event Time: 16:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
| Person (Organization):
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
| Event Text UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF TWO CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUALS
"Two employees reported to the on-site dispensary this afternoon with chemical burns to their shoulders at approximately 1645 CDT. The plant nurse and doctor administered treatment to the employees and then sent them home. A whole body survey of the employees in their plant clothing was performed while in the dispensary. The maximum amount of contamination found was present on one of the employee's boots, 20,745 dpm/100cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employees removed all plant clothing, changed into their personal clothing, and exit monitored from the facility. The employees were free of contamination upon release."
The licensee plans to notify NRC R2. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49157 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY KUNKA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/29/2013
Notification Time: 03:12 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 37 | Power Operation | 37 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO NORTH CAROLINA - RAIN CAUSED OVERFLOW OF HOLDUP POND TO CATAWBA RIVER
"Notification is to be made to an offsite agency: North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources [NCDENR]. Due to heavy rains on site, a holdup pond overflowed to the Catawba River. Holdup pond overflow included chemicals (Rotenone) used to treat macro fouling in the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond. Notification to NCDENR will be made by telephone Saturday morning 6/29/13."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49158 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN WOOLSEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/29/2013
Notification Time: 18:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2013
Event Time: 12:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DIGITAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM OPERATING INTERMITTENTLY
"At 1214 EDT on June 29, 2013, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was operating intermittently resulting in an intermittent loss of control room radiation monitor indication and alarm capability. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared non-functional. Repair efforts were initiated and at 1415 EDT DRMS was restored to functional status. Compensatory measures were established during the period of time that the DRMS was operating intermittently.
"The period that BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49159 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT W. OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/29/2013
Notification Time: 22:48 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2013
Event Time: 21:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP
"Automatic trip of Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2 due to an electrical differential current fault resulted in an RPS actuation on Flux/Delta Flux/Flow. Startup Feedwater Valve 1 did not respond as expected post-trip and has been placed in manual control. All secondary side steam reliefs initially re-seated following reactor trip. Subsequent Main Steam Line #1 Safety Valve leakage mitigated during post-trip recovery actions. All other systems have functioned as expected. The plant is stable in Mode 3 - Hot Standby."
All rods inserted into the core during the trip. Decay heat is being removed via turbine bypass valves to the main condenser with normal feedwater to the steam generators. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee characterized the trip as uncomplicated.
The licensee will be notifying Lucas and Ottawa counties, the State of Ohio and will be issuing a press release. They have notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49161 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WALTER HUNNICUTT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/30/2013
Notification Time: 22:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2013
Event Time: 17:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO HIGH HOTWELL TEMPERATURES
"The Auxiliary Feedwater System was inoperable due to elevated hotwell temperatures from 1720 to 1739 EDT on 6/30/13. At no time was there a risk to the health and safety of the public. The elevated hotwell temperatures resulted from the loss of multiple cooling tower fans due to a lightning strike.
"Cooling tower fans and hotwell temperatures have been restored. Power was slightly reduced solely to maintain condenser vacuum until cooling tower fans were restored."
At Catawba, the hotwell is a credited water supply for the auxiliary feedwater system. The unit is currently in a power ascension back to 100%. No other plant equipment was affected by the lightning strike.
The licensee will be notifying the state warning points in both North and South Carolina and local warning points in Gaston, York, and Mecklenburg counties. They have notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |