United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for October 11, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/10/2012 - 10/11/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48391 48395 48396 48397 48398

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48391
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM OAKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/09/2012
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 10:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled

Event Text

LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY AT THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

"At approximately 0100 hours EDT, on October 9, 2012, a low voltage circuit breaker in the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) tripped due to an electrical fault. The associated loads were powered by backup batteries until they depleted at approximately 1057 EDT. This condition resulted in the loss of dose assessment (RASCAL) and facility cooling capability.

"Dose assessment capability at the EOF was restored by 1335 EDT. During this event, RASCAL could be run from any plant computer outside of the EOF and the results conveyed back to the EOF. EOF ambient temperature is being monitored. An estimated completion time for chiller restoration has not been established. A follow-up notification will be provided when the chiller operation has been restored. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At no time was the public's or plant employees' health or safety at risk. Due to numerous backup systems, alternate methods were available to calculate dose projections, if required, and communicate the information to the EOF.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE MCAGY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 2001 EDT ON 10/10/12 * * *

"At 1500 EDT on 10/10/12 Chiller Operations for the EOF has been restored. At 1700 EDT on 10/10/12 the EOF returned to normal office temperatures. At no time did temperatures affect the habitability or functionality of the EOF."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Notified R2DO (Seymour).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48395
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHETSLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 00:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 18:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED FIRE PROTECTION DEFICIENCIES

"On 10/9/12, at 16:30 PDT control room operators were questioned whether recently identified fire protection program deficiencies should have been reported to the NRC.

"On October 3 and October 8, 2012, DCPP [Diablo Canyon Power Plant] staff reviewing NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) Variance From Deterministic Requirements (VFDRs) identified fire areas that neither conformed to Appendix R requirements nor had established, proceduralized and practiced compensatory measures in place. The issues were identified in the DCPP corrective action program and compensatory measures were established in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements.

"Event: 10/3/12 Fire areas containing cables associated with startup transformers 1-2 and 2-2 could result in loss of startup power and also prevent the emergency diesels from performing their Appendix R safe shutdown function.

"Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing reactor coolant pump (RCP) breakers could result in loss of RCP seal cooling and prevent the credited local manual trip of the RCPs, contrary to the specified method of performing the Appendix R safe shutdown function.

"Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing cables for the ventilation systems of the 480V switchgear, DC panels, and battery chargers could require unproceduralized use of portable fans to maintain adequate cooling of the electrical equipment necessary to perform the Appendix R safe shutdown function.

"Operators established fire watches as compensatory measures as required by the DCPP fire protection program requirements.

"The above late notification of discovery of the unanalyzed conditions has been entered into the DCPP corrective action program.

"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48396
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN CAVES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 07:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATION

A non-licensed employee supervisor was administered a for-cause chemical test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48397
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE LESTER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2012
Event Time: 16:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

REDUCED RADIATION MONITORING CAPABILITY FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING AND CONTAINMENT VENT STACKS

"On October 10, 2012, at 1633 [CDT], Kewaunee Power Station staff identified (in response to concerns raised by the NRC Resident Inspector) that the Containment and Auxiliary Building SPING (Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas) units could likely not have been relied upon to determine Emergency Classifications based on the Kewaunee Emergency Action (EAL) Level Matrix. This was due to these SPINGs having been nonfunctional during the period from 2/28/2011 at 0150 [CDT] until 3/30/2011 at 1845 [CDT]. Alternate radiation monitoring capability remained available to provide indication of radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building and Containment vent stacks; however, they would not have been sufficient to identify the upper two emergency action levels. Alternate means (e.g., grab samples) could also have been used to make the appropriate declarations. However, use of the alternate means could potentially impair the plant's ability to declare an emergency in a timely manner.

"These SPING units had been returned to service on 3/30/2011 and were subsequently available for EAL classifications. However, the ramification of this condition was not fully recognized until today.

"This condition is being conservatively reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 48398
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: DEREK WARFORD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 22:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2012
Event Time: 13:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
ROBERT JOHNSON (NMSS)

Event Text

DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROL FOR EMPTY CYLINDERS NOT MAINTAINED

"At 1305 CDT, on 10-10-12 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that during reviews of paperwork for a customer, it was discovered that four clean, empty cylinders used for transfer did not have a hydrocarbon test performed prior to filling, in violation of NCSA 360-005. NCSA 360-005 requires a test for never used non-USEC owned cylinders prior to filling to detect the presence of hydrocarbons. The presence of moderator in the cylinders could lead to either an 'explosion' that ruptures the cylinder and releases UF6 or criticality from moderation of greater than a safe mass of uranium. The controls ensure that double contingency exits to prevent filling a cylinder containing enough moderator to support criticality.

"Cylinders affected are GE0195, GE0191, JM0226, and GE0407 and were filled on 9/16/12 and 9/22/12.

"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01 Supplement 1.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-12-2554; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2012-06.

"Responsible Division: Production Support & Product Scheduling

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: A control relied upon for double contingency was violated. A cold pressure check and cylinder weight check performed prior to initial transfer of UF6 did not indicate the presence of moderator, and customer compliance with ANSI N14.1 also ensures that cylinders received at PGDP would not contain moderator. There was no indication of an adverse reaction noted during the filling of the cylinders. A cold pressure check performed after filling and cooldown did not indicate that an adverse reaction associated with UF6 and moderator had occurred. The introduction of UF6 eliminates the possibility of any residual moderator remaining in the cylinder; therefore, the cylinders are now in compliance with double contingency.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for criticality to be possible, sufficient undetected moderator would have to be present in the cylinder prior to the initial transfer of UF6. Although a control was violated, the cold pressure check ensured the moderation parameter was not exceeded.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency for this scenario is provided by two controls on moderation.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: 20,000 lbs. of UF6 at approximately 4.0% U235 enrichment. Plant limit is 5.5 wt.% U235 enrichment

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on cylinder compliance with ANSI N14.1 and the performance of a cold pressure check prior to initial transfer of UF6. ANSI N14.1 compliance ensures that the cylinders are clean and free of moderator. The cold pressure check provides a positive indication that no moderator is present inside the cylinder. The cold pressure check was adequately performed prior to initial UF6; therefore, this control was not violated.

"The second leg of double contingency is based on performing a hydrocarbon test on the internal valve opening of the UF6 cylinder prior to initial transfer of UF6. The presence of hydrocarbon material in a UF6 cylinder could result in a cylinder rupture or criticality prior to initial transfer of UF6. The hydrocarbon test will give telltale signs that the inside of the cylinder may contain oil or other potential moderators. The hydrocarbon test was not performed; therefore, this control was violated. This leg of double contingency is considered to have been lost.

"Since double contingency for this scenario is based on two controls on one parameter and a control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: None are needed."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, October 11, 2012
Thursday, October 11, 2012