| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/17/2013 - 01/18/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48619 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM HOLT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/21/2012
Notification Time: 15:17 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2012
Event Time: 09:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH UNIT TWO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"21 Motor Driven and 22 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (AFWP) were declared inoperable at 0900 CST on 12/21/2012 due to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) temperature exceeding 92 degrees F.
"In accordance with procedure C28.6, 'Condensate Storage Tank Freeze Protection System', the maximum CST temperature shall not exceed 92 degrees F. This is to ensure the maximum AFWP discharge temperature is less than 100 degrees F when an AFWP is at design flow per USAR Table 11.9-2, 'Summary of Assumptions,' used in the AFW system design verification analyses.
"LCO 3.7.5 Condition D was entered for two AFW trains inoperable in Modes 1, 2 or 3. The AFWP's could start and run if required at the time of entry.
"Immediate action was taken to reduce the CST temperature. At 1315 CST temperature were lowered below 92 degrees F and LCO 3.7.5 condition D was exited.
"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (v) (D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LOOSBROCK TO TEAL ON 1/17/13 AT 1412 EST * * *
"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification (EN) #48619, which reported 21 Motor Driven and 22 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (AFWP) were declared inoperable due to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) temperature exceeding 92 degrees F. Based on engineering analysis the 92 degree F was a margin value with no formal basis or evaluation. This value was added to the C28.6 procedure in the early 1990's as a precaution to provide Operations with additional operating information.
"After the 22 CST tank was found above the 92 degrees F temperature on 12/21/12, a formal engineering evaluation (EC 21354) was performed to determine CST heat values and provide an accurate number for temperature margin. The purpose of the CST tank temperature being at a specific value is to ensure that the AFWP discharge temperature stays at or under 100 degrees F to ensure the AF system can provide adequate decay heat removal if called upon during an accident. Engineering evaluation EC 21354 determined that the average CST tank temperatures could reach 96.5 degrees F before the AFWP discharge temperature could have reached 100 degrees F. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function or past operability concerns."
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Notified R3DO (Bloomer). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48679 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSH STROUPE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 01/17/2013
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/17/2013
Event Time: 14:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FIRE IN SWITCHYARD CIRCUIT BREAKER
"Failure of Unit 2 McGuire switchyard Power Circuit Breaker (PCB) 55 resulted in a fire and damage to the PCB. PCB 55 and the McGuire switchyard are located outside of the protected area. The fire was confined to the PCB only and extinguished by offsite municipal fire department in 33 minutes. This breaker affects the offsite transmission supply to Rock Springs and South Mountain. The Unit 2 plant breakers connecting offsite to onsite power were not affected and remain in service. The failure of PCB 55 did not damage any plant equipment nor did this event cause a plant transient. An estimated 50 gallons of oil has spilled from the damaged equipment which is contained to the immediate area. The spilled oil cleanup efforts are underway at this time."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 48680 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: DAVID PETTY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 01/17/2013
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2012
Event Time: 23:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
ANTHONY HSIA (NMSS)
| Event Text MINOR INCIDENTAL URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE RELEASE
"Note this is a late report (1/17/2013).
"During December 2012, the C-360 Toll Transfer and Sample building experienced three incidents where the Laboratory Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD) system was actuated. No visible smoke was ever seen. Subsequent bioassay samples of personnel in the area confirmed that minor exposures did occur, although no work restrictions were required. The exposures confirm that the PGLD actuations were due to actual minor incidental uranium hexafluoride releases. Investigation and testing found that the first two incidents were caused by a small pinhole leak in instrument tubing and the third incident was caused by slight leakage around the stem of a small instrument valve. These three events were evaluated for reportability at the time they occurred, but it was determined they did not meet our reporting criteria. However, after further evaluation and discussion with NRC staff, USEC is conservatively reporting the incidents.
"The actuations occurred on December 22, 23, and 29, 2012. Upon each actuation, the system automatically closed the appropriate valves as designed. Response to each leak consisted of atmospheric sampling for HF and radiological swipes per procedure along with precautionary bioassay samples. The atmospheric sampling and radiological swipes on the first release were negative and the system was returned to service. The second incident the next day was similar to the first and again the immediate samples were negative. Bioassay results were then obtained from the previous night and showed a detectable exposure. With confirmation of a small leak, helium leak detection was utilized to find the small pinhole leak. The third incident was due to slight leakage around a valve stem that was discovered by soap testing the valve and evidence of some visible oxides on the valve stem.
"These types of releases are incidental and do not have the potential for impact on the health and safety of personnel or the public.
"These incidents are being conservatively reported as a 24-hour event based on SAR 6.9 Table 1, J.2 as an Unplanned Actuation of a Q Safety System." An automatic or manual actuation of a Q safety system that results from an event or condition that has the potential for significant impact on the health or safety of personnel. Events having the potential for significant Impact are those events where actual plant conditions existed that the system was designed to protect against."
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." | |