Event Notification Report for April 26, 2013

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILS TO RETRACT

The following information was received via fax:

"On 04/26/2013, the RSO for IRIS, was notified by one of his radiography crews working at the Marathon Refinery that a source was not retracting into the shielded area of the camera.

"This incident involved a QSA Global Exposure Device, Model Delta 880, S/N D6458, loaded with an Ir-192 source. Associated equipment was used with the exposure device. The problem occurred when the crew used a magnetic source tube stand as opposed to a non-magnetic support stand.

"Source retrieval was accomplished by the RSO around 2:53 pm. Using safety equipment, maintaining a 2 mR boundary, and time, the highest exposure received was by the RSO which was 75 mR. The other exposures recorded were from normal work activities. The Department [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] was notified after source retrieval was completed."

UNATTENDED VEHICLE ADJACENT TO THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA

"On April 26, 2013 at 0442 EDT operations personnel were notified of an unattended vehicle discovered on a public road adjacent to the owner controlled area [OCA]. Investigation revealed evidence of an individual briefly entering the owner controlled area and exiting. The Berrien County Sheriffs department was contacted and participated in a search of the immediate area with DC Cook Security personnel. The search was completed at 0721 EDT and did not identify anything unusual.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification, as a four (4) hour report.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee observed the individual via security camera. The person exited the OCA within 5 minutes.

The licensee notified the State of Michigan and the St. Joe FBI field office.

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED OPERATOR HAD A CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS

A licensed operator had a confirmed positive test for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The licensed operator's plant access has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO RAPIDLY DECREASING LEVEL IN THE EHC OIL RESERVOIR

"On 4/26/13 at about 0855 CDT while operating at rated electrical power, operators initiated a manual reactor scram due to rapidly decreasing level in the main Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) oil reservoir. All systems responded as expected with no complications. The cause of the main EHC decrease in level is under investigation. The plant is stable in mode 3.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee reports that bypass valves remain available via a separate EHC system and decay heat is being routed to the condenser.

DIAPHRAGMS MAY NOT BE QUALIFIED FOR SPECIFIC RADIATION DESIGN CONDITIONS

The following report was received from ITT Engineered Valves, LLC via facsimile:

"It is my duty as the Responsible Officer of ITT Engineered Valves, LLC (ITT) to inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a defect with certain items of our nuclear diaphragm valve product line which may be considered Basic Components. The components are ITT's Nuclear M1 diaphragms, sizes 3 inch and 4 inch that may have been sold to certain customers for specific design conditions. The defect does not affect all 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms that have been sold. It only applies to those that were sold for a particular service condition of Code Case N31 (250?F and 220 psi with 40 year radiation exposure of 1E8 Rad).

"The nature of the defect is best described by 10 CFR Section 21.3 Defect Definition #5, as 'an error, omission or other circumstance in a design certification or standard design approval that... could create a substantial safety hazard.' In this case, ITT inadvertently qualified the 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms for a design condition that includes the effect of radiation when in fact our recommendation was erroneously based on diaphragm testing that did not include irradiated diaphragm test results for those sizes. The potential safety hazard stems from the fact that if one of these diaphragms sees radiation in this particular service, there is no data to indicate that the diaphragm will perform its function in that service condition. Until such time that we can conduct additional irradiated diaphragm testing to additional sample diaphragms and test for this condition, we need to consider the parts that are in this service as potentially unsafe.

"ITT is in the process of identifying all facilities for which the diaphragms were sent, either as spare parts or diaphragms incorporated into valve assemblies. We are also preparing to do further verification tests of the 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms in an attempt to ascertain the true performance rating at the noted condition.

"Per 10 CFR 21 policy guidelines, this initial notification will be followed by a written notification by May 27, 2013."