Event Notification Report for September 14, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/13/2012 - 09/14/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
4849348306483094831048311
Part 21
Event Number: 48493
Rep Org: ABB INC. (MEDIUM VOLTAGE SERVICE)
Licensee: ACCUTREX PRODUCTS, INC.
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: ACCUTREX PRODUCTS, INC.
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/08/2012
Notification Time: 14:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2012
Notification Time: 14:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 - AN OPERATING MECHANISM FRONT COVER FAILED DURING LICENSEE RECEIPT INSPECTION
The following information was received by facsimile:
"[ABB, Inc. provided] notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with an operating mechanism front cover P/N 707939A00 used in low voltage electrically operated K-Line circuit breakers. A single occurrence of a newly manufactured circuit breaker failure to close was noted during Next Era Energy Seabrook Station receiving inspection supported by an ABB Medium Voltage Service Field Service Engineer. This circuit breaker was set up and tested satisfactorily during ABB cycle testing, inspection and commercial grade dedication prior to shipping. It was noted during the Seabrook receiving inspection that the control device plunger and secondary close latch were misaligned. Replacement of the operating mechanism front cover improved this alignment and the circuit breaker receipt inspection was completed satisfactorily. Inspection of the subject operating mechanism front cover indicates cause of the misalignment is due to incorrect hole locations for mounting the control device. This operating mechanism front cover was manufactured by Accutrex Products, Inc., an ABB approved vendor.
"Identification of the Subject component: ABB part numbers 707939A00 and 707939B00 operating mechanism covers. These covers are used in operating mechanisms for the K-Line electrically operated circuit breakers rated 2000 amps and below.
"Because of the large potential variety of usages of the affected circuit breakers, ABB (Medium Voltage Service) cannot determine if the potential for a substantial safety hazard exists at any licensee's facility if control device plunger and secondary close latch are misaligned. It is recommended the Licensees determine if the circuit breaker control device plunger and secondary close latch are misaligned at the next convenient maintenance opportunity defined in the ABB K-Line circuit breaker Information Bulletin."
The following information was received by facsimile:
"[ABB, Inc. provided] notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with an operating mechanism front cover P/N 707939A00 used in low voltage electrically operated K-Line circuit breakers. A single occurrence of a newly manufactured circuit breaker failure to close was noted during Next Era Energy Seabrook Station receiving inspection supported by an ABB Medium Voltage Service Field Service Engineer. This circuit breaker was set up and tested satisfactorily during ABB cycle testing, inspection and commercial grade dedication prior to shipping. It was noted during the Seabrook receiving inspection that the control device plunger and secondary close latch were misaligned. Replacement of the operating mechanism front cover improved this alignment and the circuit breaker receipt inspection was completed satisfactorily. Inspection of the subject operating mechanism front cover indicates cause of the misalignment is due to incorrect hole locations for mounting the control device. This operating mechanism front cover was manufactured by Accutrex Products, Inc., an ABB approved vendor.
"Identification of the Subject component: ABB part numbers 707939A00 and 707939B00 operating mechanism covers. These covers are used in operating mechanisms for the K-Line electrically operated circuit breakers rated 2000 amps and below.
"Because of the large potential variety of usages of the affected circuit breakers, ABB (Medium Voltage Service) cannot determine if the potential for a substantial safety hazard exists at any licensee's facility if control device plunger and secondary close latch are misaligned. It is recommended the Licensees determine if the circuit breaker control device plunger and secondary close latch are misaligned at the next convenient maintenance opportunity defined in the ABB K-Line circuit breaker Information Bulletin."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48306
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: REESE KILIAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: REESE KILIAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/14/2012
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2012
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48309
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/14/2012
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 16:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2012
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 16:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
DAVID SKEEN (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
DAVID SKEEN (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 68 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE 120 KV SWITCHYARD
"At 1603 EDT, Fermi 2 automatically scrammed due to onsite loss of 120 kV switchyard. All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 98 inches. Division I diesels, EDG-11 and EDG-12, automatically started and loaded. HPCI and RCIC automatically started and restored RWL. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with Condensate/Feed and Control Rod Drive (CRD) systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 and 2 occurred as expected. Investigation into loss of 120 kV switchyard continues.
"At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were operable with the exception of EDG-11 which was available vice operable due to ventilation work, and no other safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), any event that results in ECCS discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical."
EDG-11 and EDG-12 are performing all of their functions and providing power to the Division I AC buses. Temperatures are being monitored in the room containing EDG-11 and the room is not approaching any temperature limits. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1603 EDT, Fermi 2 automatically scrammed due to onsite loss of 120 kV switchyard. All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 98 inches. Division I diesels, EDG-11 and EDG-12, automatically started and loaded. HPCI and RCIC automatically started and restored RWL. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with Condensate/Feed and Control Rod Drive (CRD) systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 and 2 occurred as expected. Investigation into loss of 120 kV switchyard continues.
"At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were operable with the exception of EDG-11 which was available vice operable due to ventilation work, and no other safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), any event that results in ECCS discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical."
EDG-11 and EDG-12 are performing all of their functions and providing power to the Division I AC buses. Temperatures are being monitored in the room containing EDG-11 and the room is not approaching any temperature limits. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48310
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHAWN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHAWN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/14/2012
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 20:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2012
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 20:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"[At] 2025 [EDT] reactor tripped on 'C' Steam Generator Low Low Level due to feed water regulating valve failing closed due to a 7300 process cabinet card failure. Control Room entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
"Emergency Feedwater actuated due to the Low Low Steam Generator Level. All other plant equipment functioned as expected. Plant is being stabilized in mode 3.
"Emergency News Manager will update the states and local media.
"NRC Resident Inspector was notified at 2045 [EDT]."
The trip was uncomplicated and all rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves. Electrical buses are powered by offsite power.
"[At] 2025 [EDT] reactor tripped on 'C' Steam Generator Low Low Level due to feed water regulating valve failing closed due to a 7300 process cabinet card failure. Control Room entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
"Emergency Feedwater actuated due to the Low Low Steam Generator Level. All other plant equipment functioned as expected. Plant is being stabilized in mode 3.
"Emergency News Manager will update the states and local media.
"NRC Resident Inspector was notified at 2045 [EDT]."
The trip was uncomplicated and all rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves. Electrical buses are powered by offsite power.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48311
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HARRIS WELT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HARRIS WELT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/15/2012
Notification Time: 03:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 19:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2012
Notification Time: 03:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2012
Event Time: 19:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO INDICATIONS ON REACTOR VESSEL HEAD DURING DYE PENETRANT TEST
"On September 14, 2012, during the Byron Station Unit 1 refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned Liquid Penetrant (PT) examinations performed on two previous overlay repairs of the reactor vessel head do not meet applicable acceptance criteria. Both penetrations require repairs prior to returning the vessel head to service. These indications are not in the reactor coolant pressure boundary; however they are very near the previously repaired J-groove weld. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to ensure the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. No ultrasonic indications have been identified at this time. Repairs are currently being planned, which will include buff of the rejectable area and retest, and will be completed prior to returning the vessel head to service. If retest of the rejectable areas is unacceptable, then additional repairs will be required prior to returning the vessel head to service.
"This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. Any further examination failures and repairs will be updated under this ENS Notification.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The original indications that led to the two overlay repairs were discovered during ultrasonic testing and were reported to the NRC and assigned EN #46686.
"On September 14, 2012, during the Byron Station Unit 1 refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned Liquid Penetrant (PT) examinations performed on two previous overlay repairs of the reactor vessel head do not meet applicable acceptance criteria. Both penetrations require repairs prior to returning the vessel head to service. These indications are not in the reactor coolant pressure boundary; however they are very near the previously repaired J-groove weld. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to ensure the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. No ultrasonic indications have been identified at this time. Repairs are currently being planned, which will include buff of the rejectable area and retest, and will be completed prior to returning the vessel head to service. If retest of the rejectable areas is unacceptable, then additional repairs will be required prior to returning the vessel head to service.
"This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. Any further examination failures and repairs will be updated under this ENS Notification.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The original indications that led to the two overlay repairs were discovered during ultrasonic testing and were reported to the NRC and assigned EN #46686.