United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for December 3, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/30/2012 - 12/03/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45232 48395 48547 48548 48549 48550 48551

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General Information Event Number: 45232
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: PATISON EVANOFF ENGINEERING LLC
Region: 4
City: TUCSON State: AZ
County:
License #: 10-134
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/28/2009
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2009
Event Time: 06:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()
MEXICO VIA FAX ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TROXLER GAUGE

The following information was received from the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency via email:

"At approximately 9:45 am, July 28, 2009, the Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency] was notified that a Troxler Model 3411 had fallen out of the transporting vehicle on the way to the construction site. The operator had placed the device in the pickup truck at approximately 6:30 am on July 27, 2009, became distracted and failed to secure the device or to close the tailgate. The device, serial number 10308, apparently fell off the truck on the way to the construction site at Broadway and Jessica St. A search was instituted, but the device was not located and the Tucson Police were called at approximately 8:00 am July 27. Tucson Police report number 09 07270185 was prepared. As of the time cited above, the device has not been recovered. Press interest is expected. The Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency] continues to investigate this event.

"The U.S. NRC, the State of CA, NV, UT, NM, CO and TX and Mexico are being notified of this event. "

Arizona Report Number 09-003

* * * UPDATE FROM AUBREY GODWIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 11/30/12 AT 1154 EST * * *

The following information was received by email:

"On 11/29/2012 [at 0915 MST], the Tucson Police were called after a couple found a yellow container with radiation stickers on it outside of a City of Tucson Recyclables Dumpster located at Park and East Fair Street, Tucson, AZ. The Tucson Police department notified the Tucson Fire Hazardous Material team who then notified the Tucson Bomb Squad who then notified the FBI. X-Rays by the Bomb Squad found nothing suspicious. During this time (10:40 AM) the Agency was then called and responded to the scene.

"The Agency response team surveyed the device and made wipe smears. The survey indicated a source was in the device and the smears were negative for contamination. A review of the x-ray made by the Bomb Squad indicated the sources were in the device as designed. The case was undamaged but not locked. The device is being held by the Agency pending return to licensee.

"There was minor media interest in the recovery.

"The USNRC, FBI, the States of Ca, NV, UT, NM, CO and TX and Mexico are being notified of this event."

The recently found Troxler serial number match with the originally reported lost Troxler.

Notified R4DO (Whitten), ILTAB(Langlie) and FSME via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48395
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHETSLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 00:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 18:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED FIRE PROTECTION DEFICIENCIES

"On 10/9/12, at 16:30 PDT control room operators were questioned whether recently identified fire protection program deficiencies should have been reported to the NRC.

"On October 3 and October 8, 2012, DCPP [Diablo Canyon Power Plant] staff reviewing NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) Variance From Deterministic Requirements (VFDRs) identified fire areas that neither conformed to Appendix R requirements nor had established, proceduralized and practiced compensatory measures in place. The issues were identified in the DCPP corrective action program and compensatory measures were established in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements.

"Event: 10/3/12 Fire areas containing cables associated with startup transformers 1-2 and 2-2 could result in loss of startup power and also prevent the emergency diesels from performing their Appendix R safe shutdown function.

"Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing reactor coolant pump (RCP) breakers could result in loss of RCP seal cooling and prevent the credited local manual trip of the RCPs, contrary to the specified method of performing the Appendix R safe shutdown function.

"Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing cables for the ventilation systems of the 480V switchgear, DC panels, and battery chargers could require unproceduralized use of portable fans to maintain adequate cooling of the electrical equipment necessary to perform the Appendix R safe shutdown function.

"Operators established fire watches as compensatory measures as required by the DCPP fire protection program requirements.

"The above late notification of discovery of the unanalyzed conditions has been entered into the DCPP corrective action program.

"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

*****UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 11/01/12 FROM GLENN GOELZER TO S. SANDIN*****

"This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 10, 2012, at 0032 EDT.

"During the NRC's Fire Protection Triennial Inspection the NRC identified that several Alternate Compensatory Measures (ACMs) were not in the current post-fire procedure CP M-10. The ACMs address potential Appendix R non-conformance issues identified via the initiative to convert the DCPP fire protection program to NFPA 805. PG&E has established compensatory measures for all the identified areas in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements.

"[The] NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R4DO (Deese).

* * * UPDATE FROM D. BAHNER TO V. KLCO ON 11/30/12 AT 1618 EST * * *

"This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 9, 2012, at 2132 PST.

"During the ongoing evaluation of the issues previously identified in this event notification, PG&E [Pacific Gas & Electric] has concluded that a fire in the fire areas containing cables associated with startup transformers 1-2 and 2-2 would not result in loss of startup power or prevent the emergency diesels from performing their Appendix R safe shutdown function. This issue was reported as an unanalyzed condition. However, it is analyzed and controlled in plant procedure CP M-10, 'Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment.' PG&E retracts the initial event documented on October 3, 2012, thus making the date on which the first unanalyzed condition was discovered October 8, 2012. Therefore, PG&E will submit the 60-day Licensee Event Report by December 7, 2012.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified the R4DO(Whitten).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48547
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT STRUSINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/30/2012
Notification Time: 04:54 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2012
Event Time: 03:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - 40 GALLONS OF DIESEL FUEL SPILLED IN OCA

"This is a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) notification to the NRC of an event related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made.

"On 11/30/12 at 0310 EST, [licensee was] notified by the site Hazardous Materials Coordinator that a diesel fuel spill occurred in the owner controlled area [OCA] that exceeded the reporting quantity (RQ) to the state and local agencies. The quantity spilled was 40 gallons, with a minor portion entering the cooling canal system.

"On 11/30/12 at 0325 EST, [licensee] initiated contact with the following government agencies:
1) National Response Center (Report # 1031907),
2) Florida State Watch Office (Report # 2012-7936), and
3) South Florida Regional Planning Council (voice mail message left with contact number)."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48548
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS BOHREN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/01/2012
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2012
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TSC VENTILATION NOT ABLE TO DIRECT AIRFLOW TO THE CHARCOAL FILTER

"The Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation failed to enter 'Incident Mode' as required during scheduled testing. That is, the air cannot be re-directed through the charcoal filter in an event requiring the TSC atmosphere to be filtered due to an on-site release. The TSC ventilation system remains in service providing proper temperature control to maintain the facility habitable during normal operation; however with the 'Incident Mode' being unavailable, it may not remain habitable during all postulated scenarios and is, therefore, considered non-functional."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York Public Service Commission.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48549
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC WILKINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/02/2012
Notification Time: 03:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2012
Event Time: 23:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 31 Power Operation 14 Power Operation

Event Text

AMSAC ACTUATED AT LOWER THAN EXPECTED TURBINE INLET PRESSURE

"The Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) caused a Unit 2 turbine trip with reactor power at 31%. The 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started. The 2B Nuclear Service Water pump started as a result of 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pump automatically starting. The Main Feedwater Regulating valves and the Main Feedwater Bypass valves were in the correct position for corresponding power level and turbine inlet pressure, but AMSAC actuated earlier than design (290 psig vs. 360 psig)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48550
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM EASTRIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/02/2012
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2012
Event Time: 11:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 15 Power Operation 15 Power Operation

Event Text

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AND NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PUMP ACTUATION

"The Unit-2 AMSAC (Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation Actuation Circuitry) actuation generated a Unit-2 turbine trip signal. The Unit-2 turbine was already tripped, but the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater and 2B Nuclear Service Water pump started. AMSAC actuation occurred during calibration of AMSAC actuation pressure switches."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48551
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: KLINT KUDLACEK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/02/2012
Notification Time: 17:28 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2012
Event Time: 15:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled

Event Text

INADEQUATE RAW WATER PUMP ANCHOR EMBEDMENT

"The raw water pumps (AC-10A/B/C/D) base plate support anchors were discovered by Fort Calhoun Station personnel to have inadequate embedment to support existing analysis. Plant drawing specify a j-bolt type of anchor with a required 16 inch embedment. Actual plant configuration was found to be a j-bolt type anchor with a 9 inch embedment. Plant design analysis requirements are not being met for the existing configuration. Existing analysis requires a minimum embedment of 60 inch for a j-bolt type anchor. There are a total of 4 anchors for each raw water pump, totaling 16 anchors. The as found condition renders all four raw water pumps inoperable.

"In the current plant Mode 5 (De-fueled), Shutdown Condition, the raw water pumps are considered available per the station's Shutdown Operations Protection Plan. Raw water pumps AC-10B and AC - 10D are in service providing cooling to the Component Cooling Water System. The core is offloaded and the Component Cooling Water System is maintaining Spent Fuel Pool temperature."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, December 03, 2012
Monday, December 03, 2012