| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/31/2012 - 01/03/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 48606 | Rep Org: US GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
Licensee: US GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
Region:
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CRAIG HENDRICKSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 12/19/2012
Notification Time: 14:17 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2012
Event Time: 15:07 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
MEXICO (FAX)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text POTENTIAL LOST OR STOLEN C-14 SOURCE
The licensee is reporting approximately 1.35 mCi of C-14 in liquid form that is missing it's Menlo Park facility.
On March 18, 1991 it was reported by the licensee to the Menlo Park Radiation Safety Committee that they had in their possession 9.3 mCi of C-14 which exceeded their maximum possession limit for the permit. At the time they recorded that they had ordered or logged as ordered 5 mCi and 0.25 mCi of C-14. However, the licensee could not find any records that those isotopes were actually received.
The RSO believes that the cause of the discrepancy from the quantity that they have and what was found is due to a bookkeeping error. On November 7, 1990 the records show that they transferred 1.725 mCi which would leave a balance of 2.171 mCi. This transfer does not show up on the records until August 20, 1991. The quantity was adjusted on the record to 2.173 mCi. They believe that back in 1991 they misreported the amount of Carbon-14 that they actually had in inventory and the error was carried forward.
The licensee is going to start doing physical inventories of all isotopes on a 6-month basis as a corrective action.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48644 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DONALD WALLS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 01/02/2013
Notification Time: 18:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2013
Event Time: 13:08 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 87 | Power Operation | Event Text INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF SAFETY INJECTION, CONTAINMENT COOLING AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNALS
"At 1308 hours [CST] on January 2, 2013, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO-2) experienced an inadvertent safety injection actuation signal (SIAS), containment cooling actuation signal (CCAS) and containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS) during matrix testing on 'C' channel plant protective system (PPS). All components actuated as designed for the stated actuation signals.
"After verification that the actuation signal was not valid the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps and low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps were secured and their hand switches placed in pull-to-lock as directed by the abnormal operating procedure for inadvertent SIAS at 1312 hours. The HPSI and LPSI pumps were the restored to normal standby condition and available for automatic operation at 1352 hours.
"The unit did down power to approximately 87% power when all three coolant charging pumps ran with suction aligned to the boric acid makeup tanks. The unit currently remains in mode 1. SIAS, CCAS, and CIAS have been reset. The cause of the inadvertent actuation signals is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Unit 2 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 40 minutes while the LPSI and HPSI pumps were in pull-to-lock. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48645 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BEN HUFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 01/03/2013
Notification Time: 02:01 [ET]
Event Date: 01/03/2013
Event Time: 03:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNAVAILABILITY OF TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"At 0300 EST on Thursday, January 3, 2013, the DC Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary.
"TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 2200 EST on January 3, 2013.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility." | |