| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/26/2013 - 04/29/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 48942 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: SABIC
Region: 4
City: BAY ST. LOUIS State: MS
County:
License #: MS-689-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDY FRAISER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 04/18/2013
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MALFUNCTIONING GAUGE SHUTTER
The following report was received via email:
"The licensee RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] notified [Mississippi] DRH [Division of Radiological Health] of malfunctioning gauge shutter discovered upon leak testing on 3/16/13. The gauge is a Kay Ray 7700 J, Source Model Kay Ray 7064 and is mounted on functioning pipe and is currently in use, however, the shutter will not close. The [licensee] RSO, stated a technician was on-site to deliver an estimate to be received by the following week. Until then, the licensee stated the gauge would continue to be used as usual.
"Update: On 4/5/13, [the license RSO] called to notify [Mississippi] DRH the gauge is still being used, he has received the quote for the repair, and is waiting for the appointment scheduled by the technician (3 weeks from this date).
"Update: Formal report received by SABIC on 4/17/13 which includes description of the incident, as stated above. At this time, [the licensee RSO] is still awaiting the appointment for repair or replacement of the gauge."
Mississippi Report #: MS-13001 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48944 | Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: 3M HEALTH PHYSICS SERVICES
Region: 3
City: AMES State: IA
County:
License #: 0271185FG
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL S. DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 04/19/2013
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER MECHANISM FAILURE ON A FIXED GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Iowa via fax:
"On April 18, 2013, the licensee (3M Company - Ames) reported to the Iowa Department of Public Health that a shutter mechanism had failed to close on a fixed gauge at their Ames, Iowa facility. The device is a Thermo EGS Gauging, model ASC-185, serial number KA1527 containing a nominal activity (May 25, 2006) of 1250 millicuries Krypton-85. The licensee's RSO and trained maintenance staff proceeded to troubleshoot the cause of the failure to close. They identified that screws holding the shutter mechanism had become stripped and loose causing the source shutter to not operate properly. The gauge was removed and is now stored in a locked cabinet under the RSO's control. The RSO is currently pursuing the purchase of new screws so that the shutter mechanism can be repaired. Additional corrective actions include a more detailed inspection of the shutter screws during six month inspections."
The sealed source (Krypton-85) is manufactured by Isotope Products Lab, S/N NER-588.
IA Item Number: IA130003 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48946 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CORNERSTONE CHEMICAL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: WAGGAMAN State: LA
County:
License #: GL-155
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PATE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 04/19/2013
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON KAY-RAY DENSITY METER
The following was received by the State of Louisiana via fax:
"Louisiana Dept. of Environmental Quality was notified on April 2, 2013, by a written letter from Cornerstone Chemical Company. A Kay-Ray Cs-137 50 mCi (decay corrected to 31 mCi) density meter, model number 7062BP, serial number S93C1706 was removed in order to service a pipe during a turnaround activity. After the device was removed, the shutter was discovered to be stuck in the half closed position and would not completely close. An employee who carried the density meter was calculated to receive a radiation exposure of 1.8 mR total dose. BBP Sales serviced the shutter, reinstalled the density gauge, performed a leak test, and installation survey. Notification was given to all Cornerstone Chemical maintenance planning personnel and supervision in the acid unit to contact the RSO for any activities concerning radiation sources. All activities are to be conducted by licensed contractors.
"The general license registration is in the stages of being modified to a specific license."
State event report number: LA-13-0015 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48968 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSH CARROLL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/25/2013
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2013
Event Time: 17:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text VENT STACK RADIATION MONITORS DE-ENERGIZED FOR SHORT DURATION DURING PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"On April 25, 2013 at 1759 CDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support de-energizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors at 1845 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release.
"At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors.
"The NRC Resident inspector has been informed."
* * * UPDATE AT 0400 EDT ON 4/29/13 FROM BRANNON PAYNE TO S. SANDIN * * *
"On 28 April, 2013, power was again interrupted to the Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors to restore the connection to their normal power supply. The radiation monitors were out of service from 2315 until 2340 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were again implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and minimize potential for vent stack release.
"The reported time for the initial loss of vent stack radiation monitoring on April 25, 2013 was incorrect. The correct time was 1759 CDT.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Sykes). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48972 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK TURKAL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/26/2013
Notification Time: 12:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2013
Event Time: 08:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
"This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Due to the shared configuration of the onsite AC Electrical Distribution System, this event is applicable to both Units 1 and 2.
"On March 4, 2013, at approximately 0804 EST, while performing a planned maintenance activity associated with the Unit 2 Start-Up Auxiliary Transformer (SAT), the SAT lock-out relay was inadvertently energized. This occurred when a Transmission Maintenance electrician closed the fault pressure device oil isolation valve without having previously opened the fault pressure cutoff switch. This action resulted in energizing the SAT lock-out relay and, per design, started all four EDGs.
"All four EDGs started and operated as expected. Because electrical power was never lost to the emergency busses and none of the EDGs loaded to their respective emergency busses, the actuations were considered to be partial.
"The EDGs were returned to their standby line-up by 1023 [EST] hours on March 4, 2013. Since no actual bus under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48973 | Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: CHRIS ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/26/2013
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2013
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED OPERATOR HAD A CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS
A licensed operator had a confirmed positive test for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The licensed operator's plant access has been terminated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48974 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: KEN LEFFEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/26/2013
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2013
Event Time: 08:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO RAPIDLY DECREASING LEVEL IN THE EHC OIL RESERVOIR
"On 4/26/13 at about 0855 CDT while operating at rated electrical power, operators initiated a manual reactor scram due to rapidly decreasing level in the main Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) oil reservoir. All systems responded as expected with no complications. The cause of the main EHC decrease in level is under investigation. The plant is stable in mode 3.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee reports that bypass valves remain available via a separate EHC system and decay heat is being routed to the condenser. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48976 | Rep Org: ITT ENGINEERED VALVES, LLC
Licensee: ITT ENGINEERED VALVES, LLC
Region: 1
City: LANCASTER State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN DONONHUE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/26/2013
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2013
Event Time: 13:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (RX) (E-MA)
| Event Text DIAPHRAGMS MAY NOT BE QUALIFIED FOR SPECIFIC RADIATION DESIGN CONDITIONS
The following report was received from ITT Engineered Valves, LLC via facsimile:
"It is my duty as the Responsible Officer of ITT Engineered Valves, LLC (ITT) to inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a defect with certain items of our nuclear diaphragm valve product line which may be considered Basic Components. The components are ITT's Nuclear M1 diaphragms, sizes 3 inch and 4 inch that may have been sold to certain customers for specific design conditions. The defect does not affect all 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms that have been sold. It only applies to those that were sold for a particular service condition of Code Case N31 (250?F and 220 psi with 40 year radiation exposure of 1E8 Rad).
"The nature of the defect is best described by 10 CFR Section 21.3 Defect Definition #5, as 'an error, omission or other circumstance in a design certification or standard design approval that... could create a substantial safety hazard.' In this case, ITT inadvertently qualified the 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms for a design condition that includes the effect of radiation when in fact our recommendation was erroneously based on diaphragm testing that did not include irradiated diaphragm test results for those sizes. The potential safety hazard stems from the fact that if one of these diaphragms sees radiation in this particular service, there is no data to indicate that the diaphragm will perform its function in that service condition. Until such time that we can conduct additional irradiated diaphragm testing to additional sample diaphragms and test for this condition, we need to consider the parts that are in this service as potentially unsafe.
"ITT is in the process of identifying all facilities for which the diaphragms were sent, either as spare parts or diaphragms incorporated into valve assemblies. We are also preparing to do further verification tests of the 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms in an attempt to ascertain the true performance rating at the noted condition.
"Per 10 CFR 21 policy guidelines, this initial notification will be followed by a written notification by May 27, 2013." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48977 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JIM SPIELER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 04/28/2013
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2013
Event Time: 21:24 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 6 | Startup | 0 | Startup | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED PLANT SHUTDOWN
"This notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), Plant Shutdown required by Technical Specifications, and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)A, Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition.
"At 2245 CDT on 04/27/13, LaSalle Unit 1 commenced a Technical Specification required plant shutdown, due to identification of pressure boundary leakage. At 2124 CDT on 04/27/13, a through-wall leak was identified in the body of 1E51-F076, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system steam supply inboard isolation bypass warmup valve. This qualifies as pressure boundary leakage, which requires entry into Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage, Required Action C, to be in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, by 0924 [CDT] on 04/28/13, and Mode 4, Cold Shutdown, by 0924 [CDT] on 04/29/13. This leakage is significantly less than 10 gpm and therefore does not meet the threshold for entry into the Emergency Action Plan. At the time of discovery, Unit 1 was in startup mode following a forced outage. A unit shutdown has been initiated. A repair plan is being prepared at this time, and the unit will remain in Cold Shutdown until repairs are complete."
The leak is located inside the primary containment and was visually identified during a containment walk-down.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48978 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/28/2013
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2013
Event Time: 15:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP
"This is a 60-day optional telephonic notification of an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP). This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On 28 February 2013, at 1534 CST, during restoration of the Unit 1 TDAFWP from steam admission valve maintenance, steam was inadvertently admitted to the TDAFWP turbine, resulting in the TDAFWP delivering auxiliary feed water flow to the steam generators.
"On 28 February 2013, the Unit 1 TDAFWP was removed from service for replacement of the hand switch and air-supply solenoid to the TDAFWP steam admission valve. The tagout utilized for this maintenance closed the TDAFWP trip-throttle valve to ensure that steam remained isolated from the TDAFWP. During the replacement of the hand switch and air-supply solenoid, the normally closed steam admission valve failed to the open position. This went unnoticed by Operations personnel. When the TDAFWP trip throttle valve was reopened during post-maintenance restoration, the failed-open steam admission valve provided a steam path to the TDAFWP. The TDAFWP started and supplied approximately 60-70 gpm feed water flow to each steam generator for approximately one minute prior to being secured by the operators. No main turbine load reduction was required to maintain reactor power within limits.
"This was an invalid actuation of the TDAFWP due to no automatic actuation signals being present and no operator actions being taken with the intent of starting the TDAFWP.
"During a normal TDAFWP start, the steam admission valve is opened in concert with steam supply valves aligned in series with the steam admission valve. During this event, the steam supply valves remained closed (steam flow bypassed these valves through normally open warm-up valves). Therefore, this event was a partial actuation of the TDAFWP.
"The TDAFW Pump is a third, independent train of AFW. No other portions of the auxiliary Feed Water System actuated or received actuation signals during this event.
"The primary cause of this event was determined to be not complying with the tagging checklist when sequencing the tagout restoration steps. Corrective actions are scheduled to complete on 30 May 2013."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |