Event Notification Report for October 04, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/03/2012 - 10/04/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
48383483754837648377483784837348424
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48383
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARLIN JOSEPH QUARBERG
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARLIN JOSEPH QUARBERG
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 19:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 19:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONFIRMED POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 48375
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: GERALD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: GERALD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
UNANALYZED ACCIDENT SCENARIOS FOR CERTAIN CONSEQUENCES OF CONCERN
"This notification is based on 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1), 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'
"Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility routinely enters external NRC event notifications and issues into the Corrective Actions Program (CAPs) for external operating experience. Westinghouse Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) staff and the Issue Review Committee evaluated the AREVA NP, Inc. Richland NRC Event Report #48366 for applicability and impact on compliance for the Columbia plant.
"This evaluation identified a regulatory noncompliance. The ISA currently identifies Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) for scenarios based on Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) (i.e., airborne concentration criteria) for chemical consequences. However, the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) conducted for the ISA, with minor exceptions, did not specifically identify high or intermediate events that may or may not require additional IROFS for dermal or ocular exposures from the plant's chemical processes subject to 10 CFR 70 requirements. This report is intended to cover all potential chemical dermal or ocular exposures within those systems covered by the plant's ISA.
"There is no actual safety significance, and the potential safety significance of this issue is low due to the following:
"- An extensive number of IROFS are currently in place to prevent chemical spills that could lead to airborne concentrations above ERPG limits, and these same IROFS can be readily utilized to prevent most dermal/ocular exposure accident sequences.
"- SNM-1107 License Application, Section 7.0 - Chemical Safety Program, as well as the governing Occupational Health and Safety (OSHA) regulations, already contain requirements for worker protection from these hazards. The Columbia plant recognizes these hazards through its PHA and Job Safety Analysis (JSA) processes and identified the need for controls, where applicable.
"- Robust procedures, training and appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) are in place to ensure worker safety from these types of hazards.
"However, failure to specifically identify the dermal/ocular exposure as potentially high or intermediate consequence events in accident sequences in the framework of the ISA process led to these sequences not being included in the ISA Summary, and therefore, IROFS were not designated for these sequences as required by 10 CR 70.61. As noted above, this issue has been entered into CAPs (IR 12-277-C001). Until the PHA and JSA are reviewed for identification of specific IROFS, the applicable elements of our license-required Chemical Safety Program will be treated as IROFS for purposes of compliance with 10CFR70.61 and reporting under 10CFR 70 Appendix A."
"This notification is based on 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1), 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'
"Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility routinely enters external NRC event notifications and issues into the Corrective Actions Program (CAPs) for external operating experience. Westinghouse Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) staff and the Issue Review Committee evaluated the AREVA NP, Inc. Richland NRC Event Report #48366 for applicability and impact on compliance for the Columbia plant.
"This evaluation identified a regulatory noncompliance. The ISA currently identifies Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) for scenarios based on Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) (i.e., airborne concentration criteria) for chemical consequences. However, the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) conducted for the ISA, with minor exceptions, did not specifically identify high or intermediate events that may or may not require additional IROFS for dermal or ocular exposures from the plant's chemical processes subject to 10 CFR 70 requirements. This report is intended to cover all potential chemical dermal or ocular exposures within those systems covered by the plant's ISA.
"There is no actual safety significance, and the potential safety significance of this issue is low due to the following:
"- An extensive number of IROFS are currently in place to prevent chemical spills that could lead to airborne concentrations above ERPG limits, and these same IROFS can be readily utilized to prevent most dermal/ocular exposure accident sequences.
"- SNM-1107 License Application, Section 7.0 - Chemical Safety Program, as well as the governing Occupational Health and Safety (OSHA) regulations, already contain requirements for worker protection from these hazards. The Columbia plant recognizes these hazards through its PHA and Job Safety Analysis (JSA) processes and identified the need for controls, where applicable.
"- Robust procedures, training and appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) are in place to ensure worker safety from these types of hazards.
"However, failure to specifically identify the dermal/ocular exposure as potentially high or intermediate consequence events in accident sequences in the framework of the ISA process led to these sequences not being included in the ISA Summary, and therefore, IROFS were not designated for these sequences as required by 10 CR 70.61. As noted above, this issue has been entered into CAPs (IR 12-277-C001). Until the PHA and JSA are reviewed for identification of specific IROFS, the applicable elements of our license-required Chemical Safety Program will be treated as IROFS for purposes of compliance with 10CFR70.61 and reporting under 10CFR 70 Appendix A."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48376
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LARRY SLOAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LARRY SLOAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 09:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 09:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE
"The 'A' Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (MCREV) fan failed to automatically start when placed in service at 0959 EDT on 10/4/12. The `B' fan was available at the time of the initiation, but was inoperable due to E-42 Emergency 4kV Bus outage. Both MCREV fans inoperable is an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.4 Condition E which requires Unit 3 to be Mode 3 in 12 hours. Unit 2 was not in a mode of applicability at the time of the event [Unit 2 is defueled]. This issue is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function - mitigate the consequences of an accident. The 'A' MCREV fan was restored to an operable status at 1237 EDT on 10/4/12 and the Technical Specification Action was exited."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The 'A' Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (MCREV) fan failed to automatically start when placed in service at 0959 EDT on 10/4/12. The `B' fan was available at the time of the initiation, but was inoperable due to E-42 Emergency 4kV Bus outage. Both MCREV fans inoperable is an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.4 Condition E which requires Unit 3 to be Mode 3 in 12 hours. Unit 2 was not in a mode of applicability at the time of the event [Unit 2 is defueled]. This issue is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function - mitigate the consequences of an accident. The 'A' MCREV fan was restored to an operable status at 1237 EDT on 10/4/12 and the Technical Specification Action was exited."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48377
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAN HUNT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAN HUNT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 13:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 13:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF ALL EMERGENCY SIRENS
"At 1301 [CDT] on October 4, 2012, during the restoration of a single Farmer City owned siren, DeWitt County Emergency Dispatch Center inadvertently activated all of Clinton Power Station's emergency sirens instead of the Farmer City owned siren. A siren in the Farmer City area had fallen off a pole, and following repairs, instead of testing the individual siren, the Dispatch Center inadvertently actuated all 40 Clinton Power Station sirens. The sirens were actuated for approximately 1 minute and 14 seconds. The Clinton Power Station siren system covers parts of four surrounding counties (DeWitt, Piatt, McLean, and Macon).
"A spurious actuation of one or more emergency response sirens is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) addressing a notification of a government agency related to the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All of the affected county Emergency Management Agencies have been notified.
"The DeWitt County Sheriff has notified various media outlets."
"At 1301 [CDT] on October 4, 2012, during the restoration of a single Farmer City owned siren, DeWitt County Emergency Dispatch Center inadvertently activated all of Clinton Power Station's emergency sirens instead of the Farmer City owned siren. A siren in the Farmer City area had fallen off a pole, and following repairs, instead of testing the individual siren, the Dispatch Center inadvertently actuated all 40 Clinton Power Station sirens. The sirens were actuated for approximately 1 minute and 14 seconds. The Clinton Power Station siren system covers parts of four surrounding counties (DeWitt, Piatt, McLean, and Macon).
"A spurious actuation of one or more emergency response sirens is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) addressing a notification of a government agency related to the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All of the affected county Emergency Management Agencies have been notified.
"The DeWitt County Sheriff has notified various media outlets."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48378
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: SCOTT WEEKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: SCOTT WEEKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 22:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 22:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PRIMARY AND BACKUP METEOROLOGICAL TOWERS OUT OF SERVICE
"At 1600 CDT on 10/4/2012, it was determined that the plant backup meteorological tower was not reliable as a source of data and was declared non-functional. At the time of this determination, the primary meteorological tower was out of service for maintenance and was also non-functional. Based on both the primary and backup meteorological towers being non-functional, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability. The ability to assess certain Emergency Action Levels (EALs) or perform dose assessment calculations could potentially be hampered by the unavailability of the meteorological monitoring instrumentation. The alternate method per procedure is to contact the National Weather Service for information. The station implemented the alternative method for information gathering. The primary met tower was returned to service at 2011 CDT on 10/4/2012."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1600 CDT on 10/4/2012, it was determined that the plant backup meteorological tower was not reliable as a source of data and was declared non-functional. At the time of this determination, the primary meteorological tower was out of service for maintenance and was also non-functional. Based on both the primary and backup meteorological towers being non-functional, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability. The ability to assess certain Emergency Action Levels (EALs) or perform dose assessment calculations could potentially be hampered by the unavailability of the meteorological monitoring instrumentation. The alternate method per procedure is to contact the National Weather Service for information. The station implemented the alternative method for information gathering. The primary met tower was returned to service at 2011 CDT on 10/4/2012."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48373
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 08:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 08:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM REPAIRS
"At approximately 0802 EDT on 10/04/2012, [Air Handler] AH-17, TSC Cooling Fan, was discovered not running. The fan belt for AH-17 TSC was found broken. AH-17 TSC belt has been replaced; it is expected to be placed back in service by 1200 [EDT], 10/04/2012 and after verification of proper operation will be declared operable. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. In addition, at approximately 0900 EDT, on October 4, 2012, the Harris Nuclear Plant Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance on TSC outside air fan OA-2 (belt replacement). The fan was out of service for greater than one hour for this activity then returned to service for an 8 to 24 hour run in period for the new belts. After the run in period, the TSC outside air fan and AH-17 TSC will be taken out of service again for greater than one hour for belt adjustment. Following the belt adjustment, the fans will be returned to service and TSC ventilation will be declared operable. Compensatory actions are in place for periodic monitoring of TSC temperatures and the two other TSC HVAC units which are operating satisfactorily. The assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the TSC ventilation system is non-functional. The on-call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The alternate TSC is available per plant procedure if required."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At approximately 0802 EDT on 10/04/2012, [Air Handler] AH-17, TSC Cooling Fan, was discovered not running. The fan belt for AH-17 TSC was found broken. AH-17 TSC belt has been replaced; it is expected to be placed back in service by 1200 [EDT], 10/04/2012 and after verification of proper operation will be declared operable. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. In addition, at approximately 0900 EDT, on October 4, 2012, the Harris Nuclear Plant Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance on TSC outside air fan OA-2 (belt replacement). The fan was out of service for greater than one hour for this activity then returned to service for an 8 to 24 hour run in period for the new belts. After the run in period, the TSC outside air fan and AH-17 TSC will be taken out of service again for greater than one hour for belt adjustment. Following the belt adjustment, the fans will be returned to service and TSC ventilation will be declared operable. Compensatory actions are in place for periodic monitoring of TSC temperatures and the two other TSC HVAC units which are operating satisfactorily. The assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the TSC ventilation system is non-functional. The on-call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The alternate TSC is available per plant procedure if required."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 48424
Rep Org: ACUREN INSPECTION
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: PRUDHOE BAY State: AK
County:
License #: 42-32443-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT JEFFERSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: PRUDHOE BAY State: AK
County:
License #: 42-32443-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT JEFFERSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/19/2012
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 23:30 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2012
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2012
Event Time: 23:30 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
FSME RESOURCES (FSME)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
FSME RESOURCES (FSME)
RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE STUCK
"A drive cable designed for 25' controls was installed in a 35' control assembly. This resulted in 15' of usable drive cable to travel through the guide tube. The radiographers were using a guide tube and extension with a total length of 17' and were unaware that there was not enough drive cable to reach the source stop. The cable was run out past the stop, and could not be retracted.
"The exposure being taken at the time of the incident was a 6:00 shot on a 12" oil line. The line was 15' off the ground near an elevated platform. There was a 42" pipe running between the platform and the pipe being inspected. The exposure device was placed on the platform and an extension was added to the guide tube to route the source around the 42" pipe. The total length of the guide tube and extension was 16'11". The control cables were rerouted to take advantage of nearby shielding. The conduits were disconnected from the Pistol Grip Assembly exposing the drive cable. The source was then retracted into the fully shielded position by pulling the drive cable by hand.
"The entire inventory of control assemblies were inspected to ensure the proper drive cables are installed, as will new assemblies when they are initially received. Additionally, personnel qualified to repair control assemblies will be retrained with emphasis placed on ensuring proper length of drive cable is in place. Training will be documented and filed in personnel records.
"Qualifications of personnel involved in incident:
1. Radiographer, Texas Industrial Radiographer Certification holder, Dose Received, 3mR (dosimeter)
2. Radiographer, IRRSP card holder, Dose Received, 5mR (dosimeter)
3. Radiographer, Illinois Industrial Radiography Certification holder, Dose Received, 7mR (dosimeter)
4. Assistant Radiographer, Dose Received, 2mR (dosimeter)
Source retrieval personnel: Site Radiation Safety Officer, IRRSP card holder, Source Retrieval trained by LAMCO & Associate February 25, 2011, Dose Received, 2mR (Dosimeter)
"Equipment Involved:
7' flexible Guide Tube, serial # GT 1211 22
10' flexible Guide Tube Extension, serial # EXT 12 11
Crank Assembly serial # 11652
Exposure Device Model #: Sentinel Delta 880
Exposure Device serial #: D3534
Isotope: Iridium 192
Source serial #: 84462B
"A drive cable designed for 25' controls was installed in a 35' control assembly. This resulted in 15' of usable drive cable to travel through the guide tube. The radiographers were using a guide tube and extension with a total length of 17' and were unaware that there was not enough drive cable to reach the source stop. The cable was run out past the stop, and could not be retracted.
"The exposure being taken at the time of the incident was a 6:00 shot on a 12" oil line. The line was 15' off the ground near an elevated platform. There was a 42" pipe running between the platform and the pipe being inspected. The exposure device was placed on the platform and an extension was added to the guide tube to route the source around the 42" pipe. The total length of the guide tube and extension was 16'11". The control cables were rerouted to take advantage of nearby shielding. The conduits were disconnected from the Pistol Grip Assembly exposing the drive cable. The source was then retracted into the fully shielded position by pulling the drive cable by hand.
"The entire inventory of control assemblies were inspected to ensure the proper drive cables are installed, as will new assemblies when they are initially received. Additionally, personnel qualified to repair control assemblies will be retrained with emphasis placed on ensuring proper length of drive cable is in place. Training will be documented and filed in personnel records.
"Qualifications of personnel involved in incident:
1. Radiographer, Texas Industrial Radiographer Certification holder, Dose Received, 3mR (dosimeter)
2. Radiographer, IRRSP card holder, Dose Received, 5mR (dosimeter)
3. Radiographer, Illinois Industrial Radiography Certification holder, Dose Received, 7mR (dosimeter)
4. Assistant Radiographer, Dose Received, 2mR (dosimeter)
Source retrieval personnel: Site Radiation Safety Officer, IRRSP card holder, Source Retrieval trained by LAMCO & Associate February 25, 2011, Dose Received, 2mR (Dosimeter)
"Equipment Involved:
7' flexible Guide Tube, serial # GT 1211 22
10' flexible Guide Tube Extension, serial # EXT 12 11
Crank Assembly serial # 11652
Exposure Device Model #: Sentinel Delta 880
Exposure Device serial #: D3534
Isotope: Iridium 192
Source serial #: 84462B