U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/31/2012 - 11/01/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48395 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON Region: 4 State: CA Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JOHN WHETSLER HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/10/2012 Notification Time: 00:32 [ET] Event Date: 10/03/2012 Event Time: 18:15 [PDT] Last Update Date: 11/01/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION | Person (Organization): DON ALLEN (R4DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED FIRE PROTECTION DEFICIENCIES "On 10/9/12, at 16:30 PDT control room operators were questioned whether recently identified fire protection program deficiencies should have been reported to the NRC. "On October 3 and October 8, 2012, DCPP [Diablo Canyon Power Plant] staff reviewing NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) Variance From Deterministic Requirements (VFDRs) identified fire areas that neither conformed to Appendix R requirements nor had established, proceduralized and practiced compensatory measures in place. The issues were identified in the DCPP corrective action program and compensatory measures were established in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements. "Event: 10/3/12 Fire areas containing cables associated with startup transformers 1-2 and 2-2 could result in loss of startup power and also prevent the emergency diesels from performing their Appendix R safe shutdown function. "Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing reactor coolant pump (RCP) breakers could result in loss of RCP seal cooling and prevent the credited local manual trip of the RCPs, contrary to the specified method of performing the Appendix R safe shutdown function. "Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing cables for the ventilation systems of the 480V switchgear, DC panels, and battery chargers could require unproceduralized use of portable fans to maintain adequate cooling of the electrical equipment necessary to perform the Appendix R safe shutdown function. "Operators established fire watches as compensatory measures as required by the DCPP fire protection program requirements. "The above late notification of discovery of the unanalyzed conditions has been entered into the DCPP corrective action program. "NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." *****UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 11/01/12 FROM GLENN GOELZER TO S. SANDIN***** "This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 10, 2012, at 0032 EDT. "During the NRC's Fire Protection Triennial Inspection the NRC identified that several Alternate Compensatory Measures (ACMs) were not in the current post-fire procedure CP M-10. The ACMs address potential Appendix R non-conformance issues identified via the initiative to convert the DCPP fire protection program to NFPA 805. PG&E has established compensatory measures for all the identified areas in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements. "[The] NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R4DO (Deese). | Agreement State | Event Number: 48434 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH Licensee: MATERIALS TESTING LAB, INC. Region: 1 City: QUEENS State: NY County: License #: C2274 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ROBERT SNYDER HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/23/2012 Notification Time: 11:51 [ET] Event Date: 10/23/2012 Event Time: 09:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/23/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): JOHN CARUSO (R1DO) ILTAB (EMAI) FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE The following report was received from the State of New York via fax: "The Radiation Safety Officer for Materials Testing Lab, Inc. (NYS license no. C2274) called to report that a moisture density gauge (Troxler Model 4640, serial no.1003) was stolen around 9 a.m. today. The New York City Police Department was immediately called but as of 10:45 a.m. they have not responded. The gauge contains 40 mCi of Am-241/Be and 8 mCi of Cs-137. Materials Testing Lab staff are canvassing the area and posting reward flyers with a picture of the gauge. [The RSO] will keep NYS DOH informed of any significant changes to the situation. No press release has been issued at this time. New York City radioactive material program has been notified. "NYS DOH Incident: #991 "Event Report ID No. NY-12-02" THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source. | Agreement State | Event Number: 48438 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV Licensee: MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY Region: 4 City: GARYVILLE State: LA County: License #: LA-3239, AI 3 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JAMES PATE HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/24/2012 Notification Time: 17:07 [ET] Event Date: 09/13/2012 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): BOB HAGAR (R4DO) FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON A FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via fax: "Event date and Time: [On] 09/13/2012, the RSO for Marathon Petroleum called to be in compliance with Condition #4 of his radioactive material license. "Event Location: Production/process field at the refinery located at 4663 Airline Highway, Garyville, LA 70051 "Event type: Fixed gauge, stuck shutter "Event description: On 09/13/2012, the RSO for Marathon called to report a stuck shutter on a fixed level gauge utilized in a process in the refinery. There was no possible exposure to the plant workers because the gauge was installed on process [equipment] and the shutter remaining [open] was not a problem. [The RSO] called in the incident to comply with Condition #4 of Marathon's Radioactive Material License. The gauge is an Ohmart Vega gauge Model SHFBI, loaded with 20 mCi of Cs-137. The gauge has been [exposed to] the elements in excess of 10 years and the shutter malfunctioned due to corrosion in the mechanism. Eight [gauges] were evaluated and only one needed repair. The manufacturer stated that it appeared to be from being in the elements. The manufacturer stated that they were looking into finding a modification to shield the shutter mechanism from the elements. The Department [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] considers this item closed. "Event Report ID No.: LA 12-0005" | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48452 | Facility: OYSTER CREEK Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-2 NRC Notified By: STEVE SERPE HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER | Notification Date: 10/29/2012 Notification Time: 19:18 [ET] Event Date: 10/29/2012 Event Time: 18:55 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: ALERT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP | Person (Organization): JOHN CARUSO (R1DO) WILLIAM DEAN (R1 R) ERIC LEEDS (NRR) MICHELE EVANS (NRR) JANE MARSHALL (IRD) VICTOR MCCREE (R2 R) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO HIGH INTAKE STRUCTURE WATER LEVEL At 1855 EDT on 10/29/2012, the licensee declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) per criteria HU4 for high water level in the station intake structure of greater than 4.5 feet. At the time of the notification, water level in the intake structure was approximate 4.8 feet and slowly rising. The cause of the increased water level was due to storm surge associated with Hurricane Sandy. No other station impacts were reported at the time. The licensee continues to monitor the intake levels and ocean tides. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New Jersey. * * * ALERT UPDATE ON 10/29/2012 AT 2141 EDT FROM STEVE SERPE TO RYAN ALEXANDER * * * At 2044 EDT on 10/29/2012, the licensee escalated its emergency declaration to an Alert per criteria HA4 for high water level in the station intake structure of greater than 6.0 feet. At the time of the notification, water level in the intake structure was approximately 6.6 feet. The site also experienced a loss of offsite power event concurrent with the additional water level increase. Both emergency diesel generators started and are supplying power to the emergency electrical busses. Shutdown cooling and spent fuel pool cooling have been restored. Reactor pressure vessel level is steady at 584.7 inches. Intake levels continues to rise slowly and the licensee is monitoring. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New Jersey. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, and NuclearSSA via e-mail. * * * UPDATE on 10/30/12 at 0414 EDT FROM GILBERT DEVRIES TO RYAN ALEXANDER * * * The licensee updated this report with an 8-hour non-emergency notification of emergency diesel generator auto-actuation due to the actual loss of off-site power event [which occurred at 2018 EDT on 10/29/2012]. This event caused a valid RPS actuation with automatic containment isolations that resulted in a temporary loss of shut-down cooling to the reactor. Shutdown cooling was subsequently restored with power provided by the emergency diesel generators. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Caruso). * * * UPDATE AT 0357 EDT ON 10/31/12 FROM GILBERT A. DeVRIES TO S. SANDIN * * * "Termination of Alert. "The Oyster Creek Station has terminated the Alert that was declared at 2044 [EDT] on 10/29/12 due to Intake Structure high water level greater than 6.0 ft. MSL (EAL HA4). "Intake water level has returned to normal and is now below the Unusual Event EAL threshold (4.5 ft. MSL) and continues to lower." The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified Region I IRC (Clifford), NRR (Evans), and IRD (Marshall). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, and NuclearSSA via e-mail. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48455 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [2] [3] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: JAMES BROWN HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 10/30/2012 Notification Time: 03:20 [ET] Event Date: 10/30/2012 Event Time: 00:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): JOHN CARUSO (R1DO) JANE MARSHALL (IRD) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO IMPACTS FROM HURRICANE SANDY "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Control Room was notified of a loss of greater than 25% of sirens after severe storms in the area associated with Hurricane Sandy. Thirty-one (31) of 97 Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) sirens are currently unavailable in Lancaster, York, Cecil and Harford Counties. Actions are currently being taken to restore unavailable sirens." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE AT 0515 EDT ON 10/31/12 FROM SCOTT RUCKER TO S. SANDIN * * * "Currently 12 of 97 sirens remain inoperable." The licensee will inform state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Caruso). | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48460 | Facility: OYSTER CREEK Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-2 NRC Notified By: GILBERT A. DeVRIES HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/31/2012 Notification Time: 00:07 [ET] Event Date: 10/30/2012 Event Time: 23:40 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | Person (Organization): IRC (R1) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE "[The licensee] notified National Marine Fisheries Service per OC-08 that Oyster Creek has been unable to use the dilution and intake trash rake for greater than 24 hours due to safety concerns and loss of power. Daily manual raking of intake and dilution is in progress." The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48461 | Facility: VOGTLE Region: 2 State: GA Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: CHARLES STUHAAN HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/31/2012 Notification Time: 09:06 [ET] Event Date: 10/31/2012 Event Time: 07:42 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUTAGE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE "A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements ManuaI13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) Evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." * * * UPDATE FROM ERIC TEW TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/31/12 AT 1452 EDT * * * TSC maintenance is complete. The TSC has been returned to operable status at 1445 EDT on 10/31/12. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper). | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48462 | Facility: MCGUIRE Region: 2 State: NC Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: ERIC G. BLOUGH HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/31/2012 Notification Time: 13:34 [ET] Event Date: 08/01/2009 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text HISTORICAL UNAVAILABILITY OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION DUE TO MAINTENANCE "This non-emergency event report is being made per 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(ii) which requires reporting events that occurred within three years of the date of discovery. "Based on operating experience, Engineering personnel reviewed past maintenance activities involving the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system (VH system) and identified four (4) occasions between August 2009 and October 2012 (three years) where the VH system functions could not have been restored within the required facility activation time. The specific instances have been documented in our corrective action program. "If an emergency had been declared during these period and TSC ERO activation was required, the TSC would have been staffed and activated unless the TSC came uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff was necessary, the Station Emergency Coordinator would relocate the staff to the alternate TSC location. "Practices and processes have been revised to improve control of TSC maintenance activities and to improve facility availability going forward. In addition, site reporting guidance has been revised to assure timely reporting for these types of events if required. "This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since the maintenance activities affected an Emergency Response Facility." The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48463 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK Region: 4 State: TX Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: MICHAEL STAKES HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/31/2012 Notification Time: 14:09 [ET] Event Date: 10/31/2012 Event Time: 06:15 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): RICK DEESE (R4DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation | Event Text SEQUENCER FAULT RESULTING IN SYSTEM ACTUATIONS "On October 31, 2012 at 0615 hours CDT, Unit 1 Train 'B' Safety Injection/Blackout Sequencer faulted resulting in a start of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (TDAFW) Pump and Train 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Reactor power was reduced to 97% rated thermal power (RTP) by an immediate load reduction of 50 MWe due to the resulting cooler Auxiliary Feed Water being injected into the Steam Generators; reactor power did not exceed 100% RTP. Train 'A' equipment was not affected by the event. "The TDAFW Pump was secured at 0628 hours by closing the Train 'B' steam supply valve from the main control board and the steam supply valve was declared operable at 0916 hours when the hand switch was returned to 'Auto' and the control switch lineup surveillance was completed. The Train 'B' EDG was loaded to 100% capacity in accordance with the operating procedure and secured at 1032 hours. The EDG is available but remains inoperable until the Sequencer is declared operable. "Efforts continue to restore the Sequencer at this time. A faulted 15 Volt power supply was identified and further investigation/calibration will determine if other conditions contributed to the fault. A final surveillance test will determine Sequencer operability. The most limiting Shutdown Technical Specification action statement is 24 hours in accordance with Safety Injection Sequencer TS 3.8.1 F. Current projections for Sequencer operability, and thus Train 'B' EDG operability, are 1800 hours. "This action appears to be an invalid actuation. However, this will be confirmed after a cause analysis and an update to this event will be provided at that time." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48464 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND Region: 3 State: MN Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: MARK LOOSBROCK HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 10/31/2012 Notification Time: 15:41 [ET] Event Date: 10/31/2012 Event Time: 14:18 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED | Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3DO) CYNTHIA PEDERSON (DRA) HO NIEH (NRR) SCOTT MORRIS (IRD) JIM WHITNEY (ILTA) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO SECURITY CONDITION The licensee declared an Unusual Event based upon a security condition at the site. Compensatory measures are being put in place. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email. * * * UPDATE FROM TERRY BACON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/31/12 AT 1924 EDT * * * The licensee terminated the NOUE at 1754 CDT. Notified NRR EO (Nieh), IRD (Morris), and R3DO (Kozak), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48466 | Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: DAVID NOYES HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 10/31/2012 Notification Time: 20:12 [ET] Event Date: 10/31/2012 Event Time: 14:41 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION | Person (Organization): JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH TRAINS OF STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INOPERABLE "On Wednesday, October 31, 2012 at 1200 hours, with the reactor at approximately 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System Train 'B' was removed from service (made inoperable) for surveillance testing. "At 1441 hours, the control room staff declared the Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'A' inoperable as a result of an engineering analysis that determined that 480 VAC feed, Motor Control Center (MCC) B15, had the potential to exceed its trip set point under worst case bus loading. "The inoperability of both SBGT System Trains 'A' and 'B' could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions to 'control the release of radioactive material' and 'mitigate the consequences of an accident.' "At 1510 hours, a compensatory measure was taken to preclude the overload condition on MCC B15 and the SBGT System Train 'A' was restored to operable status. "At the time of submittal of this notification, the SBGT System Train 'B' remains inoperable for replacement of an overload relay. SBGT System Train 'B' is expected to be returned to service this evening. "This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the Public. "The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48467 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [1] [2] [3] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BALL HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 10/31/2012 Notification Time: 21:09 [ET] Event Date: 10/31/2012 Event Time: 12:53 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/31/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | Person (Organization): GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIALLY UNABLE TO PROVIDE POWER TO SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING APPENDIX R FIRE "During BFNP [Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant] NFPA [National Fire Protection Association] 805 transition review, it was determined in the event of an Appendix R fire, the ability to provide power to equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown may be adversely impacted. In certain fire zones/areas, feeder breakers for the 480V Shutdown Boards are credited for backup control operation using the 43 emergency switches, which isolate the breaker controls from circuits going to the control bay, and allow for local operation of the breaker. Fire damage to Main Control Room 480V Shutdown Board transfer switch cables could cause the control circuit fuses for the credited breaker to clear prior to the use of the 43 emergency switch. In addition, cable fire damage in the same fire areas could also cause the normal and/or alternate feeder breakers to spuriously trip. These breakers do not have separate emergency fuses like other BFNP breakers equipped with backup controls. Therefore, Safe Shutdown Instruction (SSI) procedure steps to use 43 switches to perform local breaker operation to supply power to safe shutdown equipment may not work as written where this cable fire damage can occur. "Compensatory actions in the form of fire watches to mitigate this condition are in place in accordance with the BFNP Fire Protection Report. "This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A),(B),(C).&(D). "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |