| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/18/2012 - 10/19/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48419 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ERIC STEELE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 10/18/2012
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2012
Event Time: 14:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONFIRMED POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48421 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ERIC STEELE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 10/18/2012
Notification Time: 18:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2012
Event Time: 13:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW IDENTIFIES A POTENTIAL UNANALYZED CONDITION
"During BFNP [Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant] NFPA [National Fire Protection Association] 805 transition review, it was determined in the event of an Appendix-R fire, fire induced circuit damage could potentially result in the Residual Heat Removal System Division II inboard isolation valve being prevented from opening or cause the valve to spuriously close on units 2 and 3. The current Appendix R safe shutdown analysis credits opening of these valves. Failure to open these valves results in loss of ability to provide long term cooling to the core.
"Compensatory actions in the form of fire watches to mitigate this condition are in place in accordance with the BFNP Fire Protection Report.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |