| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/03/2013 - 05/06/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 48242 | Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ANDERSON ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: Little Rock State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0519-0312
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/28/2012
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/28/2012
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The following report was obtained from the Arkansas Radioactive Materials Program via e-mail:
"On August 27, 2012, the Radiation Control Program of Arkansas received notification from the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management that a tractor trailer had run over a nuclear gauge at the 192 mile marker on Interstate 40 near Hazen, Arkansas.
"The driver of a Motorists Assist Truck familiar with moisture density gauges identified the gauge parts on the side of the highway. The gauge had been struck by a vehicle and broken up. The driver reported the presence of the gauge parts to his construction company Project Manager who in turn notified Highway Police. At 1914 the west bound lane of Interstate 40 was closed and remained closed until 2155. The Highway Police asked for assistance from the Radiation Safety Officer of the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department (AHTD) who drove to the scene.
"The 44 millicurie, Americium-241:Beryllium source was still contained within the original threaded cavity with the Caution-Radioactive Material label covering it. The base of the gauge was broken to the point that only the threaded cavity and surrounding lead remained.
"The 9 millicurie, Cesium-137 source remained attached to the source rod and inside the original shielding. The shielding was sheared off just above the tungsten sliding block (shutter).
"The AHTD Radiation Safety Officer, upon arrival, secured the Americium-241:Beryllium source in a polyethylene box brought to the scene. The Cesium-137 source was removed from the gauge shielding by the AHTD RSO and this source was placed in a lead shield brought to the scene.
"Two Health Physicists from the Arkansas Radiation Control Program were also dispatched and upon arrival took wipes of both sources. These smears were field counted utilizing a Ludlum-2241 and Ludlum 44-9 pancake probe. No loose contamination was found.
"All potential serial numbers were recorded and the sources were transferred to the Radiation Control Program by the AHTD RSO. The Health Physicists transported the sources to a secure storage area at the State Health Department.
"On Tuesday morning, Troxler identified the owner of the gauge by the serial number. The gauge is a Model 3430, Serial Number 21024. The gauge is owned by Anderson Engineering of Little Rock, Arkansas. Arkansas Radioactive Material License Number ARK-0519-03121.
"It appears that an Anderson Engineering technician had been working at a construction job site in De Valls Bluff, Arkansas. On Monday evening, he left this job site and returned to the Anderson Engineering Little Rock Office. The gauge was left unsecured in the back of the pickup. On Interstate 40 West at mile marker 192, the gauge fell out of the pickup bed, where it was struck by at least one vehicle. Upon arrival at the Anderson Engineering offices, the technician removed the Troxler Gauge Storage Box from the pickup bed and noted that it was empty. The technician believed that he had left the gauge at the job site. On the morning of August 28, 2012, he returned to the jobsite to search for the gauge.
"On Tuesday, August 28, 2012, the Radiation Safety Officer was contacted and retrieved the two sources from the Arkansas Department of Health and secured these in the Anderson Engineering permanent storage area.
"The Arkansas Radiation Control Program has assigned Incident Number AR-2012-006 and is continuing to investigate."
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE MACK TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/3/13 AT 1012 EDT * * *
The following was received from the State of Arkansas via email:
"The sources were disposed of through the manufacturer on 2/22/2013. The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] considers this event to be closed."
Notified R4DO (Haire) and FSME Event Resource via email. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48811 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE BORGER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/07/2013
Notification Time: 03:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2013
Event Time: 01:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 0135 EST, Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable, and LCO 3.5.1 entered, due to its turbine steam exhaust valve failing in the closed position during the quarterly valve exercising surveillance. The supply breaker tripped when the opening stroke was attempted. The valve was verified to have remained fully closed via the manual operator. HPCI will not automatically start with this valve closed.
"HPCI is a single train Emergency Core Cooling Safety [ECCS] system. This event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and the guidance provided under NUREG-1022, rev. 2.
"There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM TODD CREASY TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/3/13 AT 1401 EDT * * *
"The reported condition, described above, was further evaluated by PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL). The following is additional information concerning the condition:
"The HPCI Turbine Exhaust valve (HV255F066): 1) is a DC motor operated valve with no design features which cause automatic valve actuation, 2) is manipulated by remote Operator action to open or close the valve, 3) is designed as a normally open valve to support the HPCI function, and 4) is manually closed for long-term containment isolation.
"When the HPCI turbine exhaust valve was stroked, the valve successfully closed; however, position indication was lost when attempting to re-open the valve. Troubleshooting identified a faulty relay contact that in conjunction with the operator repositioning the key lock switch from CLOSE to OPEN caused a direct short in the circuit.
"NUREG-1022, Revision 2, Section 3.2.7, provides the following example of a condition that is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v): Removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function).
"When the failure of the HV255F066 occurred, HPCI was properly removed from service for planned quarterly valve exercising in accordance with an approved surveillance procedure and LCO 3.5.1.
"Since HV255F066 is a normally open valve, a failure to open does not impact the safety function to provide a flow path for HPCI exhaust since routine valve stroking or maintenance that might close the valve would not be conducted in an accident scenario where HPCI would be required to start and closure associated with long-term containment isolation would only occur after the HPCI function is complete (i.e., the failure to open was introduced by the testing activity and would not occur in a scenario in which the valve is required to perform its safety function to open). With regard to the long-term containment isolation function, the faulty relay contact failed in a manner that prevented the valve from opening but did not prevent the valve from closing. Based on closure of the valve during the test, there was no pre-existing operability issue associated with its safety function to close. Furthermore, even without credit for HV255F066, the containment isolation safety function would be maintained by Check Valve 255F049 and Drain Isolation Valve 255F013.
"Based on the above additional information, PPL is retracting this report. Susquehanna was in a planned evolution and did not discover a condition that could have prevented performing a safety function."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Hunegs). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48967 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/25/2013
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE TO FULLY RETRACT
The following information was received from the State of Texas via E-mail:
"On April 24, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that they were unable to fully retract an Iridium-192 source into a QSA model 660 radiography device. The radiographers attempted to retract the source several times, but were unable to get the device to lock the source in the fully shielded position. The radiographers contacted the Radiation Safety Officer who responded to the location along with the licensee's Source Retrieval Supervisor. The supervisor attempted to retract the source and on the second attempt, dose rates indicated that the source was fully shielded, but the device's locking device had not tripped. The supervisor inserted the source shipping plug into the device to secure the source in place. The source crankout device was dismantled and they discovered the connector on the end of the drive cable had separated from the drive cable. The crankout device has been shipped to the manufacturer for inspection and repair. The crankout device was placed in service by the licensee on April 11, 2013. The exposure device was inspected by the licensee and found to operate normally. No significant exposure was received by any individual involved in this event. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9074 |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 48971 | Rep Org: PREFIX CORPORATION
Licensee: NRD LLC
Region: 3
City: ROCHESTER HILLS State: MI
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN STEMPOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/26/2013
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
DENNIS ALLSTON (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST POLONIUM-210 STATIC ELIMINATOR SOURCE
Prefix Corporation uses static control ionizers for applying coatings in some of its product processes. These static control ionizers are leased from NRD LLC and contain less than 0.1 millicuries of Polonium-210. In early April, 2013, Prefix was preparing to return one of its leased Nuclecel Ionizers to NRD and discovered it was missing. The source was last used in November of 2012. A search was conducted for the source without success and Prefix considers the source to be lost. The source is small and cylindrical and could have rolled off its storage location onto the floor and been swept-up as trash. Prefix sent a written notification to NRC Region 3 on April 18, 2013, but had not previously reported the event to the NRC Operations Center.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 48975 | Rep Org: BEAUMONT HEALTH SYSTEMS
Licensee: BEAUMONT HEALTH SYSTEMS
Region: 3
City: ROYAL OAK State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01333-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERYL SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/26/2013
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
| Event Text SURFACE CONTAMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT EXCEEDED LIMITS
During an audit of a satellite facility associated with Beaumont Health Systems, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) determined that a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination on the outside of the package greater than NRC reporting limits had been received but not reported to the NRC as required per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1).
The package was received on February 21, 2013 and wipe tests performed on the external surface of the package. Removable contamination levels were found on the package of 19,070 dpm/300 cm2. This level exceeds the reportable limits specified in 10 CFR 71.87(i).
The package contained Technetium-99m that had been shipped and delivered by Beaumont's Troy Hospital facility. The receiving facility did not find any damage or contamination on the Tech-99m vial or inside the ammo case used to transport the vial. The audited receipt inspection report revealed the external package contamination event was documented but not reported to the company's RSO. Troy Hospital was notified at the time of the event and contamination surveys were performed at the packaging location, on the transport vehicle, and on the driver. The only contamination found was a wipe used to wipe the area where the package had been stored in the truck (wipe-down of radioactive material lay-down area is routine protocol for the licensee).
The RSO stated that corrective actions are being taken related to improving contamination controls while packaging these shipments. In addition, improvements in the process related to reporting events to the RSO and the NRC are being explored.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1415 EDT ON 4/29/2013 FROM CHERYL SCHULTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The removable contamination of 19070 dpm/300cm2 equates to 63 dpm/cm2 which is below the reportable limit of 220 dpm/cm2. Therefore, this event is retracted.
Notified the R3DO (Duncan) and FSME Resources (via e-mail). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48980 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY ROSE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 04/29/2013
Notification Time: 08:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2013
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"At 0900 EDT on Monday, April 29, 2013, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room, if necessary.
"TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 1200 EDT on Thursday, May 2, 2013.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE FROM GREG KANDA TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 5/2/13 AT 1448 EDT * * *
"Due to scheduling issues, the restoration of the Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems has been delayed. The TSC ventilation systems are expected to be returned to service by 0000 EDT on Friday, May 3, 2013.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Duncan).
* * * UPDATE FROM DEAN BRUCK TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/3/13 AT 0515 EDT * * *
"The restoration of the Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems has been delayed but is in progress. The TSC ventilation systems are expected to be returned to service by 0600 EDT on Friday, May 3 2013.
"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Duncan).
* * * UPDATE FROM GREG KANDA TO VINCE KLCO AT 0822 EDT ON MAY 3, 2013 * * *
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems were restored at 0818 EDT. The TSC is fully functional.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "
Notified the R3DO (Duncan). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48993 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WALTER ORF
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/02/2013
Notification Time: 23:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2013
Event Time: 22:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text RADIATION MONITORS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR PRE-PLANNED RADIOGRAPHY
Main Steam Line radiation monitors, MSS-RE75, RE76, RE77, RE78 and Terry Turbine Radiation monitor MSS-RE79 have been taken out of service for pre-planned radiography and plant conditions. This results in a loss of assessment capability since the radiation monitors are used for EAL classification.
The radiation monitors will be restored prior to entering Mode 4.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48994 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MOECK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/03/2013
Notification Time: 06:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2013
Event Time: 05:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text OUTAGE OF FT. CALHOUN STATION SIRENS FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"A planned outage of all FCS [Ft. Calhoun Station] sirens will occur today at 0530 CDT to transfer in-service zone controllers. During the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) are nonfunctional. Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement have been completed with compensatory measures established to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Washington, Harrison, and Pottawattamie counties.
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MOECK TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/3/13 AT 0641 EDT * * *
"The maintenance has been completed and the EPZ sirens have been returned to service. Local Law Enforcement has been notified that the scheduled maintenance is complete and the primary method of alerting the public with sirens is restored."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Haire). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48995 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MCILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/03/2013
Notification Time: 07:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2013
Event Time: 01:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TEMPORARY LOSS OF BOTH TRAINS OF EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM
"On May 3, 2013, at 0111 [EDT], Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS LCO) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of both trains of Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS). The Train B EGTS had been removed from service for scheduled maintenance and at 0111 the Train A auxiliary air dryer stopped functioning. On May 3, 2013, at 0155, Train B EGTS was restored to service and declared Operable, and TS LCO 3.0.3 was exited.
"The auxiliary air system is required to support multiple safety related systems. The auxiliary air system is the safety grade air supply for EGTS. As Train A auxiliary air was no longer Operable, and the B train EGTS system was inoperable, the safety function supported by EGTS was not available. The EGTS establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building and the steel containment vessel. Filters in the system then control the release of radioactive contaminants to the environment.
"Watts Bar Unit 1 remained in Mode 1 at 100% power. No reactivity was added to the plant.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48996 | Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: EAST FARMINGTON State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DEBONIS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/03/2013
Notification Time: 09:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
| Event Text INTERIM PART 21 REPORT OF POTENTIAL DEFECT IN A RELIEF VALVE BELLOWS
The following was excerpted from a fax:
(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect.
Target Rock P/N: 303480-1, Bellows, Manufactured by Target Rock.
(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
During as-found steam testing on March 5, 2013 of a Pilgrim Main Steam Safety Relief Valve (MS-SRV) (TR Model 09J-001, valve assembly S/N 5, pilot assembly S/N 23, bellows PIN 303480-1 S/N 607) a loud pop was heard and as-found testing was secured. Subsequently, the pilot assembly was removed from the valve assembly and subjected to a leak test and would not hold pressure. The pilot assembly was disassembled and a visual inspection of the P/N 303480-1 bellows convolutions revealed a through wall failure in one of the convolutions. It is noted the steam testing was performed at an offsite test facility and the valve did not fail installed in the plant.
The bellows acts as a pressure sensor responsible for initiating the opening of the MS-SRV at set pressure. Failure of the bellows does not directly impact the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, which is maintained by the bonnet assembly that surrounds it, but does impair the ability of the MS-SRV to provide over-pressure protection of the RCS. This technology has an extensive history of reliability in nuclear power systems and has been used in Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) since the 1970s. This is the first reported incident regarding a thru wall bellows failure.
Target Rock initiated a comprehensive root cause evaluation pursuing several areas of investigation. In parallel, Entergy is conducting an independent investigation and we are cooperating with them. A complete review of our paperwork confirms all manufacturing procedures and processes were performed in accordance with all specified requirements. This includes:
- Raw material analysis
- Dimensional inspections
- Cleaning
- Heat Treatment
- Manufacturing processes
- Testing
- Review of design stresses
Preliminary metallurgical analysis of the failed bellows indicates cracks forming in an inter-granular manner as would be expected from Inter Granular Stress Corrosion Cracks (IGSCC) originating at pit like location on the interior pressurized surface. The source of this cracking is the focus of on going investigations. Target Rock has also visually inspected two other bellows of the same part number, one manufactured from the same material lot and another manufactured from an earlier material lot. Both of these bellows were installed in valves steam tested at Target Rock. One of these valves bellows was also full flow tested at Wyle Labs. Neither of these additional bellows contained pit-like locations and may indicate this potential failure mechanism is an isolated incident. However, to date, neither Target Rock nor Pilgrim can draw final conclusions with the information collected and analyzed.
The mode of failure has not been determined; however, in order to address the potential for a common mode failure, Target Rock is continuing metallurgical testing of the failed bellows and the two other bellows with the same part number. Based on these results, it is likely we will need to evaluate bellows that have been installed in other NPP as they become available.
(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
The as-found steam test and identification of the potential defect occurred on March 5, 2013.
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
The following plants are running with bellows P/N 303480-1 installed: Limerick 1 & 2, Pilgrim, and J.A. Fitzpatrick.
(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
The root cause of the potential defect is not yet known as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Corrective Action Request CAR 13-013 will document the corrective actions when they are determined. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days.
(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
Target Rock will recommend that the end user perform a detailed visual inspection of the interior convolutions of installed bellows P/N 303480-1 at the next opportunity to determine if any areas of pitting or cracking exist on the interior walls of the bellows. This is a difficult inspection to perform due to the following: internal geometry of the convolutions, a trained inspector is required and specific inspection technology is needed to yield reliable results. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48997 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN OHRENBERGER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/03/2013
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2013
Event Time: 05:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS DURING PLANNED SPDS MAINTENANCE
"On May 3, 2013 at 0542 [EDT] hours with the reactor in Cold Shutdown and Reactor Mode Switch in Refuel, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was removed from service as part of a preplanned activity in order to repair the associated 120VAC instrument power supply transfer switching scheme. The reactor cavity is flooded the fuel pool gates are removed and refueling activities are in progress. Station risk is green and all key safety functions are green as well. It is anticipated the repair will be completed in approximately ten hours.
"Following the planned de-energization, it was determined that an apparent equipment failure resulted in the loss of main control room annunciator system. The appropriate abnormal procedure was entered and compensatory actions including periodic monitoring of bus voltages and field annunciator panels implemented for systems in service at the time of the loss. The annunciator system was restored on May 3, 2013 at 0640 hours.
"This USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public."
The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48998 | Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: WOLLASTON ALLOYS, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHESWICK State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES DRAKE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/03/2013
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class:
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - INSUFFICIENT PROCESS CONTROL ON PUMP IMPELLER
The following is a summary of information received via fax:
"In January 2013, Curtiss-Wright Electro Mechanical Corporation completed final testing on AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Serial Number 9, part number 6D70795G05, Revision 8, which contained a sand cast impeller (S/N 3021) cat by Wollaston Alloys of Braintree, MA. When it was disassembled for inspection it was discovered that a piece of an impeller blade approximately 3 inches by 2 1/2 inches had separated from the main impeller casting. The separated piece was the leading edge of one blade, and it was subsequently recovered intact from the pump test loop.
"This incident was investigated as a significant condition adverse to quality with the potential to create a substantial safety hazard; but, was deemed not a reportable incident since all cast impellers were either:
1) in CW-EMD control, or
2) exported to customers in the Peoples Republic of China.
"Our customers (Westinghouse Electric Company and the Chinese customers and regulatory authorities) were kept informed as the investigation progressed and root cause was identified.
"The physical cause of the failure is most likely due to a flaw present in both the cast material and weld overlay applied to the impeller blade. The original f law was most likely a consequence of tensile overload failure due to cooling stresses introduced by the welding process. Subsequent weld repairs were insufficient in remediating the original flaw, which went undetected by NDT methods. Ultimately, AP1000 RCP Serial Number 3021 failed by high cycle fatigue followed by ductile failure.
"As a result of the above investigation, CW-EMD is concerned that the identified lack of process control at Wollaston Alloys, Inc., could result in other significant conditions adverse to quality with the potential to create a substantial safety hazard.
"Because of the nature of the issue, CW-EMD is unable to complete a full extent of condition investigation, and is reporting this issue to the Commission to ensure full awareness within the industry.
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission
James A. Drake, General Manager
Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation
1000 Wright Way
Cheswick, Pa 15024" |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49001 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ELECTRO-MOTIVE DIESEL
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/03/2013
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - FUEL INJECTORS FAILED PRESSURE TEST
The following is a summary of information received via fax:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 02/19/13 upon pressure leakage testing of three (3) fuel injectors, part number 40084720 (s/n 11K23136, 12K20318 & 12K20385), that were returned by TVA-Browns Ferry because they failed a pressure test at the site prior to installation in the engine. Another fuel injector was later returned by TVA (s/n 12K20330) for the same reason. On 3/11/13, ESI received a fuel injector (s/n 12H23003) from First Energy-Davis Besse because the injector failed their on-site pressure leakage test. The pressure test specifies applying 2000 psi to the fuel injector and verifying the pressure does not fall below 1500 psi after 30 seconds.
"TVA has been working with ESI to evaluate the reported deviation. ESI has also been working with EMD and EMD's fuel injector supplier to determine the cause of the injector leakage. All parties involved were not able to complete the deviation evaluation within the 60 day time period specified in 10CFR Part 21; therefore, TVA issued an interim report to the NRC about this issue on March 22, 2013 [NRC EN No. 48844]. This report is a follow-up to TVA's interim report.
"This evaluation was concluded on 05/02/13 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. The fuel injector pressure leakage has been attributed to debris that entered the injectors during assembly of the filter elements into the injector body at the manufacturer. A leaking or otherwise improperly functioning fuel injector could affect the load carrying capability of the diesel engine. Fuel dilution of the engine lubricating oil could also occur as a result of a leaking fuel injector. Either of these conditions could impact the operability of the diesel engine and thereby prevent the diesel generator from performing its safety related function."
The following licensees may potentially be affected: FP&L-St. Lucie, Energy Northwest-Columbia, Nextera-Point Beach, Exelon-Dresden, TVA-Browns Ferry, First Energy-Davis Besse, Dominion Va. Power-Surry, Entergy-ANO, and First Energy-Beaver Valley. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49002 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: TODD MULFORD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/05/2013
Notification Time: 01:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2013
Event Time: 01:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 88 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN - SAFETY INJECTION REFUELING WATER TANK DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LEAK
"At 0112 EDT on May 5, 2013, the plant commenced a shutdown due to water leakage from the SIRW (Safety Injection Refueling Water) Tank exceeding the operational decision-making issue process trigger point of 34 gallons per day, causing it [the SIRW] to be declared inoperable and requiring entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 Condition B. LCO 3.5.4 Condition B requires the SIRW Tank to be returned to Operable status within one hour or entry into Condition C which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 36 hours.
"This event had no impact on the health and / or safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident has been notified.
"The exact location of the leakage has not been determined at this time. The Plant will be taken to Mode 5."
The licensee has been operating with SIRW leakage at a rate of less than 34 gallons per day. The leakage has increased for unknown reasons to a calculated value of approximately 90 gallons per day.
See EN #48018 dated 06/12/12 for similar report on a technical specification shutdown for the SIRW tank leakage. | |